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ABSTRACT 
The clash between religious belief and sexual orientation has become a key flashpoint in 
modern rights struggles. A decade after the first recognition of lesbians and gay men in UK 
equality law, the conflict continues to be played out in domestic courts and in the European 
Court of Human Rights. This conflict is a microcosm of the wider relationship between 
law, religion and homosexuality, and the discursive techniques deployed by legal and 
political actors – of which liberal rights discourse plays a key role. This thesis uses a 
Foucaultian-informed Queer lens to analyse the discourses and underpinning structures that 
limit the inclusion of non-heterosexuals in the public sphere.  
Recent case law has highlighted a shift in religious conservative discourse, which now 
disavows homophobia while seeking reasonable accommodation of religious rights and 
conscientious objection to homosexual equality in employment and the provision of goods 
and services. This perpetuates the notion that religion deserves special treatment because 
of a necessary relationship between religious belief and disapproval of homosexuality. This 
binary approach not only negates the experience of Queer religious people; it also masks 
the state’s constructive delegation of homophobia through religious exemptions to equality 
law. These effects represent harms to gay people, constituting degrading treatment contrary 
to Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights. 
Liberalism’s universal human subject of rights was constructed through the 
heteronormative and theonormative prism that still permeates equality law. Queer theory’s 
problematisation of the liberal rights paradigm offers a useful challenge to established 
norms and to the supposed neutrality of the state when adjudicating between conflicting 
rights. This thesis represents my contribution to the conversation between liberalism and 
Queer theory. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
For the master’s tools will never dismantle the master’s house. They may allow us to 
temporarily beat him at his own game, but they will never enable us to bring about genuine 
change.
1
  
Equality in 2016: the queer, the cross and the closet 
In 2016, it may appear that the struggle for same-sex equality has been won. The UK no 
longer criminalises
2
 homosexuality or prevents discussion of it in state educational 
settings.
3
 Sexual orientation is recognised as a subject of hate speech
4
 and hate crime.
5
 The 
2010 Equality Act, which consolidated and replaced previous equalities legislation
6
, lists a 
series of protected characteristics,
7
 of which sexual orientation is one, as is religion. Direct
8
 
discrimination against people with protected characteristics is always illegal, as is indirect
9
 
discrimination – a provision, criterion or practice that has the effect of disadvantaging a 
protected characteristic - where it cannot be justified.  There is also a general duty on local 
                                                          
1
 Audre Lorde, Sister Outsider: Essays and Speeches (2
nd
 ed, Crossing Press 1984), 110  
2
 Partial decriminalisation was achieved by the Sexual Offences Act 1967 s 1; it was not until the Sexual 
Offences Act 2003 that full decriminalisation was achieved.  
3
 Section 28 of the Local Government Act stated that a local authority ‘shall not intentionally promote 
homosexuality or publish material with the intention of promoting homosexuality’ or ‘promote the teaching 
in any maintained school of the acceptability of homosexuality as a pretended family relationship’. It was 
repealed by virtue of the Local Government Act 2003 s 122, although a significant number of MPs – 
including the former Prime Minister, David Cameron – voted against the repeal. Concerns have been raised 
over the de facto return of Section 28; see for example Nigel Morris, ‘The return of Section 28: Schools and 
academies practising homophobic policy that was outlawed under Tony Blair’ The Independent (London, 19 
August 2013)  
4
 The Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008 amended Part 3A of the Public Order Act 1986. The 
amended Part 3A introduces the offence of inciting hatred on the ground of sexual orientation. 
5
 Hate crime is defined as ‘any criminal offence which is perceived, by the victim or any other person, to be 
motivated by a hostility or prejudice towards someone based on a personal characteristic.’ See H Corcoran, D 
Lader and K Smith Hate Crime, England and Wales, 2014/15 Statistical Bulletin 05/15 13 October, 2. The 
Criminal Justice Act 2003 s 146 (as amended) provides for increased sentences for hate crime.  
6 Equal Pay Act 1970; Sex Discrimination Act 1975; Race Relations Act 1976; Disability Discrimination Act 
1995; Employment Equality (Religion or Belief) Regulations 2003; Employment Equality (Sexual 
Orientation) Regulations 2003; Employment Equality (Age) Regulations 2006; Equality Act 2006; and 
Equality Act (Sexual Orientation) Regulations 2007 
7 Equality Act 2010 Section 4 
8 Equality Act 2010 Section 13 
9 Equality Act 2010 Section 14 
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authorities to promote equality.
10
 Since 2014, lesbians and gay men have been able to 
marry;
11
 indeed, the former Prime Minister, David Cameron, cited the passage of marriage 
equality legislation as one of his ‘proudest achievements’.12  
These victories are important and overdue. However, they have not been without legal and 
discursive costs to gay people, nor do they signify the eradication of homophobia from the 
legal system. Both the Equality Act 2010
13
 and the Marriage (Same-Sex Couples) Act 
2013
14
 contain religious exemptions and concessions, legitimising the view that religious 
belief justifies special treatment, even when such treatment facilitates and endorses 
discrimination against lesbians and gay men. Since the extension of protection to sexual 
orientation in the fields of employment and the provision of goods and services, further 
religious challenges to same-sex equality continue to be played out in domestic courts
15
 
and in the European Court of Human Rights,
16
 invoking the right to privacy (Article 8); to 
freedom of religion (Article 9); to freedom of expression (Article 10); and the requirement 
that Convention rights be enjoyed without discrimination (Article 14).  
Religious antipathy to non-heterosexuals has been prevalent throughout history, largely 
through norms both established and justified through religious texts and religiously 
informed moral codes: ‘From Hammurabi’s ancient Babylonian code to the New 
Testament to the Quran, one sees a common disdain towards women, slaves and 
                                                          
10 Equality Act 2010 Section 149 
11
 Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Act 2013 
12
 Nick Duffy, ‘David Cameron: Same-sex marriage was one of my proudest achievements in 2014’ Pink 
News (London, 10 January 2015) 
13
 Special provisions apply to religious organisations vis-à-vis homosexuality in employment (Schedule 9) 
and in the provision of goods and services (Schedule 23).  
14
 The Act contains provisions that amount to a ‘quadruple lock’ designed to ‘promote’ religious freedom: 
religious organisations must ‘opt-in’ to solemnise same-sex marriage in places of worship (ss 4-6); no-one 
can be forced to opt-in (s 2 (1)); no anti-discrimination law will be contravened by not opting-in (s 2(6)); and 
the Churches of England and Wales are unable to opt-in at all. 
15
 See for example Bull v Hall [2013] UKSC 73; Ladele v Islington LBC [2010] 1 WLR 955; McFarlane v 
Relate Avon Ltd [2010] EWCA Civ 880 
16
 See for example Eweida and others v UK [2013] ECHR 37 
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homosexuals’.17 Despite a recent survey indicating that the UK is the sixth most tolerant of 
forty nations towards homosexuality,
18
 exemptions from anti-discrimination law granted 
on the basis of religion
19
 retell an ancient story that something is wrong with same-sex 
desire. This suggests that Christian moral ideas pertaining to the body and desire have been 
encoded into legislation, and continue to permeate legal discourse. 
However, there has been a shift in conservative religious discourse over time; there has 
been a move away from explicit disdain of homosexuality in favour of arguments based on 
rights instead. Conservative religious organisations and individuals are employing the 
language of rights more often than their traditional language of morality, perhaps 
recognising that ‘where the State accords particular rights to those who are religious it does 
so, not because of the fact of their religious identity, but because they are secular 
citizens’.20 This discursive shift means that religious conservatism is able to disavow 
homophobia while seeking ‘reasonable accommodation’ of religious rights and 
‘conscientious objection’ to homosexual equality in arenas such as marriage, adoption, 
employment and the provision of goods and services. Indeed, the clash between religious 
belief and same-sex desire has now become a key flashpoint in modern rights struggles. 
This flashpoint has inspired the main question posed by this thesis: how should law 
adjudicate conflicts between sexual orientation and the expression of religious belief? 
The UK is a signatory to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), and 
domestic legislation must be ‘read and given effect in a way which is compatible with the 
                                                          
17
 Micheline R Ishay, The History of Human Rights: From Ancient Times to the Globalization Era 
(University of California Press 2004), 6  
18 This is a survey of public opinion, not legal treatment of homosexuality: Global views on Morality, Pew 
Research Center <http://www.pewglobal.org/2014/04/15/global-morality/table/homosexuality/> accessed 20 
April 2014 
19 Equality Act 2010 Schedule 9 (employment) and Schedule 23 (provision of goods and services) 
20
 Anthony Bradney, Law and Faith in a sceptical age (Routledge-Cavendish 2008), 53   
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Convention rights’21 wherever possible. Article 9(1) of the Convention provides for 
freedom of religion (including no religion), conscience and belief; Article 9(2) allows 
member states to place limits on religious expression as are necessary to protect, inter alia, 
the rights and freedoms of others. Thus ‘freedom of religion… is constituted through the 
distinction between belief and manifestation’.22 Religious conservatives have criticised this 
distinction, countering that their own rights are compromised by restrictions on the 
expression of faith in public life: in effect, their religiosity is being closeted by the law. 
Such a closeted state has historically been the burden of lesbians and gay men, but the 
public/private distinction accorded to religious expression has persuaded some that both 
religion and sexuality are equally capable of being ‘closeted’ by the law.23 This attempt to 
draw a parallel between religious and sexual orientation rights is based on a false 
equivalence. Religious people are not closeted in terms of who they are; rather, they are 
limited in how they express their beliefs, if such expression limits the rights and freedoms 
of others.  
The danger is that discriminatory attitudes towards lesbian and gay people may be 
(re)popularised under the guise of accommodating the expression of religious faith. As 
Stychin concedes, the ‘language of rights lends itself to anti-gay arguments which not only 
employ rights talk, but which can mirror the arguments advanced by progressive actors’.24 
Equality law has been criticised for creating a ‘hierarchy of rights’,25 for secularising the 
law by restricting religious freedom,
26
 and for failing to make reasonable accommodation 
                                                          
21
 Human Rights Act 1998 s 3(1) 
22
 Carl Stychin, ‘Faith in the Future: Sexuality, Religion and the Public Sphere’ (2009) Oxford Journal of 
Legal Studies, 729, 730 
23
 See for example Carl Stychin [n 22] 
24Carl Stychin, ‘Faith in Rights: The Struggle Over Same-Sex Adoption in the UK’ (2008) Constitutional 
Forum Constitutionnel 17, 12 
25
 Clearing the Ground inquiry: Preliminary report into the freedom of Christians in the UK (Christians in 
Parliament February 2012) www.eauk.org/clearingtheground (accessed 11 May 2016)  
26
 Julian Rivers ‘The secularisation of the British constitution’ (2012) Ecclesiastical Law Journal 14(3) 371 
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for the expression of religious belief, or for claims of religious conscience.
27
 The resulting 
restrictions on the liberty of people who attempt to live out their faith mean that, for 
religious conservatives, ‘the right for religious groups and individuals to discriminate on 
grounds of sexual orientation is narrow and increasingly reducing’.28 There is also a related 
discourse that lesbian and gay people have achieved ‘enough’ equality;29 that gay rights are 
now being applied too widely and are restricting the freedom of the religious to manifest 
their faith. Sexual orientation may now be a protected characteristic, but there remains a 
conservative Christian religious discourse that homosexuality may exist, as long as it is 
“not in my hotel30, registry office31 or counselling room”.32  
Research framework 
This thesis offers a critique of rights discourse in conflicts between religious belief and 
sexual orientation. The research analyses how legal and political actors have framed the 
conflict in the context of equality law in the United Kingdom, through Parliamentary 
debates on statute law, parties’ arguments and judges’ decisions in domestic and European 
case law, and academic discussion. The historical importance of rights-based arguments 
for advancing LGBT equality is recognised, but the limitations of such arguments are also 
highlighted. The religious conservative idea of a ‘hierarchy of rights’ represents a 
misappropriation of rights language; its proponents have cherry-picked from Western 
                                                          
27
 See for example Lee v Ashers Bakery and others [2015] NICty 2  
28
 Russell Sandberg ‘The Right to Discriminate’ (2011) Ecclesiastical Law Journal 13(2) 157, 181 
29
 Chris Brickell, ‘Whose “Special Treatment”? Heterosexism and the Problems with Liberalism’ (2001) 
Sexualities 4(2), 211 
30 Bull & Bull v Hall & Preddy [2012] EWCA Civ 83; Bull and anor v Hall and anor [2013] UKSC 73; Black 
v Wilkinson [2013] EWCA Civ 820 
31 Ladele v Islington LBC [2010] 1 WLR 955; Eweida & Others v UK [2013] ECHR 37 
32 McFarlane v Relate Avon Ltd [2010] EWCA Civ 880; Eweida & Others v UK [2013] ECHR 37  
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liberal discourse in order to assert, in Hohfeldian terms,
33
 a ‘privilege’ on the part of some 
religious groups and individuals to be exempt from anti-discrimination law.  
The research will focus on the conflict between Christianity and homosexuality, as this is 
the arena in which the cases in question are being fought and appealed. Recent challenges 
to equality law from other religions have been more about achieving their own recognition 
as religious people than about conflict with lesbians and gay men.
34
 It can be argued that 
non-Christian faiths are seeking to be recognised in a society where the dominant and 
normative faith is Christianity. The discussion will focus on those Christian organisations 
and individuals involved in the recent legal conflicts. The research also considers the 
resistances to hetero- and theo- normativities presented by those religious individuals and 
groups who are challenging the binary of religion versus homosexuality.  
Research questions 
The overarching question that this thesis aims to answer is how should law adjudicate 
conflicts between sexual orientation and the expression of religious belief? The thesis also 
aims to address three sub-questions as part of its answer to this overarching question. 
These sub-questions are: 
1. How are heteronormativity and theonormativity expressed in UK equality law? 
2. How central is the concept of harm to resolving the conflict between religion and 
sexual orientation? 
3. How might UK law finally realise sexual citizenship for lesbians and gay men? 
                                                          
33
 Wesley N Hohfeld (1919) ‘Fundamental legal conceptions as applied in judicial reasoning : and other legal 
essays’ < http://archive.org/stream/fundamentallegal00hohfuoft/fundamentallegal00hohfuoft_djvu.txt> 
accessed 30 September 2013  
34  See for example Begum v Denbigh High School (2006) UKHL 15 
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This thesis asks, how should law adjudicate conflicts between sexual orientation and the 
expression of religious belief? It is a normative question, and as such is part of a much 
broader discussion as to what sort of society we want, and what role law should play in 
securing it. The inquiry is situated within modern Western liberal democracy and so the 
research necessarily engages with liberal legal philosophies. Although framing the research 
in terms of conflict locates the inquiry within the prevailing discourse in this debate, the 
aim of this thesis is to move beyond it. The discussion will be developed further to argue 
that the conflict represents something more than the notion of competing rights.  
This conflict raises many of the central questions of legal liberalism: freedom, equal rights, 
and harm. However, the conflict also provides valuable insights into how legal norms are 
created and sustained, and how they change. This conflict is a microcosm of the wider 
relationship between law, religion and homosexuality, and the discursive techniques 
employed by legal actors – of which rights discourse plays a key role. The task of this 
thesis is to identify and critique the discourses and societal structures that compromise the 
belonging of non-heterosexuals.  
This task will be achieved through consideration of the three sub-questions. First, how are 
heteronormativity and theonormativity expressed in UK equality law? This question is a 
critical step and a ground-clearing exercise for examining the constellation of liberal 
concerns in the context of power and subordination. As Mouffe explains in her discussion 
of liberalism and pluralism,  
There cannot be a pluralism which accepts all differences. We must be able to 
determine which differences should exist within a liberal regime, because these 
differences are necessary for the realization of principles of liberty and equality… 
8 
 
But [some] should never be accepted because [they] would create relations of 
subordination which are not acceptable within a pluralist society.
35
  
A political and legal regime that professes to be concerned with equality should attend to 
those parts of the law that compromise equal citizenship, dignity and security by 
legitimising heterosexism and homophobia. This analysis paves the way for the second 
sub-question: how central is the concept of harm to resolving the conflict between religion 
and sexual orientation? The effects of heteronormativity and homophobia on gay people 
are first examined through an analysis of harm. The classic liberal position
36
 is considered, 
along with Raz’s ‘perfectionist liberal’ critique,37 Feinberg’s analysis of harm to others,38 
and Judith Jarvis Thomson’s discussion on harm, distress and belief.39 Thereafter, Kendall 
Thomas’s concept of constructive delegation of power in US anti-sodomy legislation40 is 
applied to UK equality law, concluding that religious exemptions constitute constructive 
delegation of homophobia. Conscientious objection, viewed in terms of power relations, is 
one example of the state’s constructive delegation of homophobia to individual religious 
conservatives. 
Finally, the thesis considers how might UK law finally realise sexual citizenship for 
lesbians and gay men? A Foucaultian-informed Queer lens will be used, through which to 
identify and critique the discourses and underpinning structures that limit the inclusion of 
non-heterosexuals in the public sphere, including the impact of socio-economic status on 
sexual citizenship. Queer theory’s general reluctance – or even refusal – to tackle 
                                                          
35 Chantal Mouffe, ‘On the Itineraries of Democracy: An Interview with Chantal Mouffe’ (1996) Studies in 
Political Economy 49, 131, 136 
36
 See for example John Stuart Mill On Liberty (Penguin Classics, 1985 [1859]) 
37
 Joseph Raz, ‘Autonomy, Toleration and the Harm Principle’ in R Gavison (ed) Issues in Contemporary 
Legal Philosophy (Clarendon, 1987) 
38
 Joel Feinberg, The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law Vol. 1: Harm to Others (Oxford University Press, 
1984) 
39
 Judith Jarvis Thomson, The Realm of Rights (Harvard University Press, 1990) 
40
 Kendall Thomas, ‘Beyond the Privacy Principle’ (1992) Columbia Law Review 92, 1431 
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normative jurisprudential questions has been criticised.
41
 Other commentators have argued 
that anti-normativity (resisting any prescription) need not follow from counter-normativity 
(challenging established norms); the value Queer places on autonomy and diversity means 
that normative commitments do animate its theory.
42
 Furthermore, the continued existence 
of lesbian and gay inequality suggests a need for both a ‘non-essentialist conceptualisation 
of rights’ – which is a central concern of Queer theory – and a ‘more interventionist state’, 
which has been of less interest.
43
 Accordingly, ‘Queer and liberal theory need to converse 
with each other’,44 particularly in the current debate where issues of rights, and the state’s 
role in determining these rights, are highlighted. This thesis is a contribution to the 
conversation by offering a ‘critical and strategic engagement’45 with rights discourse. 
Homophobia in 2016: terrorism, state sponsorship, and religious exemptions 
In June 2016, a young man perpetrated a mass shooting in a gay nightclub in Orlando, 
USA, killing 49 people and injuring 53 more. It was subsequently revealed that he was a 
Muslim who had been radicalised, but who also appeared to be struggling with his own 
sexuality.
46
 The Orlando massacre was both a terrorist attack and a homophobic attack.
47
 
Yet much of the media seized on the terrorism aspect, to the extent that the mass murder of 
gay people was redrawn as an attack ‘against human beings’ and ‘the freedom of all people 
                                                          
41
 Nicholas Bamforth, Sexuality, Morals and Justice (Continuum, 1997), 229; Steven Seidman, Difference 
Troubles: Queering Social Theory and Sexual Politics (Cambridge University Press, 1997), 160  
42
 Aleardo Zanghellini, ‘Queer, anti-normativity, counter-normativity and abjection’ (2009) Griffith Law 
Review 18 (1), 1, 9 
43
 Momin Rahman, ‘Sexuality and rights: problematising lesbian and gay politics’ in Terrell Carver and  
Véronique Mottier (eds) Politics of Sexuality: Identity, Gender, Citizenship (Routledge, 1998) 79, 87 
44
 Zanghellini [n 42], 14 
45
 Ben Golder, ‘Foucault’s Critical (Yet Ambivalent) Affirmation: Three Figures of Rights’ (2011) Social 
and Legal Studies 20(3), 283, 286 
46
 Eric Heinze, ‘Internalised homophobia: the exception or the paradigm?’ (Critical Legal Thinking, 15 June 
2016) <http://criticallegalthinking.com/2016/06/15/internalised-homophobia-exception-paradigm/> accessed 
9 September 2016 
47
 Terrorism is defined as ‘the use of violent acts to frighten the people in an area as a way of trying to 
achieve a political goal’; homophobia is defined as ‘irrational fear of, aversion to, or discrimination against 
homosexuality or homosexuals’. See <http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/terrorism> and 
<http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/homophobia> , both accessed 9 September 2016 
10 
 
to try and enjoy themselves’.48 This disavowal of the homophobic nature of the attack 
enabled commentators to locate the event firmly within the narrative of Islamist-inspired 
threats to Western liberal freedoms. Further, by painting the killer as someone with mental 
health problems, whose religion prevented him from accepting his sexuality, the liberal 
West excused itself from having to examine its own attitude towards same-sex desire.  
One month earlier, the International Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans and Intersex 
Association (ILGA) published a global report
49
 on state-sponsored homophobia. The ILGA 
report found that, out of 193 UN member states, 73 states (and five non-UN entities) 
criminalise same-sex sexual relations, with the death penalty applied in 13 states (or parts 
thereof).  At least 17 states have ‘propaganda’ laws outlawing the promotion of 
homosexuality; and seven states uphold ‘morality’ laws restricting the expression of 
lesbian, gay and bi sexualities. Criminalisation of homosexuality is concentrated in the 
Middle East and parts of the global south, again enabling the West to position itself as 
more enlightened than the rest of the world; a place where lesbians and gay men can be 
told ‘aren’t you lucky you’re not in Uganda?’50  
The underlying message to a non-heterosexual is that ‘unless I am being thrown in prison 
or herded onto a cattle train, then it is not homophobia’.51 Such messages have proved 
useful for conservatives, particularly religious conservatives, in their crusade against same-
                                                          
48
 Owen Jones, ‘On Sky News last night, I realised how far some will go to ignore homophobia’ The 
Guardian (London, 13 June 2016) 
49
 Aengus Carroll, State-sponsored Homophobia. A world survey of sexual orientation laws: criminalisation, 
protection and recognition  (11
th
 ed, updated to June 2016, ilga.org) 
<http://ilga.org/downloads/02_ILGA_State_Sponsored_Homophobia_2016_ENG_WEB_150516.pdf> 
accessed 8 September 2016 
50
 Panti Bliss, ‘All the little things’ TEDx Dublin < https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hIhsv18lrqY> 
accessed 25 March 2015. See also the discussion on how ‘homonationalism’ has been used to describe how 
gay politics have been used to bolster Islamophobic discourses that present Muslim cultures as sexually 
backward and oppressive: JK Puar, Terrorist Assemblages: Homonationalism in Queer Times (Duke 
University Press, 2007). For a critique of ‘homonationalism’ see Aleardo Zanghellini, ‘Are Gay Rights 
Islamophobic? A Critique of Some Uses of the Concept of Homonationalism in Activism and Academia’ 
(2012) Social and Legal Studies 21(3), 357. 
51
 Panti Bliss, ‘Panti's Noble Call at the Abbey Theatre’ 
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WXayhUzWnl0> accessed 15 February 2014  
11 
 
sex equality. The disavowal of homophobia has been used by the religious right in the 
West as both a shield and a sword against equality campaigners. For example, in 2014 the 
Irish television station, RTÉ, staved off legal action by agreeing a financial settlement with 
some opponents of same-sex marriage, after a gay rights campaigner and drag queen had 
described them on television as homophobic, because they had actively campaigned for 
gay people to be treated less favourably.
52
 Her comment on this is worth reproducing at 
some length: 
So now Irish gay people find ourselves in a ludicrous situation where not only are 
we not allowed to say publicly what we feel oppressed by, we are not even allowed 
to think it because our definition has been disallowed by our betters… I have been 
denounced from the floor of parliament to newspaper columns to the seething 
morass of internet commentary for “hate speech” because I dared to use the word 
“homophobia”. And a jumped-up queer like me should know that the word 
“homophobia” is no longer available to gay people. Which is a spectacular and neat 
Orwellian trick because now it turns out that gay people are not the victims of 
homophobia – homophobes are.53 
The disavowal of homophobia by religious conservatives has been partly facilitated by 
their success in reframing the conflict as a clash of rights. Rights claims on sexual 
orientation grounds have largely been either for equal benefits or access, or an end to 
discrimination. On the other hand, religion-based claims seek exceptions so that religious 
individuals or organisations do not have to abide by rules which apply to others. Thus the 
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discourse of rights has been increasingly used by religious conservatives, but in pursuit of 
an aim that is unlike other rights claims, namely ‘the right to deny equal, inclusive 
treatment for queer people… where services are being offered to, or even on behalf of, the 
public’.54 The following section offers an analysis of the role of liberal rights discourse in 
the conflict between religion and sexual orientation. 
 An analysis of liberal rights discourse 
Conceptualising the conflict in terms of rights has left many legal actors ‘staring blankly at 
conflicting claims’55 and attempting to balance these rights. Several commentators insist 
that religion deserves special consideration. For example, it has been said that there is 
something distinctively burdensome about the denial of a religious exemption,
56
 and that it 
is wrong to force religious individuals to participate in practices they regard as 
unconscionable.
57
 Religion has been characterised as an object of ‘strong evaluation’ that 
should be accorded government protection.
58
 Counter-arguments have criticised religion as 
a culpable form of unwarranted belief,
59
 the consequences of which should be borne by the 
believers themselves.
60
 It has been suggested that we might assess how far the person 
claiming the exemption is responsible for the beliefs that cause her to be burdened. The 
more an individual is responsible for putting herself in a situation where she comes into 
conflict with the law, the more her case for an exemption is weakened.
61
 However, 
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religious belief can be the result of early indoctrination, so responsibility is a complex 
issue.
62
 
It becomes clear that framing the issue in terms of rights has led to a zero-sum game and 
has resulted in compromise becoming a figural term in the discourse. For example, Stychin 
has argued for a ‘fact-specific approach which is sensitive to the rights in a particular 
context, and which focuses upon the values of accommodation, tolerance and mutual 
respect’.63 Eisgruber and Sager64 argue that there should be no privilege accorded to 
religion, but that religion should be protected from discrimination due to the particular 
vulnerability of religious minorities.  Malik concludes that, while there is no perfect 
resolution, it may be possible to develop ‘a set of principles that encourage a balance 
between the values of religious freedom, free speech and equality’.65 The value of such 
exhortations, beyond rhetoric, is not clear. However, the difficulty experienced by legal 
liberalism is illustrated by how uneasily it wears its neutral face when a conflict of rights 
arises.  
This difficulty can be attributed, at least in part, to the fault line that runs through Western 
liberal thought: the concept of universal rights, held by subjects who embody an 
‘anthropological constant – an atemporal and universal human essence’66 – that provides 
the basis for rights claims. Moreover, universal rights, as illustrated in the preceding 
discussion, are ‘sooner or later entangled in their own contextual particularism and are 
                                                          
62
 See the general criticism of raising children within a religion put forward by Richard Dawkins, The God 
Delusion (Bantam Press, 2006), 382  
63
 Carl Stychin, [n 22], 729 
64
 Christopher Eisgruber and Lawrence Sager, The Vulnerability of Conscience: Religious Freedom and the 
Constitution (Harvard University Press, 2006) 
65
 Maleiha Malik, ‘Religious freedom, free speech and equality: conflict or cohesion?’ (2011) Res Publica 
17(1), 21 
66
 Ben Golder [n 45], 284 
14 
 
incapable of fulfilling their universal function’.67 This is because liberalism’s focus on 
formal rights largely ignores how differences are socially constructed. Throughout history, 
societies have walked an uneasy line between ideas of a common humanity and norms 
justifying differential treatment for certain moral sub-categories in the taxonomy of the 
human species. Norms established through the prism of religiously-inspired disdain 
influenced the law and determined who was entitled to participate fully in civic society.  
The liberal Enlightenment in the eighteenth century saw the ambition of a common 
humanity become more figural in Western legal and political discourse, and with this 
ambition came the idea of universal human subject of rights.  However, the creation of any 
subject logically requires the corresponding creation of a non-subject or Other, against 
whom the subject can be favourably compared.
68
 The universal legal subject – the 
beneficiary of human rights – was constructed as white, male, heterosexual, and indeed, 
Christian. This is why the Enlightenment’s assumption of a universal human subject, and 
the subsequent human rights movement, came to be criticised by those who recognised that 
the liberal ambition of a universal rights-bearing human subject was far from all-
embracing.  
 In the United Kingdom in the 21
st
 century, the line between the subject of legal rights and 
the Other has moved, to the extent that lesbians and gay men, as we have seen, now have 
unprecedented civil rights. However, liberalism’s universal subject was constructed 
through a heteronormative and theonormative prism that still permeates equality law. The 
reluctance to recognise homophobia, and the law’s willingness to allow faith-based 
exclusion of gay people, is facilitated by the endurance of both hetero- and theo-
normativity in law.  
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Heteronormativity 
Legal discourse has the power to shape sexual subjectivities: ‘law constitutes and 
regulates, punishes and self-disciplines’.69 This power is found in equality law; the very 
framework of anti-discrimination law requires an ‘other’ to use as a comparator with 
reference to an established norm. Under the Equality Act, discrimination on grounds of a 
protected characteristic is established with reference to a standard comparator. People of 
colour, women, people with disabilities, non-heterosexuals and those who do not conform 
to gender binaries are compared to the universal legal subject. Equality law thereby grants 
protection to those ‘others’ who have been able to show that they are sufficiently ‘like’ 
white, male heterosexuals in order for the comparator to be meaningfully deployed.
70
  
For example, in the ‘bed and breakfast’ cases,71 the focus was on the equivalence of 
marriage and civil partnership, and the comparator was a heterosexual married couple – the 
very paradigm of heteronormativity. With the exception of Lady Hale,
72
 the Supreme 
Court had very little to say about the implications of religious exemptions for sexual 
citizenship. There was no recognition of the heteronormativity implicit in the equivalence 
of heterosexual marriage and homosexual civil partnerships. In effect, homosexual 
relationships are considered suitable for legal protection if they mirror traditional 
heterosexual ones.  
Heteronormativity (and the related term, heterosexism), then, assumes that ‘heterosexuality 
is the normative form of human sexuality… the measure by which all other sexual 
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orientations are judged.’73 In the current debate, the prevailing rights-based discourse 
largely neglects the construction of sexuality. Even liberal, democratic societies are based 
on a hierarchy of sexuality (as opposed to the ‘hierarchy of rights’ as claimed by religious 
conservatives), with non-heterosexual desires construed as deviations from the given norm. 
Maintaining a distinction between sexualities, without questioning the structures and 
discourses behind them, confirms heterosexuality’s normative status.74 As a consequence, 
state accommodation of religious expression, which discriminates against lesbians and gay 
men in the public sphere, serves to maintain heteronormativity and homophobia.
75
  
Today, the Master of the Rolls – the head of the civil judiciary and the second most senior 
judge in England and Wales – is a gay man.76 Yet the judiciary has a history of 
heteronormativity, and the perception of homophobia still lingers. For example, until 1991 
unmarried men and women – including lesbians and gay men – were not permitted to 
become judges. More recently, research by the lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender legal 
group Interlaw found that 70% of LGBT lawyers believe there is prejudice within the 
selection process for judicial office.
77
  
The concept of heteronormativity continues to be useful in questioning the prevailing 
heterosexual norm and challenging homophobia. However, the concept can also be 
something of a distraction from discussions of how the politics of sexuality include issues 
of race and class, which is why some argue that ‘queer critique needs to move beyond its 
focus on the heteronormative if it is to capture emerging modalities and ambivalence of 
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inclusion and exclusion’.78 Part of the task of this thesis is to consider how sexual 
orientation equality is compromised through the privatization of citizenship, through the 
decimation of the post-war welfare state and the increasing role of the market. The thesis 
also considers how sexual orientation equality is threatened by religion’s role in this 
process with faith organisations increasingly plugging the gap in public service provision.  
Theonormativity 
In a similar vein, theonormativity exists ‘when theism is the default, the standard, and 
everything else is a deviation from this norm’.79 The extent to which theism has been 
socially constructed as ‘real’ is under-appreciated. The noun ‘atheist’ itself is defined with 
reference to ‘theist’.80 Even the atheist sentiment ‘I don’t believe in God’ carries with it an 
assumption of theonormativity. The word ‘god’ is invariably capitalised, in contrast to 
those subjects of worship from other cultures (both historical and present).  We do not say 
‘I don’t worship any gods’ or ‘I don’t believe in your god.’ So the idea of a god is 
pervasive, even in liberal discourse. This thesis argues that it is dangerous to allow this 
theonormative assumption to go unchallenged. It not only continues to permeate our 
lawmaking;
81
 it is also precisely what creates a space for ‘conscience’ talk to be used by 
religious conservatives.
82
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The relationship between law and religion can be characterised as ‘the vicarious rule of the 
church’, ie the Church of England.83 In a recent speech,84 Sir James Munby (President of 
the Family Division) criticised the ‘dominant influence wielded by the Christian churches 
historically’: 
Although historically this country is part of the Christian west and, although it has 
an established church which is Christian, we sit as secular judges serving a multi-
cultural community of many faiths, sworn to do justice ‘to all manner of 
people’. We live in this country in a democratic and pluralistic society, in a secular 
State not a theocracy. 
Unfortunately, there exists a series of factors which together compromise Munby’s idea of 
a secular British state. The legal and political system is still steeped in Christianity. The 
House of Lords contains 26 Church of England Bishops, termed the Lords Spiritual. The 
judicial oath contains the phrase ‘I do swear by almighty God…’.85 At the commencement 
of the legal year, judges attend a service at Westminster Abbey – a tradition which ‘dates 
back to the middle ages when judges prayed for guidance at the start of the legal term… 
The service includes prayers, hymns, psalms and anthems; the Lord Chancellor reads a 
lesson.’86 The previous Attorney General recently stated that Christianity remains ‘a 
powerful force in this country’.87  The former Communities and Local Government 
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Minister, Eric Pickles
88
 and the former Faith and Communities Minister, Sayeeda Warsi
89
 
each made public statements endorsing this sentiment during their times in office. The 
former Education Secretary, Nicky Morgan stated that part of her political mission is ‘to 
remember the word of God and serve the Lord’.90 These factors, combined with the 
presence of 26 Bishops in the House of Lords, indicate that Munby LJ was somewhat 
optimistic.  
Theonormativity has been further entrenched with the passage of the Local Government 
(Religious Observances) Act 2015, which provides for the right of all local authority 
councils to hold prayers at the start of their meetings, and also to support any religious 
event or any event with a religious element.
91
 Pickles described the new law as a victory 
for ‘freedom to worship over intolerant and aggressive secularism, for long-standing 
British liberties over modern-day political correctness, and for parliamentary sovereignty 
over judicial activism’.92 His words tie religious faith to British liberty and to 
parliamentary sovereignty, whereas secularism – ‘the separation of religion and state’93 – is 
cast as the ‘intolerant and aggressive’ force, while ‘activist’ judges are represented as a 
threat to democracy. Terms such as ‘British liberties’ and ‘political correctness’ function as 
empty signifiers in order to enhance the populist appeal of the legislation, by absorbing 
whatever meanings that readers want to impose upon it.
94
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This approach fails to understand that legal interpretation is essentially political. As the 
liberal theorist Dworkin acknowledged, ‘There can be no useful interpretation… that is 
independent of some theory about what political equality is and how far equality is 
required by justice... reliance on political theory is not a corruption of interpretation but 
part of what interpretation means’.95 The point here is not to reduce law to politics, but 
instead to recognise the politics internal to law – the politics within legal doctrine. This 
politics may have entered law decades earlier or longer ago, but it no longer appears as 
politics because its political aspects have been lost or rendered invisible. ‘Apolitical’ law 
simply acts out this apoliticality, while in some respects being political to the core.
96
 It 
could therefore be helpful, and more intellectually honest, to put one’s politics on the table. 
This thesis will examine the extent to which the conflict between religion and sexuality has 
scratched away law’s apolitical veneer. It will also consider the role of law in society; 
whether law is neutral or whether its role is to intervene to uphold certain values and 
principles – and if so, to explain which, and why.97  
At present, the combined effect of hetero- and theo- normativities means that laws 
purporting to offer same-sex equality – but with limitations and religious exceptions – 
offer little more than a ‘promise of a solution’.98  The ‘master’s house’ in the quote at the 
beginning of this chapter is a helpful allegory as to why. If we visualise law as the master’s 
house, we can recognise how heteronormativity and theonormativity have shaped its 
construction. Arguments based entirely within a liberal rights-based framework are akin to 
using the master’s tools to effect repairs: plastering over cracks while failing to notice that 
the whole building is damaged. This damage consists of the hetero- and theo- normativities 
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already outlined, but also damage on a more structural, socio-economic level. Further, the 
framing of struggles around sexuality as ‘merely cultural’99 serves to mask ‘the real 
economic situation of poverty and discrimination that affects lesbians and gay men on a 
daily basis’.100 The following section highlights the importance of socio-economic status to 
sexual citizenship for lesbians and gay men. 
One of our equalities is missing: the socio-economic equality duty 
The legal victories won in the wake of equalities legislation meant that, on the face of it, 
lesbians and gay men could feel entitled to participate in society without fear of exclusion. 
However, as Stychin observes in his discussion of issues arising from the 2007 
Regulations, ‘It is all too easy to defend sexuality rights that have been achieved, without 
critically engaging in the politics of these victories.’101 The Regulations ‘protect our rights 
as consumers in a capitalist society’102 and such protection is never going to be equally 
distributed under capitalism. Under capitalism we are all consumers, but we cannot all 
consume equally. Economic and social benefits continue to be determined by social class 
in particular, and also by factors such as educational background, skin colour, gender and 
location.
103 
Moreover, equality legislation in general glosses over structural inequality in 
favour of individuals who possess certain protected characteristics.  
The protection of sexual orientation in the provision of goods and services has highlighted 
the position of gay people as citizens in a consumer, capitalist society, and the extent to 
which they are able to participate – as gay people – in the quotidian activities of everyday 
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life without encountering faith-based homophobic resistance. This thesis contends that 
class has an important – and under-examined – effect on access to full citizenship in a 
consumer-oriented society. An understanding of class is crucial to any genuine 
appreciation of systemic subordination and advantage under capitalism. The liberal focus 
on individual rights blurs the issues that still prevent lesbians and gay men from 
participating fully in public space, and fails to link the struggle for gay equality with 
broader issues of social justice.  
Part 1 of the Equality Act 2010 sets out a public sector duty regarding socio-economic 
equalities, whereby ministers, government departments and local authorities ‘must, when 
making decisions of a strategic nature about how to exercise its functions, have due regard 
to the desirability of exercising them in a way that is designed to reduce the inequalities of 
outcome which result from socio-economic disadvantage’.104 However, this part of the Act 
was not brought into force by the previous Coalition government, and remains listed as 
‘prospective’.105 Even if it were to be implemented, as Bob Hepple points out, ‘it would 
not confer any private right of action on individuals, and there would be formidable 
obstacles in the way of seeking judicial review for an abuse of the public body’s use of 
discretionary powers’.106 This means that, at present, equality law is not a vehicle through 
which socio-economic equality can be achieved. This is one reason why equality law can 
be criticised as being less a means of ensuring genuinely transformational, societal equality 
and more ‘a market of rights, competitively asserted as against other market actors’.107  
Equality law, then, is concerned primarily with individual protection against 
discrimination. This individualism has, in turn, enabled religious conservatives to 
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appropriate the language of identity.
108
 Identity-based movements for race, sex and 
sexuality equality historically sought to establish oppressed-group identities in order to 
campaign for official recognition and protection.
109
 Religious conservatives now assert a 
religious identity in order to preserve their desire to discriminate against gay people. As 
Stychin observes, ‘the very language of oppression has now been fully appropriated’ by 
those opposed to equality for lesbians and gay men.
110
 Furthermore, this valorisation of 
individual freedom appeals to both of the philosophies which underpin Western society: 
(neo)liberalism and capitalism. As D’Emilio observes, ‘two of the most wildly successful 
identity movements of the last generation have been evangelical Christians and the filthy 
rich’.111 The echo of Margaret Thatcher’s mantra ‘there is no such thing as society’112 
persists in a political regime that favours individual enterprise and small government. The 
combination of religious freedom and business freedom is exemplified by the rise of 
conscience-based arguments being deployed by individual goods and service providers to 
justify excluding lesbians and gay men. The debate has now become about the rights of 
business owners and other individuals, rather than about the hetero- and theo- norms that 
pervade society.  
Class (as a shorthand for socio-economic status) has been overlooked in the mainstream 
debates, yet an analysis of class is necessary, because ‘without an analysis and appreciation 
of systemic subordination and advantage, a progressive politics can become 
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directionless’.113 Class can be viewed as an ‘organising principle’ similar to race, age, 
disability, gender – indeed, to many of equality law’s ‘protected characteristics’.114 These 
organising principles affect how power is exercised wherever it operates in society.
115
 
Power relations determine the ability of some sections of society to do things that others 
are unable to. Class is not a protected characteristic because law views it as lacking the 
requisite categorical fixity. This view is itself informed by the ideology of meritocracy and 
social mobility.
116
  Yet one’s class – particularly one’s socio-economic status – has an 
impact on one’s choices as to how public space, in its broadest sense, can be accessed. This 
has implications for lesbian and gay citizenship. As Vaid puts it, 
… homophobia does not originate in our lack of full civil equality. Rather, 
homophobia arises from the nature and construction of the political, legal, 
economic, sexual, racial, and family systems within which we live. As long as the 
rights-oriented movement refuses to address these social institutions and cultural 
forces, we cannot eradicate homophobic prejudice.
117
 
This illustrates the limits of civil rights, which are ‘principally mechanisms to gain access, 
not means to implement fundamental social change’.118 This is particularly important when 
one considers the current government’s ideologically-driven decimation of state-funded 
public services, in favour of a programme of privatisation and voluntarisation. Liberal 
democracy has gone from state-building (such as the post-war welfare state) to state-
dismantling. It can thus be argued that we should be somewhat suspicious of the 
government’s supportive stance on sexual orientation equality. It represents a diversion 
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from the government’s war on public spending: ‘The primary goal of the political elite is to 
starve the public sector to death’.119 Gay rights do not cost ‘the taxpayer’ money, so they 
are acceptable to a government whose main concern is to extinguish demands made on the 
state through public provision.  
In the course of this thesis, the government’s LGBT-friendly image will be contrasted with 
its ideological commitment to austerity and a small state. The government’s unwillingness 
to allocate state resources to welfare (in its broad sense) has heralded an increase in 
voluntary and charity provision. This has, in turn, provided opportunities for faith groups 
to be directly involved in service provision, providing more scope for religious influence 
over working-class, poor and disabled people. The thesis will also contrast the image of 
“gentrified” gays with the experience of average gay people who want to be able to 
participate in average activities such as booking hotel rooms and buying cakes. It aims to 
demonstrate how ‘conscience’ discourse threatens to bring about a re-emergence of the 
closet for LGBT people.  
Chapter outline 
Chapter 2 reviews and engages with the liberal literature on rights but also aims to move 
beyond it. A Foucaultian critical analysis of rights is concerned with a central question that 
liberalism tends to overlook: that of power. It may be tempting to view the development of 
rights as an inevitable process, but a more accurate view is that this development occurred 
in the context of particular social and political circumstances.
120
 Language can be used to 
preserve the status quo of power relations, and to privilege some groups while oppressing 
others. A Foucaultian analysis of equality and power recognises the discursive effects 
produced by and within legal discourse, including those of subordination. Foucault’s 
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concept of power as a complex network of relations existing at a given time, in a given 
society
121
 informs the analysis of how relations of power are revealed in the current debate. 
Consideration is also given to how rights can be viewed within a Foucaultian critique as 
‘conduits’ – as ‘modes for distributing capabilities and forms of power and influence – thus 
shaping behaviour as much as constraining it’.122 Finally, the review examines the 
literature on citizenship generally and on sexual citizenship in particular. Following 
Hubbard’s suggestion that ‘a basic right of citizenship is the right to access and use 
specific kinds of space within a given territory,’123 the thesis argues that religious 
exemptions exert boundaries on spaces which exclude gay people, and thus render them 
less than full citizens.  
Chapter 3 explores the theories informing the methodology in more detail, drawing on 
Foucault; on Queer theory more broadly; and on other writers in the field of discourse 
theory, such as Laclau and Mouffe.
124
 Discourse theory is influenced by poststructuralism, 
which recognises that language is not a stable, unchanging and totalising structure.
125
 Our 
ways of talking do not neutrally reflect our world, identities or social relations, but rather 
play an active role in creating, limiting and changing them. Our access to reality is always 
through language; language generates and therefore constitutes the social world, and so 
changes in the discourse are the means by which the social world itself is changed.
126
 
Contrary to the Enlightenment view, “truth” is not neutral: ‘Truth operates through the 
exclusion, marginalisation and even prohibition of other truths. Power is exercised through 
the production and dissemination of truth’.127 This is what Foucault means by his concept 
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of productive power: ‘power produces; it produces reality; it produces domains of objects 
and rituals of truth. The individual and the knowledge that may be gained of him belong to 
this production’.128 The methodology chapter builds on the discussions in the review of the 
literature in Chapter 2, and goes on to set the groundwork for subsequent chapters.  
Chapter 4 analyses the discourses within recent conflicts and the surrounding legal and 
political arguments. The chapter charts the growth of religious rights-based discourse, 
which represents both a shift away from morality-based arguments and a reanimation of 
older homophobic tropes. It examines the Parliamentary debates during the passage of 
equality legislation and the jurisprudence of domestic courts and the European Court of 
Human Rights (ECtHR) in subsequent case law. To the casual observer, it appears that 
lesbian and gay people are “winning” the battle against manifestations of religious belief 
which discriminate against them, causing religious believers to suffer as a consequence.
129
 
However, even as “victory” is toasted, there are discursive costs. Liberal law’s reluctance 
to address relations of subordination has left swathes of religious discrimination 
untouched. Furthermore, a liberal rights-based approach can and often does fail even when 
it succeeds, because of what is lost in the law reform moments. The chapter concludes with 
a consideration of possible future discursive directions, as a result of resistances to the 
current binary of religion versus homosexuality.   
Chapter 5 builds on the preceding chapter and critiques the concepts of ‘reasonable 
accommodation’ and ‘conscientious objection’ as justifications for faith-based exemptions 
from anti-discrimination legislation, focusing on their grounding in the heteronormative 
and theonormative discursive fields. It looks in some detail at the discursive techniques 
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deployed in the report of the Christians in Parliament Group, Clearing the Ground.
130
 
MacDougall and Short draw a useful distinction between forms of religious 
accommodation: 
Religious accommodation is desirable when it facilitates inclusion and does not 
entail exclusion for others. Otherwise it constitutes a claim for exceptionalism and 
an ability to exclude others from the usual social and economic fabric. A person 
ought not to be permitted to make his or her inclusion dependent on the exclusion 
of another.
131
 
This chapter acts as a bridge between the analysis of legal discourse in Chapter 4 and the 
examination of the link between homophobia and harm in Chapter 6. It contends that 
‘reasonable accommodation’ and ‘conscientious objection’ operate, in terms of power 
relations, as harmful homophobic weapons dressed up in the guise of religious equality 
rights. 
Chapter 6 considers the harm caused to lesbians and gay men by discrimination and 
homophobia. Thomas’s study of US anti-sodomy laws led him to conclude that the main 
question is not about individual rights but about political power relations; this chapter 
draws on his arguments to reach a similar conclusion regarding UK equality law. Adopting 
Foucault’s characterisation of power, Thomas argues that homophobic violence perpetrated 
by citizens can be viewed as ‘constructive delegation of power’ by the state to those 
citizens, because private relations have public origins and public consequences.
132
 
Religious exemptions and arguments from conscience in equality law implicate the state in 
the perpetration and perpetuation of homophobia, through constructive delegation of power 
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to religious organisations and individuals. The problem is exacerbated by the ideologically-
driven programme of austerity and the consequent slashing of social welfare spending, 
with religious organisations forming part of the voluntary sector plug in this social support 
gap. 
The discussion in Chapter 6 includes analysis of the impact of socio-economic inequalities 
on lesbians and gay men and the increasing influence of faith organisations in service 
provision in the wake of cutbacks to LGBT services. The chapter analyses the extent to 
which Thomas’s approach reveals similar issues for the liberal state in the current conflict 
between religious expression and sexual orientation. When religious organisations take on 
an active role in civil life, it can be argued that ‘such involvement is quasi-governmental in 
nature, and ought therefore to be subject to the same constraints that would be imposed on 
a government engaged in such an operation’.133  It argues that religious exemptions from 
equality law takes gay people below a baseline of equal citizenship, and the liberal state 
has a responsibility to address this problem. It suggests, further, that they constitute 
‘degrading treatment’ contrary to Article 3 ECHR.  
Chapter 7 focuses on the Ashers Bakery case,
134
 for which the appeal judgment is currently 
pending. It uses the case to explore in more detail the implications of heteronormativity, 
theonormativity, socio-economic inequality, citizenship and conscientious objection. 
Foucault’s concept of pastoral power is used to analyse the state of equality in Northern 
Ireland
135
 and the relationship between conservative religion and conservative politics. The 
chapter also offers a Queer critique of the construction and marketisation of a purported 
“gay identity”. For example, to what extent has the movement for sexual orientation 
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equality been appropriated by individualist consumerism? Has capitalism’s fascination 
with ‘the pink pound’ become a tool for ‘pinkwashing’ genuine equality for lesbians and 
gay men?
136
 These questions are relevant in challenging the assumption that gay people 
wield significant economic power, and so gay rights issues are ‘merely cultural’,137 rather 
than also economic. It can be argued that sexuality rights operate through pinkwashing to 
cloak the effects of aggressive capitalism. Finally, Chapter 8 draws together the arguments 
presented throughout the thesis and restates its contribution to knowledge in this field.  
Contribution to knowledge 
This thesis provides an original contribution to the question of how law should adjudicate 
conflicts between sexual orientation and the expression of religious belief. 
Notwithstanding the gains that have been made in terms of same-sex equality, the thesis 
argues that non-heterosexuals continue to be stalked by what can be characterised as the 
“four horsemen of homophobia”: war, famine, pestilence and death.138 War - because 
religious conservatives have often adopted such language to describe their experience vis-
à-vis extensions to gay equality.
139
 Famine - because cutbacks to public spending have 
impacted on LGBT support services, with faith-based organisations increasingly filling the 
gap in provision.
140
 Pestilence - because old tropes of homosexual infection and corruption 
of youth still persist.
141
 Finally, death - because conservative religious attempts to curtail 
sexual citizenship have the effect of causing gay people to be ‘socially dead’.142 
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Claims for reasonable accommodation and conscientious objection perpetuate the fallacy 
that religion deserves special allowances because of a purported necessary relationship 
between religious belief and disapproval of homosexual acts.
143
 This binary approach not 
only negates the experience of Queer religious people; it also masks the state’s 
constructive delegation of homophobia through religious exemptions to equality law. 
These effects represent harms to gay people, constituting degrading treatment contrary to 
Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights. Further, Part 1 s 1(1) of the 
Equalities Act should be brought into force, so that ministers, government departments and 
local authorities ‘must, when making decisions of a strategic nature about how to exercise 
its functions, have due regard to the desirability of exercising them in a way that is 
designed to reduce the inequalities of outcome which result from socio-economic 
disadvantage’. 
The former Archbishop of Canterbury recently admitted the culpability of the Anglican 
Church in homophobic discrimination:  
I think the church has to put its hands up and say our attitude towards gay people 
has at times been appallingly violent. Even now it can be unconsciously patronising 
and demeaning… We have to face the fact that we’ve deeply failed a lot of gay and 
lesbian people, not only historically but more recently as well.
144
  
This thesis suggests ways that the Church and the state can stop failing lesbians and gay 
men in the future. The thesis focuses on lesbians and gay men because the legal disputes so 
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far have been fought on this basis; however, it recognises that bisexual and trans people are 
also subject to discrimination from religious conservatives. The arguments pertaining to 
hetero- and theo- normativities; to harm, degrading treatment and ‘social death’; and to 
socio-economic inequality can also apply to bisexual people, trans people, and other 
members of broader queer communities. The thesis contributes to the ongoing discussion 
between liberal and Queer theories, and informs the development of Queer legal theory.  
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CHAPTER 2: RIGHTS, IDENTITY AND CITIZENSHIP 
A kiss is not just a kiss when it is performed by a same-sex couple in an everyday location.
1
  
This chapter reviews some of the vast liberal literature on rights, with particular reference 
to religious belief and sexual orientation, and highlights some of the dead ends that have 
been reached in attempts to resolve the conflict between them. It also interrogates the 
assumptions regarding religious and sexual identities, using Queer theory to challenge 
some of the traditional understandings of identity. Finally, the chapter considers the debate 
regarding how religious expression and sexuality should be treated in the public sphere. It 
examines the literature on citizenship generally and on sexual citizenship in particular, 
recognising that ‘a kiss is not just a kiss’ when it is performed by non-heterosexuals in 
public space. Following Hubbard’s suggestion that ‘a basic right of citizenship is the right 
to access and use specific kinds of space within a given territory,’2 the thesis argues that 
religious exemptions exert boundaries on spaces which exclude gay people, and thus 
render them less than full citizens.  
These discussions provide the basis for the argument that ‘reasonable accommodation’ of 
religious desire to discriminate on sexual orientation grounds fails to acknowledge fully (or 
at all) the costs of so doing for non-heterosexuals.  Therefore, this chapter addresses the 
ethical-political issue of establishing those costs. It also aims to move beyond questions of 
rights and identity towards questions of power. Foucault’s concept of power as a complex 
network of relations existing at a given time, in a given society
3
 informs the analysis of 
how relations of power are revealed in the current debate. In this context, rights can be 
understood as ‘conduits’ – as ‘modes for distributing capabilities and forms of power and 
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influence’.4 The influence of power relations on the concepts of rights, identity and 
citizenship, and the knowledges produced by them, has been overlooked in traditional 
liberal theories. This chapter therefore provides a basis for the methodological discussion 
in Chapter 3. 
Human rights in context 
It is tempting to view the development of rights – and rights language – as an inevitable 
process. The website of the human rights organisation, Liberty, describes the Human 
Rights Act 1998 as ‘rooted in British culture and history... a proud, 800-year old family 
tree’.5 The image evoked of rights as a venerable oak tree, with its roots grounded firmly in 
our soil, is an attractive one. However, conceptualising history as a progressive journey of 
human rights fails to recognise that previous events left open diverse paths to the future, 
rather than paving a single road towards the current position. It can be tempting to view the 
development of rights as an incremental process, but a more accurate view grounds it in the 
context of particular social and political circumstances.  Perhaps human rights are ‘best 
understood as survivors’,6 as they came to prevail due mainly to the collapse of previous 
political ideologies, not unlike the triumph of one combination of genes over another in 
Darwin’s metaphorical ‘tree of life’.7  
Political theories and movements are formed and developed within social and historical 
contexts. This has implications for rights. As Douzinas suggests, rights may not be the 
outcome of intrinsic human traits but are rather a contingent development which will 
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wither away as the need for them expires.
8
 Rights may therefore be symptomatic of a 
problem that needs to be overcome, rather than a solution to problems.
9
 Further, if human 
rights can be understood as contingent, this has implications for the concept of “humanity” 
itself. Being human does not necessarily involve a shared, transcendent essentialism whose 
meaning is constant. Rather, our understanding of what it means to be human is a product 
of the discourses within society at a given time.
10
  
Indeed, the ‘human’ rights being protected were in fact created by various agreements and 
declarations
11
 throughout history, as a response to both the zeitgeist and the state’s needs at 
the time. As Appiah notes, ‘When the American colonists declared it to be “self-evident” 
that they had inalienable rights to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness, they sought to 
make it so’.12 It can be argued that such extravagant assertions were necessary in order for 
humanity to succeed “God” as the new locus of meaning. Nature was an early justification 
for rights; god provided an authority; and the state eventually became the benefactor, 
restrictor and protector of the human. The irony is that the human rights project accepts 
modernity’s rejection of religious transcendence, while relying on a transcendence 
principle for the construction of rights.
13
 
Human rights: a universal moral embrace or a means of exclusion? 
Rights and equality share a connection in Western liberal thought. Western rights discourse 
generally understands equal rights as a matter of treating like people alike. The Christian 
legacy here is notable; St Matthew’s gospel commands that ‘whatever you wish that others 
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would do to you, do also to them’,14 as is the focus is on treating others as you (ie not they) 
would like to be treated. Behind this understanding is the presumption of a fundamental 
sameness. The understanding is that everyone is viewed as equal before the law, with equal 
rights and protections, which purport to offer all people equal opportunities.
15
 The 
discourse of equal rights has become embedded into Western politics,
16
 with the concept of 
respect for equal worth, dignity and identity playing a central role in modern discussions. 
The discursive focus is on the intrinsic value of individuals by virtue of their human 
existence.
17
 Equality in Western rights discourse, then, is grounded on the very fact of 
being alive.
18
  
This thesis, instead, supports the contention that ‘equality is not an independent, objective 
or self-evident characteristic, but is a socially constructed phenomenon’.19 As part of this 
construction process, rights were historically bound up with notions of exclusion; women, 
people of colour and non-heterosexuals have suffered greatly from political, social and 
economic exclusion. For example, slavery was abolished in the USA in 1865, but it was 
another hundred years before the right to vote did not depend on skin colour.
20
 In Britain, 
women had to wait until the end of the First World War to be enfranchised.
21
 Moreover, it 
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was not until the mid-1970s that it became illegal in Britain to discriminate on the grounds 
of gender
22
 or ethnicity.
23
 
Interestingly, as women achieved greater emancipation, “effeminate” men were 
increasingly regarded as a threat, as Greenberg notes:  
The preservation of male domination in the face of women’s aspirations to equality 
depended on men possessing qualities that clearly differentiated them from women. 
It consequently became necessary to police men who lacked those qualities just as 
women who exhibited them.
24
 
Gay men did not begin to benefit from a change in official attitudes towards homosexuality 
until the Wolfenden Report
25
 was published in 1957, and it was not until the Sexual 
Offences Act 1967 that consensual male same-sex practices underwent partial 
decriminalisation. It took another forty years for British LGBT people to gain rights under 
the Equality Act (Sexual Orientation) Regulations 2007 and later the 2010 Equality Act. 
The modern history of homosexual exclusion is discussed in more detail in Chapter 4; for 
the purposes of this review, it is useful to consider the origins and subsequent early 
development of homosexual exclusion. 
Origin and development of homosexual exclusion 
Lesbians and gay men have consistently been “othered” throughout history, particularly 
through the influence of religion on the wider ruling structure. The Bible castigates both 
adulterous women and homosexuals, viewing their “sins” as morally equivalent. This 
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might suggest that the basis of both inequalities is grounded in notions of family
26
 and also 
in heterosexism. Heterosexism (or heteronormativity), as discussed in Chapter 1, ‘denotes 
prejudice in favour of heterosexual people… rooted in a largely cognitive constellation of 
beliefs about human sexuality’.27 However, this thesis questions the assumption that 
religion is special, and that there is a necessary link between religious belief and the need 
to discriminate on sexual orientation grounds. Indeed, it can be argued that the history of 
lesbian and gay oppression provides revealing examples of the confusion of religious 
beliefs with popular prejudice.
28
 For example, in the Christian New Testament, God’s 
wrath against the unrighteous is described at length in Romans 1: 18-32. Verse 26 is often 
cited as evidence against homosexuality: 
… God gave them up to dishonourable passions. For their women exchanged 
natural relations for those that are contrary to nature; and the men likewise gave up 
natural relations with women and were consumed with passion for one 
another,  men committing shameless acts with men and receiving in themselves the 
due penalty for their error.
29
 
On the face of it, this passage states that homosexuality is contrary to the word of the 
Christian god. However, in his study of the interpretation of Romans 1: 18-32, Martin 
accuses modern religious scholars of being disingenuous when they claim that their 
distaste for homosexuality is simply an application of the ‘biblical view’.30 Martin 
concludes that modern accounts of Romans I represent a ‘classic case of homophobia’, 
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which is not surprising because ‘oppressive ideologies have always in the modern world 
masqueraded as objective descriptions of the way things are’; these ideological accounts 
‘participate in a cultural homophobia… that pervades much of modern Western culture and 
expresses itself in discourses about sexuality, institutionalized marginalization of lesbian 
and gay people, and social structures that discriminate against them’.31 This is a good 
example of Foucault’s critique of the supposed neutrality of truth, discussed in Chapter 1.  
It is worth examining in a little more detail what these passages from Romans actually 
mean. In order to do so, it is necessary to go back to classical Greece and ancient Rome. 
Classical moralists viewed homosexuality as having the same origins as heterosexuality; 
the problem was ‘not to do with a disoriented desire, but with inordinate desire. Degree of 
passion, rather than object choice, was the defining factor of desire’.32 The idea of 
excessive desire is important in ancient Greek philosophy, which tended to value 
“moderation” as evidence of self-control and thus fitness to govern. So the original notion 
of something being ‘contrary to nature’ was because natural desires had been indulged in 
excessively.  
Ancient Greco-Roman moralists considered homosexual sex to originate from the same 
desire that motivated heterosexual sex. Male attraction to beautiful males was considered 
“natural”, and homosexual desire was not itself ‘contrary to nature’. Same-sex intercourse, 
however, was assumed to spring from an excess of desire, and allowing desire to exceed its 
bounds leads to actions “beyond nature”, in the same way as a glutton does not have 
inherently perverted desires, but has indulged those desires to excess. Homosexual sex 
does not have procreation as its goal, and also disrupts the male-female hierarchy, and this 
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is why it was considered in the classical period as being ‘contrary to nature’.33 The idea of 
‘excessive desire’ is particularly interesting because it echoes modern religious 
conservative claims that lesbians and gay men now enjoy “excessive equality”. The 
following section looks at how the classical notion of natural law came to be infused with a 
Christian morality which persists in law today, and which has had a major influence in the 
Western concept of rights. 
From nature to natural law 
The classical cosmopolitanism of the Stoics in ancient Greece is usually presented as the 
catalyst for modern, universalist conceptions of rights.
34
 For example, Socrates believed 
that goodness was universal, refuting the Sophists’ claim that ideas of goodness and justice 
depended on the customs of each society; Cicero looked to universal laws that transcended 
customary and civil laws, endorsing the Stoic notion of a ‘citizen of the whole universe’.35 
The Stoics believed that human beings contained a “divine spark”, enabling them to live in 
accordance with nature. The universe had been designed, or ordered, in a particular way, 
and natural law was the means by which humanity could live in harmony with the 
universe.
36
  However, over time, the classical concept of natural law became infused with a 
Christian version of universalism, and natural law thereby came to be synonymous with 
“divine command”. Law thus became intertwined with morality. 
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St Augustine (354-430 CE) played a crucial role in the redefinition of law during the late 
antiquity period. Considered to be the first Christian philosopher, St Augustine developed a 
theory of justice in which justice came to mean the love of the highest good, or god. As a 
result of the Fall of Adam in the Garden of Eden, whereby he disrupted the perfect order 
established by god, humanity is damned to endure eternally. According to Augustine, the 
state is a divinely ordained punishment for fallen humanity, serving the divine purposes of 
punishing the wicked and rewarding the righteous.  The state also acts as a panacea for the 
effects of the Fall, in that it serves to maintain such order as is possible for fallen humanity 
to enjoy in the present world.
37
 The concept of “original sin” meant that it was impossible 
for secular law and justice to redeem people from evil; the state, unlike Augustine’s god, 
had no intrinsic legitimacy. Nearly a millennium later, Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274 CE) 
synthesised original classical teachings with Christianity in his development of Canon 
(ecclesiastical) law. Aquinas’ concept of justice was built on the need for repression of sin 
and atonement for guilt. He reworked the rediscovered works of the classical Greek 
philosopher, Aristotle, and reframed his understanding of homosexuality, so that it came to 
mean “unnatural” in the sense of “sin”.38 Over time, a secularised version of Christian 
ethics came to influence the development of a broad liberal discourse on human rights.  
During the seventeenth century, humanity replaced god at the centre of the universe, and 
theories of the limits of state power over its citizens reflected this development. Thomas 
Hobbes believed that politics could only achieve peace if feuding citizens empowered the 
state to rule over them. In Leviathan, Hobbes departed from Cicero’s classical concept of a 
“social spirit” which is found naturally and universally in humanity. Instead, he 
hypothesised a ‘state of nature’ where ‘nothing can be Unjust’ in this ‘warre of every man 
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against every man’.39 A rational human being would survive and thrive in this state of 
nature by acting according to the laws of nature. Having excised ideas of the common good 
from his theory of law, Hobbes’ Golden Rule became ‘do not that to another, which thou 
wouldst not have done to thy selfe’ (1996: 79).40 We can see here another incarnation of 
neo-Christianity, and an early illustration of the tension between security and rights-
balancing.  
In the twentieth century, Finnis’ modern restatement of natural law postulated a series of 
basic human goods, one of which was religion.
41
 His approach has been criticised for being 
used to support the Catholic Church on a range of controversial moral issues.
42
 For 
example, Finnis argues that, while the state should refrain from persecuting individuals on 
the basis of their sexual orientation, it should nevertheless deter public approval of 
homosexual behaviour. Finnis grounds his argument not on the claim that homosexual sex 
is ‘a crime against nature’,43 but on the idea that gay sex cannot involve a union of 
procreation and emotional commitment and is therefore an assault on heterosexual union.
44
 
Finnis’ attitude to ‘sexual orientation’ (the fact that he uses quotation marks here is 
telling), was reflected in Christian-right discourse during the recent same-sex marriage 
debates.
45
 Section 1(3) of the Marriage (Same-Sex Couples) Act 2013 provides that Canon 
law on same-sex marriage – that marriage is the union of one man with one woman – is 
exempt from the centuries-old requirement that ‘no Canons shall be contrary to… laws or 
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statutes of this realm’.46 As Johnson and Vanderbeck point out, such a divergence between 
Canon and statute law is without direct equivalence since the 16
th
 century, and ‘until such 
time as it chooses to solemnise same-sex marriage and amend its Canon law, the Church of 
England can continue to assert a heteronormative framework of marriage in English law’.47 
These examples illustrate the point made in Chapter 1, that changes in the discourse are the 
means by which the social world itself is changed. The ‘truth’ of what the ancient Greeks 
understood as natural law was modified through the centuries into a Christian ‘truth’, 
which in turn has shaped the Western understanding of law and morality. This thesis views 
these ‘truths’ through the prism of power relations and the knowledges that are produced 
through these relations. To repeat Foucault’s observation, power ‘produces reality; it 
produces domains of objects and rituals of truth. The individual and the knowledge that 
may be gained of him belong to this production’.48 The next section moves on to examine 
the production of ‘the homosexual’ through the power/knowledge axis.  
The construction of the homosexual 
In his analysis of the development of sexuality, Foucault argued that ‘the homosexual’ was 
theorised into existence:  
Sodomy was a category of forbidden acts; their perpetrator was nothing more than 
the juridical subject of them. The nineteenth century homosexual became a 
personage, a past, a case history, and a childhood, with an indiscreet anatomy and 
possibly a mysterious physiology… The sodomite had been a temporary aberration; 
the homosexual was now a species.
49
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Current equality law conceptualises homosexuality as ‘being’, whereas faith is still seen as 
a ‘doing’. For example, Article 9(1) ECHR provides for freedom of religion and belief, but 
Article 9(2) places restrictions on the manifestation (the ‘doing’) of that belief where, inter 
alia, it conflicts with the rights and freedoms of others. However, religion seems to view 
homosexuality as ‘doing’, whereas faith is seen as ‘being’.  Nevertheless, religion was 
never medicalised and categorised in the same way as homosexuality was. In fact, Stychin 
has argued that law actually ‘desires’ the homosexual as an ‘other’ against which society 
may coalesce.
50
 This also raises an issue about the vulnerability of heterosexuality, to the 
extent that it needs bolstering. Part of this discourse on ‘the homosexual’, therefore, 
involves viewing sexuality as fixed. As Weeks notes, traditionally ‘sexuality pinned you 
down like a butterfly on a table’.51 In fact, the notion that sexuality might have been fluid 
or subject to choice had previously been part of homophobic discourse.
52
 Gay rights 
campaigns have historically characterised homosexuality as having a fixed quality in order 
to counteract this homophobia and assert rights to equality. However, Queer theory has 
challenged the idea of an immutable or essential sexuality,
53
 and this challenge will be 
examined next. 
It is a testament to heteronormativity that researchers do not seek to establish the “cause” 
of heterosexuality, while several studies
54
 have sought to determine the “cause” of same-
sex desire. These researchers were mindful that gender and sexuality stereotypes have not 
been helpful in promoting respect for gay people, or in enabling those who do not conform 
to stereotypes to feel comfortable in their gender and sexuality identities. They believed 
that the findings were important for those concerned with the mental health of sexual 
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minorities, as poor mental health in gay populations is partly due to societal stigma and 
victimisation.
55
 However, this research is not a complete explanation. In the first instance, 
it fails to account for bisexuality, or for people who move between sexualities.  
Research by Kinsey
56
 provided the first major statistical evidence that heterosexuality and 
homosexuality are not static human sexual orientations. Sexuality is rather a continuum of 
desires and behaviours, with a large group somewhere in the middle, sharing an amalgam 
of hetero and homo-oriented feelings. The possibility of human capacity for a mixed 
sexuality was first recognised in Western literature by Freud, who considered everyone to 
be born with a ‘polymorphous perversity’,57 and that an individual’s sexual orientation 
evolves through a complex developmental process which is significantly influenced by 
familial and social factors and norms. Repression of sexuality, Freud thought, was largely 
the result of the structures of morality and authority erected by society, including 
heteronormativity and homophobia (although Freud did not use these terms). If everyone is 
born with a ‘polymorphous perversity’, there is the possibility that their sexuality could 
develop in either or both directions.  
The construction of identity 
It seems that biological foundations are limited as a basis for claiming an identity for either 
sexual orientation or religious belief; however, the degree to which each is grounded in 
biology might be thought to differ significantly.
58
 This is clear if we remember that 
biological characteristics need not also be essential ones. As Halley points out, biological 
causes determine many features of an individual, such as freckles or the ability to roll one’s 
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tongue, that are rarely, if ever, considered to define her.
59
  However, Ochs
60
 and Yoshino
61
 
suggest that both heterosexuals and homosexuals share an investment in having stable 
identities, drawing comfort from this rigid social ordering. They also have their own 
distinctive investments in stabilizing sexuality categories. For the former, it is an 
investment in heteronormativity and the retention of privilege; for the latter, it is ‘an 
investment in the retention of the immutability defense and one in the ability to form an 
effective political movement’.62 Rigid categorisation of sexuality may hold comfort even 
for those stigmatised within it, because ‘it appears to foreclose on the possibility of drifting 
back into normality and thus removes the element of anxious choice’.63  
Yet homosexuality as an identity can be both empowering and limiting.  Halperin 
highlights the paradox inherent in asserting a gay identity:  
Gay identity is absolutely necessary, essential, and crucial, because it is perennially 
threatened by denial, refusal, suppression, and ‘invisibilization’… But gay identity 
is also dangerous, even treacherous. It is an identity which must be ceaselessly 
resisted and rejected, precisely because it normalizes and polices sexuality, because 
it functions to contain sexual and social difference, both in heteronormative culture 
at large and in lesbian and gay culture in particular. It is a politically catastrophic 
identity insofar as it enables society serenely to manage sexual diversity and in fact 
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to stabilize and consolidate heterosexual identity itself (which would be a much 
more fluid, unstable and insecure entity without gay identity to shore it up).
64
  
It is true that emerging lesbians and gay men often find solace in the existence of a gay 
identity. However, as Tatchell observes, ‘gay identity is the product of anti-gay repression. 
If one sexuality is not prioritised or privileged over another, defining oneself as gay (or 
straight) will cease to be necessary and have no social relevance or significance’.65 
Yoshino is correct to suggest that the increased visibility of bisexuality could have 
transformative consequences for how sexual orientation is viewed, both politically and 
legally. Tatchell goes further and imagines a future where differences in sexual orientation 
no longer matter: 
Once homophobia declines, we are bound to witness the emergence of a 
homosexuality that is quite different from the homosexuality we know today. With 
the strictures on queerness removed, more people will have gay sex, but less of 
them will identify as gay. This is because the absence of homophobia makes the 
need to assert and affirm gayness redundant.
66
  
The disappearance of heteronormativity and homophobia would enable people to express 
their sexualities more naturally and spontaneously. Nevertheless, it is undeniable that such 
a utopia is likely to remain a desire, rather than an actuality, for some considerable time. In 
the meantime, it seems as though a gay identity will remain important for many people, 
irrespective of whether sexuality is fixed or fluid. In the absence of utopia, it remains 
important to recognise both the necessity of identity and the importance of challenging it. 
A gay (or indeed religious) identity enables collective action, but ultimately such action 
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must be linked to wider social liberation rather than simply gaining incremental rights. In 
the context of this thesis, social liberation involves full sexual citizenship that is not 
dependent on socio-economic status.  
The preceding discussion illustrates that the question of identity is not straightforward. As 
Gallop observes, ‘identity must be continually assumed and immediately called into 
question’.67 Identity is felt to be subjectively important, but most people would probably 
struggle to define what it means objectively, not least because it carries a multiplicity of 
differences within itself.
68
 Yet identity is a major plank of the debate between faith and 
sexuality rights. Indeed, it has been argued that the question of sexual identity has taken on 
increasing importance in the West as the numbers of people actively practising a religion 
has declined: ‘In the absence of any alternative world outlook to that of religion, sexuality 
itself has become an arena for thinking about personal destiny and belonging’.69 It is 
important to examine how the meaning of both sexual and religious collective identities 
might be reshaped to better reflect the diversity of human experience.  
Collective identities 
According to Appiah, collective identities all seem to have a similar structure.
70
 A 
collective identity firstly requires ‘the availability of terms in public discourse that are used 
to pick out the bearers of the identity by way of criteria of ascription, so that some people 
are recognised as members of the group’. Then, ‘a consensus on how to identify them is 
applied, usually organised around a set of stereotypes. There is a ‘social conception’ of 
them’. At the same time, there is ‘internalization of those labels as parts of the individual 
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identities of at least some of those who bear the label’. Finally, there exist ‘patterns of 
behaviour towards the group… gender, sexuality, and racial and ethnic identity have all 
been profoundly shaped (even, in a sense, produced) by histories of sexism, homophobia, 
racism, and ethnic hatred’. Appiah concludes that identity has ethical and political 
implications: ethical because ‘it figures in identification, in people’s shaping and 
evaluation of their own lives’, and political because ‘it figures in treatment by others, and 
that how others treat one will help determine one’s success and failure in living one’s life’. 
Identity is clearly important to people, both individually and collectively. How, then, are 
these identities formed? 
Plummer
71
 charts four stages of identity formation. It begins with ‘sensitization’: an 
awareness of the possibility of being different, and moves on to ‘signification’: the 
attribution of a developing meaning to the difference. Then follows ‘subculturalization’: 
recognising oneself through involvement with others who share the difference. Finally, 
there is ‘stabilization’: full acceptance of one’s feelings and way of life. While this 
approach is useful, it does not provide the full picture. In terms of sexuality, for example, it 
is not guaranteed that either subculturalization or stabilization will occur. Societal and 
internalised homophobia and heteronormativity can prevent someone with homoerotic 
feelings from acting them out, from being part of a gay scene, or indeed ever feeling 
comfortable in their orientation. In terms of religion, it is possible that those raised in a 
religious family are less likely to undergo a sensitization or signification process unless 
they come to question their faith. Class and socio-economic status are also relevant here; 
working-class gay people may have less access to people and places that can facilitate 
subculturalization and stabilization. This is discussed further in Chapters 6 and 7.   
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The report by the Christians in Parliament Group, Clearing the Ground, posits religious 
identity as more fundamental than sexual identity.
72
 Seglow argues that it is rare for a 
person’s culture to make categorical or prescriptive demands, whereas religion tends to do 
so.
73
 Seglow appears not to realise that cultural communities (including lesbian and gay 
communities) can also impose norms on their members, however implicitly.  For example, 
lesbians who are perceived as “too feminine” can sometimes be subject to covert or even 
overt ostracism from other lesbians, for buying into society’s traditional concept of female 
beauty; on the other hand, “butch” lesbians have historically been accused of being too 
male-identified.
74
 One important difference with cultural community (as opposed to 
religious) norms is that there is no “higher authority” from which such norms are said to 
flow. By contrast, the religious subject is “grown” in the context of family upbringing, 
schooling, sacred texts, collective worship, ceremonies and rituals, and so on. Both 
religious and gay/lesbian identities may be socially constructed, but gay people are simply 
not “cultivated” and “normalised” in the same way as young people raised within a 
religious framework.  
People tend to be raised in the religion of their parents, and so as children they have little 
choice in that regard. Article 2 of the First Protocol of the ECHR also provides that the 
state must respect the right of parents’ religious convictions in respect of education and 
teaching.  This aspect of the right is closely aligned to the right to freedom of religion in 
Article 9.   However, this right is not without criticism. For example, Dawkins holds the 
view that: 
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A child is not a Christian child, not a Muslim child, but a child of Christian parents 
or a child of Muslim parents. This latter nomenclature, by the way, would be an 
excellent piece of consciousness-raising for the children themselves. A child who is 
told she is a 'child of Muslim parents' will immediately realize that religion is 
something for her to choose – or  reject – when  she becomes old enough to do so.75 
As adults we do have a choice whether to continue to place stock in religion, or prefer to 
adopt other philosophical approaches to life. In contrast, a heteronormative society tends 
not to inculcate homosexuality in its children; it actually militates against a person freely 
orienting themselves towards a homosexual or bisexual identity. If we accept this as true, 
we might conclude that to this extent Sedley LJ is justified in his distinction between 
religion and the other protected characteristics in equality law:  
… it is to be noted that the same definition is used for all the listed forms of indirect 
discrimination, relating to age, disability, gender reassignment, marriage and civil 
partnership, race, religion or belief, sex and sexual orientation. One cannot help 
observing that all of these apart from religion or belief are objective characteristics 
of individuals; religion and belief alone are matters of choice.
76
 
Yet as Davidson argues, religious belief is frequently not experienced as a choice on a 
subjective level.
77
 Apostasy contains the potential for profound existential loss, quite apart 
from the loss of family and community support. From the perspective of those who 
celebrate their religion, identity is not experienced as coercion. However, for most gay 
people, compulsory heterosexuality is experienced as coercion. This suggests that neither 
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faith nor sexuality is entirely fixed, but this does not prevent either group from placing an 
importance on their respective identities. In this regard, it appears that equality arguments 
based on identity are in danger of resulting in the same zero-sum game as arguments based 
on equal rights. One reason for this is that, as Cooper highlights, identity-based equality 
arguments can reinforce a ‘hegemonic norm against which other groups’ demands for 
equality are judged’. This is because ‘identities, desires, interests, and objectives are 
shaped by (in)equality, rather than operating as the uncontested, uncontestable site from 
which equality claims are made’.78 In other words, identity is constructed within an 
unequal society. 
The thesis has already discussed the prevailing norm of heterosexuality in Chapter 1. It is 
necessary to consider, then, to what extent society can offer genuine equality on the basis 
of sexual orientation. Cooper asks whether heteronormativity means that ‘only the most 
assimilated or familiar aspects of homosexual life and culture – those most similar to 
heterosexuality – can achieve equal recognition’.79 One response might be to separate acts 
from identities, treating identities equally but giving differential treatment to acts 
depending on their basis. Cooper acknowledges that this assumes a separation of the two, 
which may not always be possible. Indeed, evangelical Christians would say that it is not 
possible to separate the ‘being’ from the ‘doing’ of Christianity.80  
Notwithstanding this assertion, it should be possible to distinguish acts based on whether 
they respect or seek to undermine equality. Cooper gives the example of anti-fascist forces 
who are responding to a ‘prior politics of inequality – making any claim by fascists to be 
an oppressed minority absurd’.81 Conservative groups are now tending to present their 
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claims through discourses traditionally associated with vulnerable groups; it then becomes 
necessary to establish whether such groups are in fact defending privilege, as opposed to 
democracy and equality.
82
 Identity’s links with relations of power, such as 
heteronormativity, mean that identity is as much of a political question as is equality. Both 
concepts also find themselves subject to a legal gaze. It is here that we can consider the 
state’s role in prescribing the lens through which faith and sexuality are regarded.  
State neutrality and the public sphere 
Modern western liberalism envisages everyone being free to live according to their own 
conception of the ‘good life’ without state interference.83 The idea that the state should be 
neutral among competing conceptions of the good life is summed up by the liberal claim 
made by John Rawls that ‘the right is prior to the good’. Rawls’ priority of the right over 
the good in modern democratic societies means that individual rights should not be 
subsumed under the general welfare; and principles of justice must be reached 
independently of any one conception of the good. Rawls had posited a hypothetical 
‘original position’ as the basis for principles of justice, whereby citizens had to envision 
what a just society would look like from behind a ‘veil of ignorance’ so that they did not 
know in advance what their position in that society would be. This meant that, in theory, 
rights would not depend on any particular conception of the good life.
84
  
Rawls’ assessment of what is required by a democratic citizenship includes consideration 
of religion’s place in political deliberations in the public sphere. This is relevant to the 
discussion of how claims for religious exemptions from equality law should be treated, as 
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analysis of the legal debates in Chapters 4 and 5 will show. According to Rawls, religious 
reasons can be included in public deliberation on fundamental political questions, provided 
that non-religious, political reasons are subsequently offered in support as well.
85
 Rawls’ 
proviso of ‘proper’ political reasons refers to reasons based on values and ideals that he 
views as the baseline conditions for democracy, such as freedom and equality – what he 
terms an ‘overlapping consensus’.86 Therefore, religious citizens should, in addition to 
their faith-based arguments, advance corroborating ‘public’ (ie non-religious) reasons.87 
This suggests that Rawlsian liberalism would not accept discrimination against gay people 
that is grounded solely in religious belief, and appeals to conscience are not a sufficient 
excuse. 
However, Rawls’ proviso has been criticised elsewhere in the liberal literature, for 
imposing an unnecessarily heavy cognitive burden on religious citizens. The argument is 
that, in cases of conflict, strongly religious people feel somehow compelled to prioritise 
religious reasons in forming their convictions.
88
 Stychin argues that there is insufficient 
understanding of how religion is actually experienced by the faithful; a religious 
conscience is not experienced as a choice, and ‘the test of whether the manifestation of 
belief impacts upon the rights of others also may not be relevant when one is faced with 
the compulsion to act’.89 Stychin is clearly concerned that attempting to qualify the 
protection given to religion involves an unfair privatisation of the expression of belief; yet 
elsewhere he observes that there has so far been ‘little discursive space for a critique of 
religion’, which appears to – if not entirely contradict – then at least weaken the 
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persuasiveness of his concern for the religious experience. 
90
 The lack of discursive space 
for a critique of religion is another illustration of the prevalence of theonormativity. 
Habermas tries to ameliorate the purported burden on religious citizens by according 
different weight to religious reasons in public debate, depending on whether the debate is 
being held at the institutional level or at the wider level. While Habermas accepts Rawls’ 
proviso in the ‘formal’ public sphere (ie at the institutional level), he would remove any 
requirement to give corroborating public reasons in the ‘informal’ public sphere if such 
reasons were not available. Thus individual citizens, outside of the institutional arena, 
would have no duty to translate religious reasons into public reasons.
91
 Habermas’ 
alternative proviso thus places a more stringent requirement on state actors and institutions 
than on citizens in general. On his view, then, it appears that individual citizens would be 
entitled to justify anti-gay discrimination on grounds of conscience alone. It is submitted 
that, where no non-religious corroborating reasons are available, what remains is a 
religious veneer over straightforward prejudice. As a consequence, of the two liberal 
approaches, Rawls’ more stringent proviso is to be preferred to that of Habermas. 
As Lafont affirms in her critique of Habermas, ‘what is at issue is not so much whether 
religious citizens have the right to include their sincere beliefs and reasons in the informal 
public sphere, but whether they have the right to do nothing more’.92 Religious citizens 
should not be able to rely on exclusively religious justifications regarding policy questions 
because, if they wish to fulfil their democratic obligations in a plural society, ‘they cannot 
remain “mono-glots” in their political advocacy’.93 These democratic obligations are to 
treat all citizens as free and equal; and reasons advanced in support of policy during public 
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debates must be compatible with such treatment in order to be reasonably accepted by 
society.  
This is important when considering the extent to which religious reasons are taken 
seriously, even in the ‘informal’, non-institutional sphere. A theonormative society, even if 
it is not a theocracy, can nonetheless be persuaded to take religious arguments at face value 
because of the assumption that religion is special. Even if it is not accepted that there is a 
special religious compulsion to discriminate against gay people, arguments are made that 
religion is itself a secular value which is capable of contributing to the sum of human 
wellbeing.
94
 Nevertheless, research indicates that UK society is growing increasingly 
secular.
95
 As Chapters 4 and 5 highlight, moves towards secularism over the past sixty 
years or so have encouraged religious conservatives to become strategic polyglots. In 
recent years, the extension of equality law protection to gay people has spurred religious 
conservatives to couch exemption claims in the language of rights instead of creedal 
religious injunctions. They have appropriated the language of rights as a cloak to cover 
their distaste for homosexuality. 
Some advocates of gay rights have nonetheless criticised what is effectively a privatisation 
of belief in current equality law, arguing that ‘the division between public and private, and 
manifestation and belief, is a meaningless and, arguably, hypocritical distinction’.96 Here, 
it is instructive to consider the view of Laws LJ in McFarlane.
97
 He maintains that the law 
does, and must, distinguish between the protection of the right to hold and express a belief 
and the protection of the substance or content of a belief by virtue of it being a religious 
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belief. This distinction must be drawn as a condition of a free society, and it would be 
unprincipled to privilege a Christian moral position by granting it particular protection. 
The law must remain neutral, because religious faith, being unprovable, is entirely 
subjective to everyone except the believers themselves. Therefore, no-one else should be 
legally bound by such moral precepts, and it is unjustified to call upon the law to protect a 
purely religious position. To favour the subjective over the objective would be irrational 
and would also be divisive and arbitrary in a pluralistic society. He is emphatic as to the 
undesirable consequences of such an action:  
The precepts of any one religion – any belief system – cannot, by force of their 
religious origins, sound any louder in the general law than the precepts of any 
other.  If they did, those out in the cold would be less than citizens; and our 
constitution would be on the way to a theocracy, which is of necessity autocratic.  
The law of a theocracy is dictated without option to the people, not made by their 
judges and governments.  The individual conscience is free to accept such dictated 
law; but the State, if its people are to be free, has the burdensome duty of thinking 
for itself.
98
   
This is as clear a case as any for secularism in the public sphere. Yet Laws LJ is not 
arguing for a ‘closeting’ or privatisation of religious belief as such. The implication of his 
judgment is, rather, that law – in this case, equality law – should not be dictated to by 
religious belief. This may be a nice distinction, but it is important in terms of the 
conservative religious charge that current equality law has created a hierarchy of rights in 
which sexuality is privileged over religion. Where public values are concerned, one should 
look not for the lowest common denominator but the ‘highest common factor’: the set of 
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values at the core of every religious tradition and secular philosophy.
99
 Otherwise, 
arguments from faith would need to be capable of being translated into terms that others 
could understand and give rational weight to. Religiously-inspired public engagement is 
acceptable as long as it does not lead to religion being imbued with special status; it should 
be treated as any other point of view and be subject to interrogation and justification.  
There is a range of views as to whether public expression of religion is an appropriate 
vehicle for equality law at all. For example, Barry advocates complete state neutrality in 
matters of religion.
100
 He does not deny that the unequal impact of a law may indicate its 
unfairness; for example, if registrars are required to conduct same-sex marriage (or civil 
partnership) ceremonies, a conservative religious registrar might experience this as 
particularly difficult. However, Barry argues that this is never enough on its own; more 
substantiation is needed to show exactly why the law is unfair. Claims for equality should 
be reserved for rules that treat people differently on the basis of characteristics such as 
race, gender or sexual orientation. Barry views religion as a preference rather than a 
personal characteristic. Similarly, Jones
101
 asserts that people need to bear the 
consequences of their belief. Judith Thomson’s approach102 adds a further layer of analysis 
by distinguishing between distress that is mediated by belief and distress that is not. On her 
account, the state should protect against only the latter type of distress (or harm). One 
might also distinguish between belief-mediated distress that is rational and that which is 
irrational. Thomson excludes both, but the argument for exclusion seems more persuasive 
in the case of the irrational. Thomson’s arguments will be examined in more detail in the 
discussion on harm in Chapter 6. 
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However, it is important to recognise that a heteronormative society is not neutral as 
regards the value of different sexualities; and a theonormative society can be grounded on 
the assumption that religion has a place in the public sphere without the need for 
corroboration. Taking this into account, it can be argued that the very idea of neutrality is 
chimerical and the state cannot be neutral. This idea is not necessarily anti-liberal; it is the 
kind of argument advanced by ‘perfectionist’ liberals such as Raz, who proposes that 
individuals be free to adopt any idea of the good life they choose, as long as they do not 
expect that all ideas will be equally supported by the state.
103
 
One alternative approach is provided by Oakeshott, who believes that what links 
members of society is not a single substantive idea of the common good, but rather a 
‘practice of civility’, or a common language of civil interaction, which he terms 
‘respublica’.104  This approach is said to recognise both pluralism and individual liberty. 
However, as Mouffe observes, the respublica is still ‘the product of a given hegemony, the 
expression of power relations’,105 and whatever forms of agreement may be reached, they 
are always going to be partial because consensus is necessarily based to some extent on 
exclusion. In the context of this thesis, the continued existence of hetero- and theo- 
normative hegemonies has implications for homosexual equality because they shape how 
the public sphere itself is constituted. As Cooper states, ‘this leaves subordinate sexualities 
out in the cold, excluded from the public’s collective subjectivity’.106  
Mouffe proposes instead a ‘radical democratic citizenship’, under which citizenship is no 
longer just a matter of legal status but also a form of identification, based on the collective 
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recognition of the ethico-political values of liberty and equality.
107
 Mouffe’s concept of 
citizenship aims to construct a common ‘chain of equivalence’ among people’s differing 
demands, in line with a principle of democratic equivalence.
108
  On the face of it, this is an 
attractive concept, but on its own it cannot answer the protests of religious people who feel 
bound by a “higher” law. There might be difficulty establishing a chain of equivalence 
with respect to conservative religious demands concerning homosexual equality, as they so 
often seem to represent two opposing world views, each denying ‘the foundational value of 
that which the other finds foundational’.109 However, if a convincing case can be made that 
religion is not special and offers no solid basis for opposing homosexual equality, 
Mouffe’s idea may itself prove to have potential.  
This idea of a ‘radical democratic citizenship’ has implications for the realisation of full 
sexual citizenship in the public, as well as the private, sphere. In Chapter 4 of this thesis, 
the presence of LGBT resistance in faith communities is offered in support of the argument 
that there is no special relationship between faith and a requirement to be homophobic. The 
following section will consider some of the impediments facing non-heterosexuals in their 
bid for sexual citizenship, including those of a socio-economic nature. First, it is helpful to 
consider some of the literature on citizenship, and sexual citizenship in particular. 
Citizenship and sexuality  
In the course of this thesis, it is argued that the use of rights discourse has resulted in a 
zero-sum game when applied to the conflict between conservative religious expression and 
sexual orientation. Does this mean that the strategic deployment of rights discourse by the 
movement for gay equality might usefully be replaced with a discourse focused on 
citizenship? The argument is not without its attractions. Indeed, part of the rationale for 
                                                          
107
 Mouffe [n 101], 79 
108
 Mouffe [n 101], 79-80 
109
 Anthony Bradney, Law and faith in a sceptical age (Routledge-Cavendish 2008), 42 
61 
 
equality legislation is to remedy the historical oppression faced by particular sections of 
society; to bring them within the realm of citizenship by protecting them against 
discrimination on grounds of certain characteristics. If gay people are still subject to 
restrictions based on their sexual orientation, does reframing the discussion in terms of 
citizenship remedy this problem?  
In recent years, the literature on sexual citizenship has focused more on rights claims, such 
as the campaign for same-sex marriage, and such successful claims have led to new forms 
of citizenship for gay people. However, much of the literature has criticised the underlying 
heteronormative assumptions, along with constructions of race, gender and class, which 
have shaped the idea of citizenship.
110
 While there has been some chipping away at the 
status of heterosexuality as a condition of citizenship,
111
 there remains a debate as to how 
far the extension of citizenship to non-heterosexuals really does challenge heteronormative 
assumptions.
112
 One argument is that the sexual citizenship that has been achieved through 
successful rights claims is one that is both privatised and depoliticised
113
 and one that is 
liable to lead to a decentring of sexual identity.
114
 Another critique focuses on how sexual 
citizenship appears to be ‘primarily about rights to participation in consumer society, 
linked to marketisation and the consumption of goods and services’,115 with the result that 
‘the power that queer citizens enjoy is largely dependent on access to capital and credit’.116  
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Within the liberal rights realm, Rawls’ analysis of the properties of citizenship rights117 can 
also be criticised for linking supposedly ‘egalitarian’ principles of justice to market 
constraints of wealth and income, which underlines the close relationship between the two 
spheres in Western capitalist democracy.
118
 There is also an implicit incorporation of a 
causal relativism, because once such citizenship principles are established, the history of 
citizenship rights consists of battles over the legitimacy of relative claims. This is not 
unlike the battles over the legitimacy of relative rights claims in the field of religious 
conflict with sexual orientation. Indeed, there is some debate in the literature as to whether 
citizenship discourse is any more helpful for gay equality, beyond its use as a strategic 
tool. Stychin, for example, argues that citizenship discourse ‘may well reproduce rather 
than resolve many of the exclusions from national identity that outsiders seek to correct’.119  
This concern is related to the observation, discussed further in Chapter 7, that the modern 
Western citizen is increasingly a product of his or her constitution as a consumer.
120
 The 
modern gay citizen is also subject to this. The gay rights movement of the 1970s was 
chiefly concerned with breaking out of the heteronormative closet and proclaiming a 
public, gay identity. Decades later, the increased visibility of gay people in the public, 
commercialised sphere has offered businesses new marketing opportunities and led to a 
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‘valorized gay identity’.121 Stychin’s conclusion, that ‘a model of national citizenship 
constructed around the citizen as consumer thus seems an inadequate basis for reimagining 
national identity for lesbians and gay men’,122 is well made.  
The discourses surrounding sexual orientation equality in goods and services provision, 
discussed in subsequent chapters, illustrate that the homosexual qua consumer presents a 
challenge for our understanding of what it means to be a citizen in a capitalist society. This 
makes sexual citizenship a matter of both culture and capital – and these two aspects of 
citizenship coalesce in today’s consumer-oriented society. However, there is disagreement 
within academic opinion regarding how the relationship between homophobic exclusion 
and socio-economic exclusion should be understood – whether full homosexual equality 
requires equality of resources, or whether equality of recognition is sufficient.  
Judith Butler
123
 and Nancy Fraser
124
 have debated the extent to which homophobic 
oppression is a function of capitalism or simply a lack of cultural recognition. Fraser draws 
a distinction between people who suffer mainly economic inequality and those whom she 
regards as suffering mainly cultural injustices. Whereas women and black people, for 
example, are oppressed both culturally and economically, Fraser sees gay people as a 
unique example of a group that requires nothing more than cultural recognition. According 
to Fraser, any economic inequality faced by gay people does not arise from the capitalist 
system per se, but from an inequitable system of cultural values.  
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In contrast, Butler draws on Marxist and socialist-feminist theory to argue that the 
regulation of sexuality cannot be separated from the organisation of society. Attempts to 
sever sexuality from the economy fail to recognise that ‘heterosexuality and 
heteronormativity are intrinsically connected to gender and the sexual division of labour’ 
which grounds our capitalist system.
125
  Butler characterises the ‘heterosexual family’ as ‘a 
site for the reproduction of heterosexual persons, fit for entry into the family as social 
form’.126 In Butler’s analysis, both gender and sexuality are intrinsically connected through 
the function of the family under capitalism.
127
 Thus, if gender is a question of both 
resource and recognition equality, it follows that oppression of lesbian and gay people is 
not simply a question of cultural recognition. To unshackle the ‘mutually constitutive 
politics of class and sexuality’, and to characterise struggles around sexual orientation as 
‘merely cultural’, masks the reality of poverty and discrimination that affects gay people 
under capitalism. Instead, discussions concerning sexual citizenship need to appreciate ‘the 
impact that class has on the potential to benefit from rights claims.’128  
At this point, it is useful to contextualise the discussion further. Marshall’s seminal post-
war analysis of citizenship describes the evolution since the eighteenth century from civil, 
to political, to social rights.
129
 His writing places the development of citizenship in the 
context of Western, liberal, capitalist democracy. Civil rights – rights necessary for 
individual freedom, including freedom of speech, thought and faith – formed the core of 
citizenship during the eighteenth century and were indispensable to the growth of a 
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capitalist economy: ‘They gave to each man, as part of his individual status, the power to 
engage as an independent unit in the economic struggle and made it possible to deny to 
him social protection on the ground that he was equipped with the means to protect 
himself.’130 Civil rights originated as fundamentally individual entities, which is why they 
resonated so well with the individualist structure and rhetoric of capitalism.
131
  
The development of social rights from the end of the nineteenth century correlated with 
several factors: a rise in income, particularly at the lower level, which reduced the 
economic distance between skilled/unskilled and skilled/non-manual workers; an increase 
in small savings, even for the non-propertied classes; graduated direct taxation, which 
compressed disposable income across the board; and mass production, which enabled 
poorer people to enjoy material goods more similar to those of the rich.
132
 Social rights, 
according to Marshall, encompass everything ‘from the right to a modicum of economic 
welfare and security to the right to share to the full in the social heritage and to live the life 
of a civilized being according to the standards prevailing in the society’, and represent the 
responsibilities that the modern state has towards its citizens.
133
  
Dawn Oliver has noted that, during the 1970s and 1980s, the balance of citizenship rights 
shifted away from social rights of welfare in favour of civil rights to access the market, 
such as the right to buy council houses and to purchase shares in privatized industries. She 
argues that including such rights, which are ‘essentially directed to promoting the 
individual persona and private economy of the individual rather than citizenship in the 
sense of the relationship between the individual and the state or the community’, is to 
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stretch citizenship to breaking point.
134
 The process continued, so that by the early 1990s, 
citizenship had become crystallised ‘around the twin statuses of consumer and taxpayer’.135  
In the context of the current debate, it can be argued that current equality law fixes rights 
discourse at the stage of civil rights, and has been unable to make the full transition 
towards full social rights for gay people, for two reasons. First, religious exemptions, 
operating in a heteronormative and theonormative framework, compromise the 
opportunities for lesbians and gay men to belong fully to the heritage and life of UK 
society. Second, the government’s refusal to implement the socio-economic duty in the 
Equality Act means that rights continue to be individualised and disembodied from the 
wider political and economic arena. At the same time, rights have absorbed a discourse of 
individual entitlement, with the focus on the individual ‘choosing’ subject – ‘albeit as good 
neoliberal responsibilised consuming citizens’.136 
However, it is possible that consumer capitalism may contain within it the potential for 
resistance through increased gay cultural visibility, just as ‘reform capitalism’ provided an 
opportunity for earlier generations of gay people to challenge discrimination on an ‘equal 
rights’ basis.137 The gay person as citizen-consumer may in fact be another site of 
resistance, along with the gay person as religious adherent. This is an under-explored are of 
the literature; how extending forms of citizenship to non-heterosexuals may have the effect 
of disrupting and reconfiguring heterosexual subjectivities.
138
 These opportunities for 
resistance are discussed further in subsequent chapters of this thesis.  
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At this point in the discussion, it is necessary to highlight some of the arguments that have 
been advanced concerning the ability of gay people to act as citizen-consumers at all. 
Much of the discussion in this area has focused on the idea of liberty. Feldblum (2007) 
sees the issue as being between two types of liberty: identity liberty (which concerns 
equality) and belief liberty (which concerns morality and religious freedom). She explains 
the practical effect of the difference between identity and belief liberty in her discussion of 
equal access to employment and to goods and services provision, which have been the 
main foci of the conflict in UK equality law: 
Ensuring that LGBT people can live lives of honesty and safety in all aspects of 
their social lives requires that society set a baseline of non-discrimination on the 
grounds of sexual orientation and gender identity. If individual business owners, 
service providers and employers could easily exempt themselves from such laws by 
making credible claims that their belief liberty is burdened by the law, LGBT 
people would remain constantly vulnerable to surprise discrimination. If I am 
denied a job, an apartment, a room at a hotel, a table at a restaurant or a procedure 
by a doctor because I am a lesbian, that is a deep, intense and tangible hurt. That 
hurt is not alleviated because I might be able to go down the street and get a job, an 
apartment, a hotel room, a restaurant table or a medical procedure from someone 
else. The assault to my dignity and my sense of safety in the world occurs when the 
initial denial happens. That assault is not mitigated by the fact that others might not 
treat me in the same way.
139
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Koppelman’s counter-argument,140 in favour of religious exemptions, is based on the 
premise that ‘an antidiscrimination law with a religious exemption is nothing at all like a 
regime with no such law’. He pleads for the right of conservative Christians also to ‘live 
lives of honesty’ (ie in accordance with their anti-gay beliefs), and suggests that rendering 
them ‘constantly vulnerable’ to forced association with gay people would be ‘a deep, 
intense and tangible hurt’ to them. He also asks how is the ability of gay people ‘to live 
lives of honesty and safety’ threatened by an occasional discriminator? Koppelman finds 
an unusual bedfellow in Carl Stychin, who thinks that there may sometimes be reasons to 
allow a religious celebrant to refuse to conduct a marriage service, suggesting that 
decision-makers should consider ‘whether a minimal delay in getting a scheduled date for 
a marriage ceremony is a significant burden on a same-sex couple’.141 However, the impact 
on that same-sex couple – and on others – should not be minimised, because ‘having to 
accept even one refusal of service constitutes significant substantive (and even formal) 
inequality. The hurt and marginalization such refusal will create is magnified when the 
historical diminution of homosexuals and homosexuality is considered’.142 Even where 
there exists a wide choice of alternative provision, the exclusion of non-heterosexuals from 
access to goods and services provision is not justified.  
Koppelman acknowledges that the law needs to suppress homophobic violence, but argues 
that the discriminator proposes to exclude gay people, not to commit violence towards 
them. He concludes that the best approach to this whole issue is based upon what Taylor 
calls ‘strong evaluation’.143 Because religion in its broadest sense— humanity’s various 
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efforts to address what is fundamentally problematic in the human condition—is an object 
of strong evaluation that is not reducible to any other good, it should also be given 
government protection. It is submitted that this is a very naïve criticism of Feldblum’s 
concerns. It fails to account sufficiently for the feelings of lesbians and gay men in the face 
of religious licence to discriminate, and does not alleviate current uncertainty over 
‘competing rights’.  While one can accept that a society with no anti-discrimination law 
would be far worse for vulnerable groups than the current regime, one can also argue that 
the very existence of religious exemptions threatens the security of lesbians and gay men in 
ways which can negate the protection nominally afforded them.  
The debate over sexual citizenship, then, encompasses a range of issues, and raises the 
question as to whether recognition of gay people in the public sphere is sufficient, or 
whether socio-economic and political conditions have had an impact on the ability of gay 
people to achieve full citizenship. This thesis argues that socio-economic and political 
conditions do have an impact on gay access to public space itself, and considers the extent 
to which gay people can ‘live lives of honesty and safety’144 in public spaces that have not 
been designated as ‘gay’ areas or venues. Chapters 5, 6 and 7 examine the combined 
effects of socio-economic and political conditions, plus the regime of religious exemptions, 
on gay citizenship.  
As well as rights and citizenship discourses, justifications for religious exemptions can also 
be couched in terms of tolerance. Tolerance has sometimes been suggested as a means of 
bridging the gap between faith and sexuality rights claims. It is another key element of 
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traditional rights discourse, which has again been subject to extensive debate. However, 
tolerance also bears a heteronormative shadow.  As Richardson observes:
145
 
Sexual citizenship is heavily circumscribed and simultaneously privatized, its limits 
set by the coupling of tolerance with assimilation; thus, lesbians and gay men are 
granted the right to be tolerated as long as they stay within the boundaries of that 
tolerance, whose borders are maintained through the heterosexist public/private 
divide. 
The next section explores some of the literature concerning tolerance, with a focus on the 
conflict between expressions of religion and sexual orientation in the public sphere. 
Tolerance in the public sphere 
The principle of toleration, or tolerance, synthesised from John Stuart Mill’s writings,146 is 
that people should be free to follow their ideals and lifestyles as long as they do not harm 
anyone else. Toleration has been described as a deliberate choice not to interfere with the 
conduct of which one disapproves.
147
 Tolerance can be categorised in four ways: ‘a 
resigned acceptance for the sake of peace’; ‘passive, relaxed, benignly indifferent to 
difference’; ‘a principled recognition that “others” have rights even if they exercise those 
rights in unattractive ways’; and, finally, ‘openness to the others; curiosity; perhaps even 
respect; a willingness to listen and learn’.148 In the political sense, toleration is meant to 
allow for the peaceful coexistence of differences that do not spontaneously combine in 
harmony.
149
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Critiques of toleration touch on problems of ‘normality’ and ‘difference’ in the public 
sphere, which is relevant to the conflict between religion and sexual orientation. The social 
perception of ‘normality’, ‘difference’ and ‘deviance’ is a highly political question. As this 
thesis argues, lesbians and gay men are still viewed through a heteronormative lens which 
renders them – however implicitly – ‘abnormal’. This highlights another limitation 
inherent in the liberal conception of rights that favours state neutrality; it relies on 
toleration, which itself rests upon a bed of disapproval and confirms the dualism between 
the ‘norm’ and the ‘other’. A heterosexist social order is represented as ‘equal’ and any 
challenges to that order are seen as attempts to create inequality, and deployed against 
attempts to seek full sexual citizenship.
150
 Further, as Marcuse observed, ‘tolerance is an 
end in itself only when it is truly universal’, otherwise ‘the conditions of tolerance are 
‘loaded’; they are determined and defined by the institutionalized inequality… of 
society’.151 This observation echoes the argument made earlier in this chapter, that identity 
is constructed within a society that is institutionally unequal.  
Marcuse coined the term ‘repressive tolerance’, and repression might be viewed as the 
ultimate effect of tolerance. He states:  
The problem of making possible such a harmony between every individual liberty 
and the other is not that of finding a compromise between competitors, or between 
freedom and law, between general and individual interest, common and private 
welfare in an established society, but of creating the society in which man is no 
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longer enslaved by institutions which vitiate self-determination from the 
beginning.
152
  
Leiter’s view, mentioned earlier, of religion as a ‘culpable form of unwarranted belief’153 
means that it does not lend itself either to tolerance or to being tolerated. For Leiter, two 
features separate ‘religious’ states of mind from other world views: religious beliefs 
involve categorical demands for action; and by virtue of being based on ‘faith’, they are 
insulated from ordinary standards of evidence and rational justification. This echoes 
Rawls’ argument requiring religious reasons to be corroborated in order to be given weight 
in policy debates. Yet Rawls proposed that a just society must tolerate the intolerant; 
otherwise, society would then itself be intolerant, and thus unjust. This is the liberal 
“paradox of tolerance”. However, Rawls also accepted that society has a reasonable right 
of self-preservation that supersedes the principle of tolerance: ‘While an intolerant sect 
does not itself have title to complain of intolerance, its freedom should be restricted only 
when the tolerant sincerely and with reason believe that their own security and that of the 
institutions of liberty are in danger’.154 
The idea that the limit of tolerance is intolerance was developed by Karl Popper, who used 
that as a maxim to resolve theparadox, whereby unlimited tolerance would ultimately lead 
to the disappearance of tolerance: 
Unlimited tolerance must lead to the disappearance of tolerance. If we extend 
unlimited tolerance even to those who are intolerant, if we are not prepared to 
defend a tolerant society against the onslaught of the intolerant, then the tolerant 
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will be destroyed, and tolerance with them. We should therefore claim, in the name 
of tolerance, the right not to tolerate the intolerant.
155
 
The ‘perfectionist’ liberal Raz (introduced earlier) accepts that tolerance facilitates 
autonomy, which is another key liberal concern.  However, he argues that the government 
should not tolerate those who would deny (or even fail to promote) autonomy.
156
 In the 
current context, Raz’s approach can support the argument that denial of homosexual 
autonomy is grounds for the law to operate a policy of non-toleration. Such value-based 
approaches to tolerance have been criticised by some liberal theorists,
157
 yet even Rawls 
has acknowledged that a tolerant society need not tolerate an intolerant group which posed 
a direct threat to the security of other citizens; in the absence of a direct threat, the liberal 
state should instead seek to liberalise the group by persuasion and good example.
158
 
However, Popper’s ‘reciprocal’ approach to toleration is more persuasive. Intolerance 
should not be tolerated, otherwise tolerance itself would be threatened. Therefore, the 
stronger a link between the religion and intolerance, the stronger the reason not to grant 
religious exemptions to anti-discrimination law.
159
  
Perhaps the most passionate argument in favour of this view comes from Lord Alli, a gay, 
Muslim member of the House of Lords. During the debate over the 2007 Sexual 
Orientation Regulations, Lord Alli argued that discriminatory religious views are 
completely incompatible with democracy:  
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When I read the Koran, it tells me in some passages that I must kill Jews. If I 
believe strongly enough that I must kill Jews, does that mean that I have the right to 
say, ‘Exempt me from legislation because I believe it strongly enough. Let me 
discriminate against Jews, at least, because I believe it strongly enough and it is 
written in the Koran’?160 
There is a view that religious accommodation could be a tolerant concession that does not 
necessarily endorse homophobia. However, homosexuality does not seek to deny others’ 
legitimacy or to exclude their way of life, whereas religious accommodation has the 
capacity to exclude gay people, both legally and socially. Furthermore, when the state 
avoids condemning homophobia, it can be seen as sustaining it; ‘it is not far-fetched to 
interpret non-condemnation as support’.161 The implications of this interpretation are 
returned to in Chapter 6, as part of the discussion on religious exemptions and 
accommodation as examples of the state’s constructive delegation of power. To conclude 
this review, and to form a bridge to the discussion on methodology in Chapter 3, the 
discussion now turns to consider Foucaultian concepts of rights. 
Foucault and rights 
For Foucault, rights are not based on a timeless and immutable human essence; rather they 
are a function of particular formations of power relations and knowledge which combine to 
configure humanity at any given point. The human is not a transcendent entity; it does not 
exist outside the networks of power and knowledge in society. If the human is a work of 
construction, this suggests that rights are similarly political creations, dependent on the 
discursive and strategic viability of the rights claims that are made, and of the political will 
to observe and enforce them. Accordingly, rights can be made and unmade, according to 
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the prevailing political ethos in society.
162
 Therefore, rights cannot masquerade as 
‘something of an anti-politics – a pure defense of the innocent and the powerless against 
power’.163 Rights are better understood as political tools deployed as a means of 
constructing particular political visions; tools which engage in combat with other rights 
and other political visions on a shared terrain.
164
 Foucault himself used the language of war 
when discussing rights; a person who articulates a rights claim wields ‘a truth-weapon and 
a singular right’ and thereby seeks to insert ‘a rift into the discourse of truth and law’.165 
For Foucault, rights are not only the tools of political subjects; those individual subjects are 
also the “effects” of rights. This means that, while rights function as tools, the shape of 
those rights is the effect of pre-existing power relations (such as heteronormativity, 
theonormativity, race, class etc) which themselves effect, or create, the individual rights-
bearing subject: ‘the individual is not… power’s opposite number; the individual is one of 
power’s first effects. The individual is in fact a power-effect… a relay: power passes 
through the individuals it has constituted’.166 Thus individual rights-bearing subjects are 
not blessed with an immutable essence; instead, they are themselves constructed in and 
through regimes of rights. As a result, rights do not represent inherent or established 
identities. Through the legal and political framework of campaigning, enactment and 
enforcement, rights actually shape the very identities they purport to be recognising. They 
are ‘performative mechanisms’167 which bolster the identities based on rights claims.  
Further, rights produce discourses of identity which are frequently exclusionary. The 
binary division drawn between religious and homosexual identities is an example of this; a 
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religious identity claim that involves pleading a right to treat gay people less favourably 
excludes those gay people who are also religious believers, as well as religious believers 
who do not consider their faith compromised by treating gay people equally. However, 
within this analysis of rights lies the scope for change. The identity-based communities 
produced through rights claims are not stable, nor are they a means of achieving social 
equilibrium. On the contrary, ‘the very act of summoning “community” through a language 
of rights may expose the divisions within the community – and even beyond it’.168 This 
thesis examines, in subsequent chapters, some of the divisions within religious 
communities that have been exposed in the course of religious conflict with same-sex 
equality.
169
 
Foucault himself advocated an approach to rights based on difference, rather than identity. 
As Pickett explains, ‘by severing the tie to an arbitrary yet normalizing account of what it 
is to be human, Foucaultian rights could open potential sites for self-creation’170 through 
the right to be different. This right is articulated as a ‘relational right’ – a right to  
consensual relations of one’s choice – in recognition of the importance of social and sexual 
relations in people’s development. Traditionally, relational rights were based upon claims 
to privacy,
171
 which has come to be viewed as too defensive.
172
 Instead, ‘the relational 
right is pressed, via “coming out” as lesbian or gay, to change the normalizing-disciplinary 
practices of compulsory heterosexuality in everyday life’.173 The question arises, what are 
the limits to be placed on how different one can be? It is suggested that there cannot be a 
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fixed schedule of rights based on difference, because ‘a particular list of human rights 
envisions not only an ideal person but also a particular set of political threats to such a 
person’.174 This could lead to an ever-increasing list of rights claims, and could thereby 
weaken the status of rights in general. It could also lead to further conflicts of rights, much 
as the present regime has done.  
It has been argued that a Foucaultian approach to rights would permit rankings, or 
hierarchies, of rights, in which the right to difference has priority and is able to trump other 
rights.
175
 However, it remains unclear what forms of difference are to be permitted, leaving 
no means of distinguishing between respective rights of difference. It may be possible to 
distinguish between types of difference ‘that do not embody a resistance to power nor 
enrich an art of the self’ and those that do so.176 In such a scheme, it is fairly clear that 
race-hate groups, for example, would come under the former category, but it is less than 
clear how religious lives would be treated. Moreover, it raises the question of who should 
be given the authority to decide on the levels of difference that are acceptable as a basis for 
rights claims. A regime of rights, however construed, still requires the support of the legal 
and political system in order to be effective. 
A Foucaultian approach to rights, then, does not aim to provide a template for problem-
solving, nor a comprehensive solution to normative questions such as how law should 
adjudicate conflicts between religion and sexual orientation. Instead, it offers a critical 
approach; ‘an articulation of provocations, critiques, deployments, interventions and 
deportments’177  towards rights, through which a different understanding of humanity and 
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human rights might emerge. It helps reveal the ‘strategies and tactics’178 deployed in the 
conflict between religious and sexual orientation rights and presents them for scrutiny as 
part of the conversation between liberal and Queer legal theories. The next chapter 
examines Foucault’s theory in more detail as part of an explanation of the methodological 
approach taken in this thesis. 
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CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY 
Language before signifying something signifies for someone.
1
 
The preceding chapters sketched out the background to the current conflict between 
religious expression and sexual orientation and reviewed liberal legal literature pertaining 
to rights. The traditional liberal conception of rights has been problematised as part of ‘an 
endeavour to know how and to what extent it might be possible to think differently, instead 
of what is already known’.2 Liberalism’s reliance on universal rights imbues citizens with 
supposedly immutable, essential identities only to collapse, paradoxically, into ‘contextual 
particularism’3 when these rights collide in the public sphere. As Torfing notes, ‘it is 
precisely this claim to universal validity that makes possible a chain of equivalential 
effects’4 whereby people in different situations can make the same rights claims. In the 
context of the conflict between religion and sexual orientation, the chain of equivalent 
effects is illustrated by religious conservatives’ deployment of rights talk in order to 
delimit the recent expansion of rights for non-heterosexuals. 
Another shortcoming of liberalism is its tendency to overlook power. Recognition of this 
gap is why the methodology of this thesis is influenced by Goodrich’s critical analysis of 
the language of law, by Foucault’s conceptualisation of power, by Queer theory, and by 
Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse theory.  Foucault sees power as something not owned or 
exercised, but instead as a complex network of relations which are expressed through 
discourses or practices that form identities and subject positions; ‘those practices that 
systematically form the objects of which they speak’.5 Discourses always involve the 
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exercise of power, as they are based on a demarcation of ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’, and 
thus affect relations between these different social agents.
6
 This is where Queer theory can 
assist our understanding. Queer research has been described as ‘any form of research 
positioned within conceptual frameworks that highlight the instability of taken-for-granted 
meanings and resulting power relations’.7 Using Foucaultian-informed Queer theory and 
discourse theory to research the current conflict facilitates the analysis of what happens 
when these hegemonies and privileges of heteronormativity and theonormativity are 
challenged.  
Discourse theory and Queer theory are both influenced by poststructuralism, which 
recognises, contra Saussure’s structural approach,8 that language is not a stable, 
unchanging and totalising structure.
9
 Nor does our use of language neutrally reflect our 
world, identities or social relations; rather, it plays an active role in creating, limiting and 
changing them. Importantly, our access to reality is always through language; language 
generates and therefore constitutes the social world. Moreover, we are “thrown into” and 
inhabit a world of discourse, and cannot conceive or think about objects outside of it.
10
 
This is important when we consider that ‘language too has its violence. In language lie the 
assumptions of a culture, its rules of conduct, what it will acknowledge as possible and 
                                                          
6
 Torben Dyrberg, The Circular Structure of Power: Politics, Identity, Community (Verso, 1997) 
7
 Kath Brown and Catherine J Nash, Queer methods and methodologies: intersecting queer theories and 
social science research (Ashgate, 2010), 4  
8
 F de Saussure, Course in General Linguistics (Peter Owen, 1960). For an overview, see Laclau: 
http://www.essex.ac.uk/centres/theostud/documents_and_files/pdf/Laclau%20%20philosophical%20roots%2
0of%20discourse%20theory.pdf 
9
 Foucault [n 5], 117 
10
 Stephen Mulhall, Heidegger and Being and Time (Routledge, 1996). See also Wittgenstein’s ‘private 
language argument’ summarised at <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/private-language/> accessed 19 April 
2014 
81 
 
permissible’.11 This is where analysis of the relationship with knowledge and power 
through discourse becomes key.  
Law as social discourse 
Law is a social discourse. It is situated in both the social and political ethos of the present, 
and also in the historical decisions and principles that have been developed through statute 
and case law. In this process of development, law appropriates – and privileges – certain 
meanings and thereby rejects alternative and competing meanings. This matters because 
meanings that come to be privileged through law are seen as authoritative; legal language 
is ‘the argot… of elite or professionalised power’ and as such is seen as ‘the language of 
authority’.12 Law holds these privileged meanings to be logical and rational, granting these 
meanings normative status as the ‘objective, externally given, meaning of human 
behaviour’.13 As discussed in Chapter 2, this appropriation and privileging of certain 
meanings includes the very definition of the rights-bearing subject, and of those who have 
been excluded from this meaning and rendered “other than”. The simultaneous process of 
inclusion and exclusion of meaning – and hence people – is the mechanism by which law’s 
relationship to power is expressed. Foucault’s observation that the exercise of power in 
Western societies ‘has always been formulated in terms of law’14 can be further developed 
to conceptualise law as ‘a system of communication and non-communication, as the 
rhetoric of a particular group or class, and as a specific exercise of power and power over 
meaning’.15  
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As Bakhtin noted, ‘every discourse has its own selfish and biased proprietor… who speaks 
and under what conditions they speak, this is what determines the word’s actual 
meaning’.16 The question, “who speaks?” invites more than a simple linguistic analysis of 
who is speaking at any given time. Instead, it raises further questions:  
‘Who is speaking? Who is qualified to do so? Who derives from it their own 
special quality, their prestige, and from whom, in return, do they receive if not the 
assurance, at least the presumption that what they say is true? What is the status of 
the individuals who – alone – have the right sanctioned by law or tradition, 
juridically defined or spontaneously accepted, to proffer such a discourse?’17 
The question, “who speaks?” asks us to consider how ‘a particular set of socially oriented 
interests… gain control of a discourse and define the… forms of meaning that are to 
prevail’.18 This thesis is concerned with the expression of heteronormative and 
theonormative power in law, and particularly through the discourse of rights. Chapter 2’s 
review of the literature considered the role of religion in the public sphere and analysed the 
process by which religion – as a socially oriented interest – came to influence and define 
Western liberal democracy as being grounded on “Christian values”, by becoming integral 
to its ‘regime of truth’.19 Chapter 4 looks in more detail at this process, focusing on how 
Christian conservativism’s stance towards homosexuality has developed from a concern 
with morality towards an appropriation of rights discourse in its pursuit of exemptions to 
equality law.  
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Legal discourse and the master’s house 
Chapter 1 opened with a quote from Audre Lorde, in which she says that the master’s tools 
will never dismantle the master’s house. This thesis uses Lorde’s words as an allegory for 
law and undertakes a critical analysis of the role of rights in law as a tool (or weapon) in 
conflicts between religion and sexual orientation. It contends that rights discourse, as ‘the 
argot of professionalised power’ in Western liberal democracy, lacks the necessary 
recognition of how hetero- and theo- normativities have underpinned law’s construction. 
As illustrated in Chapter 2, this has implications for how the conflict between religion and 
sexual orientation is understood; to view it as simply a conflict of rights is to miss an 
important step in how rights have been constructed.  
Liberalism rightly holds that there is a moral right to be treated equally, grounded on the 
inherent equality of human beings – by virtue of being human. Legal rights, however, are 
granted rather than inherent; and they are granted usually as a result of social and political 
struggle and resistance. To understand the conflict solely as one of rights carries the danger 
of neglecting the history of how rights came to be granted legal status.  The inclusion of 
religion within law’s privileging of meaning came much earlier than the inclusion of 
sexual orientation, as Chapter 2 described. The hetero- and theo-norms underpinning the 
construction of law as a social discourse have not miraculously disappeared as a result of 
the belated granting of sexual orientation rights. The master’s house may have benefited 
from the construction of extensions – such as LGBT rights – but work still remains to be 
done. As part of this work, it is also important to recognise the particular characteristics of 
legal discourse. Goodrich identifies several distinctive features of legal discourse which 
can be considered as part of the question “who speaks?”: institutionalisation; lexicon and 
syntax; semantic appropriation; and ideology.  
84 
 
Firstly, legal discourse is institutionalised – that is, it is a socially and institutionally 
authorised form of speaking. Its utterances are legitimised through the ‘organisational and 
sociolinguistic insignia of hierarchy, status, power and wealth’,20 and these insignia mark 
the distinctiveness of legal discourse from its relations in politics, ethics and also religion. 
This explains the keenness of law’s relations to have their arguments accepted into legal 
discourse; for example, why religious conservatism persists in arguing for religious 
exemptions to equality law. Secondly, legal discourse is presented as a ‘context-
independent code’, with a vocabulary that is shaped by ‘memory, recognition and usage’ 
and techniques of textual repetition.
21
 Thirdly, legal meaning operates through semantic 
appropriation; it ‘arrives after the event to reconstruct the discourse of others and to rewrite 
the diversity of social languages’ in purportedly neutral terms.22 Through this process of 
semantic appropriation, the legal text defines its own conception of meaning and, in doing 
so, excludes alternatives. Goodrich’s analysis here links with Foucault’s ‘five questions’, 
which will be examined in the next section. 
Goodrich characterises the rhetoric of law as ‘the rhetoric of sovereignty and power, of 
rights and duties.’ It is ‘the discourse of power in a dual sense’: it presumes the universal 
constant that underpins traditional liberal discourse (as discussed in Chapter 2), but it 
operates discursively as a means of ‘excluding and obscuring alternative or oppositional 
readings and meanings’.23 The presumption of universality – found invariably within 
declarations of rights and equality – appears desirable on the surface but serves in practice 
to mask the power relations at play in law’s normative judgments. This leads into the 
fourth distinctive feature of legal discourse, which is ideology. Law operates as an 
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‘axiomatic and imperative normative code’24 which regulates and governs what law 
defines as the legal subject. Furthermore, law ‘fixes legal meaning to individual acts, 
conceived in the abstract terms of intention and responsibility’ and, in so doing, ‘the legal 
text reifies its meaning and obscures or mystifies the real relations which form the content 
of such actions and the explanation of their motives.’25 All of this serves to underwrite law 
as ‘the political-administrative discourse of liberal individualism’.26 The characterisation of 
law as a discourse of liberal individualism illustrates why arguments from conscience, 
increasingly used by religious conservatives to claim exemptions from equality law, need 
critical analysis. Chapters 5 and 7 undertake this analysis in more detail.  
Five Questions 
The framework for the research is based broadly on Foucault’s ‘five questions’,27 designed 
to reveal the discursive strategies and tactics that have led us to the current position in the 
zero-sum game of equal rights. First, what are the limits and forms of the sayable about 
same-sex claims to equality, and how is religion implicated in this? Second, what are the 
limits and forms of conversation in influencing which assumptions about homosexuality 
and religion persist, and which wither away? Third, what are the limits and forms of 
memory in deciding which faith-based discourses about homosexuality endure intact and 
which are subject to modification? Fourth, what are the limits and forms of reactivation in 
enabling historical religious anti-gay discourse to be resurrected? Finally, what are the 
limits and forms of appropriation whereby individuals and groups can use this religious 
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anti-gay discourse in order to further their legal or political interests? The issues raised by 
the five questions will be examined throughout subsequent chapters.  
There are inherent tensions in a project which seeks to critique liberal rights from an 
external (Queer) position, but which is located within existing legal structures. For 
example, the research interrogates some of the assumptions underlying existing equality 
law, with a view to answering a normative question as to what equality law should do, 
which is a tension in itself. The research also challenges how law positions itself as a 
‘neutral protector’ of individual rights, through raising hope that the ‘aberration’ of 
individual prejudices can be eradicated through anti-discrimination legislation,
28
 while at 
the same time denying the historical and structural nature of those prejudices.
29
 As 
Foucault observed, ‘in Western societies since the Middle Ages, the exercise of power has 
always been formulated in terms of law’.30 This thesis seeks to align a Queer approach 
with particular political and ethical principles and to even welcome the tensions, 
recognising that ‘the contradictory messiness of social life [is] such that no category 
system can ever do it justice.’31 In the words of songwriter Leonard Cohen, ‘there is a 
crack in everything; that’s how the light gets in.’32 The tensions and gaps between liberal, 
Queer and other approaches provide space for insight as to what is happening and what 
needs to change.  
With this in mind, this chapter looks first at Queer theory in more detail, followed by an 
analysis of Foucault’s approach and then of discourse theory. The chapter explains how a 
synthesis of discourse and Queer theories enables the current conflict to be re-interpreted 
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in terms of the legal and political discourses generated and their effects, such as how the 
language of rights is being used to preserve the status quo of power relations. For example, 
attempts to placate conservative religious concerns over a ‘hierarchy of rights’ largely 
ignore how the spectrum of human sexuality has been constructed and stratified into its 
own hierarchy. This theoretical synthesis is used critically throughout the thesis, to 
question the underlying assumptions that shape law’s current understanding and treatment 
of sexual orientation and religious expression; and to consider what the law should do 
instead.  
Queer theory  
Like Plummer (and plenty of others), I am ‘a bit of a humanist, a bit post-gay, a sort of a 
feminist, a little queer, a kind of a liberal, and seeing that much that is queer has the 
potential for an important radical change.’33  Engaging in Queer critique involves 
navigating these tensions and questioning whether Queer is enough to achieve the desired 
change. In general, Queer undertakes a radical questioning of norms, particularly notions 
of gender and sexuality.
34
 Queer, insofar as it can be defined, includes ‘whatever is at odds 
with the normal, the legitimate, the dominant.’35 Queer theory emerged as ‘a radical 
challenge to a range of liberal and legal assumptions – evident even in some feminist and 
gay liberation politics – about human subjectivity, especially those concerning gender and 
sexuality’.36 This section will first explain in more detail how Queer might function as a 
methodology, before going on to consider critiques of its capacity to fulfil a 
methodological function. According to Queer theoretical approach,  
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The hetero-homo binary is imagined, parallel to the masculine/feminine trope, as a 
symbolic code structured into the texts of daily life, from popular culture... to 
disciplinary knowledges, law, therapeutic practices, criminal justice, and state 
policies. It frames the way we know and organize personal and social experience, 
with the effect of reproducing heteronormativity. Queer theory aims to expose the 
operation of the hetero/homo code in the center of society and to contribute to 
destabilizing its operation.
37
 
Valdes sees Queer as ‘a theoretical and political enterprise devoted to the education and 
reformation of legal discourse, culture and doctrine regarding matters of (special) concern 
to sexual minorities’.38  He suggests eight methods of undertaking queer legal research, 
which include fighting stereotypes; bridging social science knowledge and legal 
knowledge; conceptualising ‘sexual orientation’; and promoting positionality, relationality 
and interconnectivity.
39
 While recognising that this list is not exhaustive, it is helpful to 
add, with particular reference to this thesis, Wilcox’s insight that ‘as gender identity and 
sexual identity remain in a continuous production, then, so must the notion of religious 
identity’.40 It is part of the argument of this thesis that the current conflict has disrupted the 
supposed universality of religious experience, just as much as the supposed universality of 
the human experience. This disruption has implications for the future development of 
religion, which is slowly making progress towards recognition of intersectionality, 
including the experience of LGBT religious people.  
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There is, nonetheless, a tension between queer theory and law. Whereas Queer seeks to 
destabilise rigid, taken-for-granted norms in favour of fluidity, law tends to prefer – and 
indeed rely on – fixity, categorisation and the reinforcement of dominant norms. 
Significantly, ‘queer theory and politics emerged in the context of a sexual politics that 
was suspicious of, and aggrieved by, the state’.41 Romero’s awareness of this context – and 
of Halperin’s view that ‘queer method refers not [to] a positivity but to a positionality vis-
a-vis the normative’42 – persuades him that ‘Queer legal methods ought not to be defined 
in connection with substantive agendas and commitments’.43 At the other end of the Queer 
spectrum, if you like, is the argument that Queer’s reluctance to engage with normative 
jurisprudential questions represents a serious shortcoming of the theory.
44
 Somewhere in 
between lies the question as to whether there remains a place for Queer theory at all, in 
light of liberal legal reforms that have extended rights to lesbians and gay men. Stychin 
concludes that there is still ‘a useful role for this methodological toolbox’ in showing how 
relationships are ‘constructed, disciplined and normalized’ through the law.45  
However, as Zanghellini points out, ‘this gives Queer an unduly modest role in legal 
theory’, precisely because it stops short of claiming that Queer ‘can make sound and 
original normative recommendations that will improve on these legal liberal reforms’.46 It 
is conceded that Queer legal methods need not be defined in connection with normative 
commitments, but this does not necessarily mean that there is no connection at all. 
Challenging and critiquing established norms does not automatically mean that we have to 
resist any prescription. Zanghellini points to the value that Queer places on personal 
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agency and human diversity as an indication that there are indeed some foundational 
elements to Queer’s critique of law.47 Others have gone further and identified within Queer 
a commitment to humanist values in general.
48
   
Equality is not a Queer concept as such; for example, the term hardly ever appears in 
literature published by organisations such as Queer Nation.
49
 Equality discourse is 
criticised in Queer literature for its focus on gaining a seat at the table in order to be better 
placed to sweep up what crumbs might be scattered there. This does not challenge the 
inherently unjust character of the banquet – indeed, it often legitimises and reinforces the 
very system which reproduces inequalities for non-heterosexuals. As Hamilton observes:  
When the equality argument is deployed it becomes a requirement to categorise 
individuals into classes of sexual orientation, as equality necessitates comparisons 
to be made between different groups. The categorisation of individuals is harmful 
as it means that minority groups are asserting their ‘other’ness against the 
‘heteronormal’ group.50   
The harm referred to by Hamilton is the reproduction of the ‘norm’ and the ‘other’. 
Furthermore, the fight for equality has also been criticised for being based on a 
‘subordination theory’51 that views power as something which is wielded in a top-down 
manner. Halley argues that power should instead be viewed through a Foucaultian lens: 
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power is not puissance (compulsion) but rather pouvoir – the capacity to produce effects. 
This is what is meant by the Foucaultian idea of ‘relations of power’, and why Halley 
suggests that ‘if at one time [power] could install itself only in high places whence it lorded 
itself over low ones, that time is over.’52 For Foucault, power – and resistance to power – 
in modernity has a more flexible nature: ‘one is dealing with mobile and transitory points 
of resistance, producing cleavages in society that shift about.’53 The discourses that have 
arisen through the conflict between religion and sexual orientation illustrate this well, 
explaining how and why Christians have been willing and able to present themselves as a 
marginalised group who sit lower down the ‘hierarchy of rights’ than LGBT people. The 
following section examines Foucault’s approach in more detail. 
Foucault’s approach 
Foucault understood that what is recognised as ‘truth’ is a product of discourse. In other 
words, discourses generate truth-claims. ‘Truth’ is not produced dispassionately or 
impartially – it is produced with a will to truth (or knowledge) – and gives rise to regimes 
of truth. This conception of truth pits itself against the Enlightenment view that truth is 
neutral. Truth operates through the exclusion, marginalisation and even prohibition of 
other competing truths. Power is thus exercised through the production and dissemination 
of truth. Foucault’s theory of productive power holds that ‘power produces; it produces 
reality; it produces domains of objects and rituals of truth. The individual and the 
knowledge that may be gained of him belong to this production’.54  
                                                          
52
 Halley [n 51] 
53
 Foucault [n30], 96 
54
 Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison (Vintage, 1995 [1977]) 194 
92 
 
It is said that legal discourse claims not only to reveal the truth but to ‘authorise and 
consecrate it’.55 Liberal legal discourse conceals the very fact of its own production of 
truth – law hides the fact that what it presents as normal is only one conception of so-called 
‘normality’. Thus, the law positions the field for debate in a particular way and then hides 
the very fact that it has done so.
56
 This is expressed in the current conflict through the 
historical construction of the homosexual within a discursive regime of hetero- and theo- 
normativities.  Law involves a distinctive production of truth; the procedures of law 
provide authorised means by which the truth is discovered and, once enunciated, law 
provides the guarantee of this truth.
57
 Law is a system that provides a privileged source of 
truth, which is why Foucault stated that ‘the language of power is law’.58 Foucaultian 
analysis can assist the understanding of law’s role in the current conflict and how law 
should adjudicate conflicts between religion and sexual orientation. Hunt and Wickham 
suggest two stages of analysis: first, to identify the powers at work; second, to evaluate the 
results of the play of these powers – do the cumulative effects give rise to domination or 
subordination?
59
 This is the analytical process undertaken in this thesis.  
Power and sexuality: norms and disciplines 
A Foucaultian approach recognises that sexuality is a principal point of access to 
individual subjectivity for the exercise of power in the modern age. Sexuality provides a 
domain for the exercise of power is developed through sexuality – including moral and 
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religious influences and edicts.
60
 Foucault’s approach emphasises the role of norms: it is 
through the repetition of normative requirements that the ‘normal’ is constructed. In the 
context of this thesis, the norms concerned are heteronormativity and theonormativity. 
Their normalisation has been achieved through what Foucault terms the ‘disciplines’; 
systems of ‘micropower’ – ‘tiny, everyday physical mechanisms’61 which act to embed a 
pattern of norms throughout daily life and to secure them through surveillance.
62
  
Disciplines are systems of micropower that are ‘essentially non-egalitarian and 
asymmetrical’63 in nature. They form a system of hierarchical observation, operating 
through norms, and deploying a mix of micro-penalties and rewards. As Hunt and 
Wickham point out, the ‘advance of disciplinary techniques is manifest in the rise of 
regulation – as a distinctive technique of government’.64 This is why an appreciation of 
disciplinary power is important when considering the normative question posed by this 
thesis. As discussed in Chapter 2, the liberal, humanist framework that prevails in the 
literature largely accepts the image of ‘benign point-of-viewlessness’. This image of liberal 
legal neutrality misses the importance of law’s disciplinary function.65 In fact, law can be 
said to facilitate the operation of disciplinary power ‘by constituting spaces which are then 
traversed and invested by the disciplines’.66 It is argued that legal, disciplinary and 
governmental strategies are interrelated; law forms a central part of the governmental 
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armoury, along with the disciplinary matrix and the human sciences’ ‘knowledge of 
man’.67  
For Foucault, this entails a subtle change in the nature and operation of law: ‘it is not a 
matter of imposing law on men… but of employing tactics rather than laws, or… 
employing laws as tactics’.68 Law seems to provide strong evidence of the existence of 
strategies and tactics, because ‘at particular historical moments, law reflects or 
incorporates an aggregation or condensation of shifts on the disposition or direction of 
power’.69 The struggle for LGBT equality rights can be viewed through this lens, as can 
the subsequent use by religious conservatives of rights language and conscience claims, as 
discussed in Chapters 4 and 5. For now, it is useful to set out a Foucaultian approach to the 
role of law in rights conflicts. 
The role of law in rights conflicts  
As Foucault said, ‘in Western societies since the Middle Ages, the exercise of power has 
always been formulated in terms of law’.70 Two different aspects of legal power can be 
identified: judicial power (concerning the enforcement of norms of behaviour) and 
disciplinary power concerning (the production and normalisation of identity).
71
 As 
discussed in Chapter 4, the very act of legislating about the homosexual contributes to a 
process which creates the homosexual: 
Law does not objectively operate on an already established homosexual identity, 
but actively works towards its construction and conceptualisation… Homosexuality 
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is positioned in a particular relation to law – this facilitates the increased visibility 
of homosexuality – [and] contributes to a process in which the homosexual is 
created and refined… Law participates in the production of a sexual subject.72  
Furthermore, human differences can become neutralised and categorised through the 
process of granting these rights. Disciplinary power reduces people to definition through 
these differences, which are then written into law. Thus ‘the law is brought in to manage 
otherness, but in doing so identities become reified… this reinforces division and 
separation into spheres of, at best, toleration.
73
 It is also argued that rights, ‘when framed in 
the materialist language of law,’ mean ‘nothing more than access to the courts by 
individuals asserting a claim of discrimination’.74 
Law can be said to work in ‘a constant push-pull of emancipation/regulation’,75 as it moves 
continually between determinacy (legal rules and categories) and the pressure to respond to 
new rights claims that arise both as a result of and a response to the shifts in society’s 
power relations. This points to what is the core question of law and legal discourse 
throughout modernity: the link between government and freedom. Hunt and Wickham see 
law as a ‘dilemma of government and freedom’,76 because each presupposes the other 
while at the same time threatening or challenging the other. Legal rights claims represent 
one form in which this dilemma reveals itself: ‘rights cannot guarantee freedom, but 
freedom cannot be achieved without rights’.77 However, it is suggested that, rather than 
simply engaging with human rights norms to achieve concessions from the state, ‘a process 
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is needed by which the body, the lived experience and the space occupied by “others”… 
become a potential site of challenge, or a means of exposing the internal limits of the 
law’.78 This thesis aims to be part of this process, by recognising that the conflict between 
religion and sexuality has called the limits and capacities of equality law into question. The 
following section turns to Foucault’s concept of pastoral power, and how it continues to 
influence the role religion plays in law, government and politics. 
Religious power and pastoral power 
Foucault developed the concept of ‘pastoral power’ during a series of lectures given in the 
late 1970s.
79
 He was less interested in church theologies than in the practical means of 
shaping behaviour – the disciplines – that originated in the church before being adopted by 
other social institutions. Instead of analysing religion according to its own discursive 
framework, Foucault shows how religion functions as a set of power relations in society – 
irrespective of the reality behind its truth claims: ‘Religion is a political force … It is a 
superb instrument of power for itself’. 80  The idea of pastoral power enabled Foucault to 
interpret religious phenomena as part of the framework of ‘strategies and tactics’81  
involved in the exercise of disciplinary power.  
Pastoral power became central to the forms of social control that developed over recent 
centuries.
82
 Pastoral power is related to religious power, which itself has four 
characteristics: detail; an ‘infinite’ or ‘mystical calculus’ which serves as a justification 
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beyond time and history;
83
 a focus on the body; and a focus on confession or discourse. 
These elements do not exist in isolation: the ‘detail’ focuses on the ‘body’, is framed by the 
act of ‘confession’ and is justified inside a ‘mystical calculus of the infinitesimal and the 
infinite’.84 The ‘infinite’ provides a religious rationale distinct from the ‘technical 
rationality’ of earthly institutions, enabling the relations of power to be set up ‘for the 
conquest of salvation’.85 All these characteristics of religious power come under the 
auspices of pastoral power: ‘religious power, therefore, is pastoral power’.86  
The metaphor of the shepherd and his flock, inherent in the idea of pastoral power, 
contained the seeds of an effective governance model – of what Foucault termed 
‘governmentality’.87 Pastoral power is exercised over a ‘flock’ rather than a ‘land’ of 
people. It is fundamentally a power focused on salvation, much as the shepherd gathers 
together his flock and saves it from danger. This is seen reflected in the DUP’s discourse, 
informed by the Free Presbyterian Church, during the “Save Ulster from Sodomy” 
campaign. For Foucault, ‘salvation’ provides a technology of power based on a scale of 
‘faults and merits’.88 Pastoral power is also devotional, like the shepherd who keeps watch 
over his flock, and it is individualising in that attention is given to each member of the 
flock. For the individual, the scale of ‘faults and merits becomes a process of ‘analytical 
identification’ grounded in the examination of the self.89   
As Carette explains, ‘the theological idea of truth creates a technology of power that 
creates an inner truth through direction and conduct, which is carried forward as 
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subjectivisation’ or the internalisation of that truth as an ‘inner secret’.90 The pastor and 
his flock are bound in a relationship whereby ‘the pastor must really take charge of and 
observe daily life in order to form a never-ending knowledge of the behaviour and conduct 
of the members of the flock he supervises’.91 The pastor’s concern with everyday minutiae 
necessarily includes guiding the thoughts of his flock – a procedure which involves the 
production and extraction of ‘a truth which binds one to the person who directs one’s 
conscience’.92 Foucault’s analysis helps to explain why the religious do not experience 
themselves as having a personal choice over the content of their conscience. It also reveals 
the earthly, discursive power relations at play, instead of the “divine law” posited by the 
church. 
Modern society retains the pastoral traits of self-examination and servitude: ‘the modern 
Western subject makes the pastorate one of the decisive moments in the history of power 
in Western societies’.93 This is how, according to Foucault, the principles of the Christian 
pastorate provide the origin of governmentality: ‘the real history of the pastorate as the 
source of a specific type of power over men, as a model and matrix of procedures for the 
government of men, really only begins with Christianity’.94 Foucault placed the shift from 
pastoral power to governmentality from the 16
th
 century, although pastoral power ‘has 
never been truly abolished… [it] is doubtless something from which we have still not freed 
ourselves’.95 Indeed, the intersection of pastoral power with other forms of power is 
illustrated in Chapter 4’s discussion of religious influence, privilege and exemptions in a 
wide area of public life. First, it is helpful to include some discussion of discourse theory 
as it relates to the issues raised in the chapters that follow. 
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Discourse theory 
Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse theory96 is a synthesis of recent developments in Marxist, 
poststructuralist and psychoanalytic theory, which can be used to reveal how social 
practices both articulate and contest the discourses that constitute the society in question.
97
 
The theory was intended as a ‘reformulation of the socialist project’,98 by offering a 
critique of what they saw as Marxism’s major flaw, ie that class struggle is the sole 
dynamic which characterises human society. Instead, they sought to develop a theory that 
could account for the emerging struggles around gender and race equality and gay rights. 
These multiple struggles against oppression were viewed as equally valid to the class 
struggle, because there is no single ‘true’ analysis of society; only a variety of discursive 
constructions: ‘there is not one discourse and one system of categories through which the 
‘real’ might speak without mediations’.99 Discourses, then, do not reflect the social world, 
but construct it.  
Terminology 
It is helpful to define some of the terms employed in discourse theory. The key terms to be 
drawn on are ‘empty signifier’, floating signifier’, ‘nodal point’ and ‘chain of 
equivalence’.100  An ‘empty signifier’ is one that has been emptied of any precise content. 
As seen in recent press discussions following the government’s attempt to inculcate school 
pupils with ‘British values’,101 this term means both everything and nothing at the same 
time, depending on the political vision of the individual or organisation deploying the term. 
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A ‘floating signifier’, on the other hand, is overflowing with meaning because it is 
articulated differently within different discourses. With reference to this research, terms 
like ‘rights’ and ‘equality’ can be seen as floating signifiers.  
A ‘nodal point’ is an empty signifier which can be used to fix the content of a range of 
floating signifiers by articulating them within a ‘chain of equivalence’, whereby a chain of 
identities is constructed among different elements that are seen as having a quality of 
sameness.
102
 Thus a nodal point is ‘a privileged sign around which other signs are ordered; 
the other signs acquire their meaning from their relationship to the nodal point’.103 Again, 
with reference to this research, ‘rights’ and ‘equality’ can be viewed as nodal points within 
liberalism itself, but floating signifiers in the struggle between religious expression and 
sexual orientation. We can now begin to understand Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse theory, 
which is based on the following understanding of discourse: 
Every discourse is constituted as an attempt to dominate the field of discursivity by 
expanding signifying chains which partially fix the meaning of the floating 
signifier. The privileged discursive points that partially fix meaning within 
signifying chains are called nodal points. The nodal point creates and sustains the 
identity of a certain discourse by constructing a knot of definite meanings.
104
  
In other words, discourse attempts to establish itself as hegemony. Hegemony is an 
important concept that requires more detailed discussion. Laclau and Mouffe define 
hegemony as ‘an articulatory practice instituting nodal points that partially fix the meaning 
of the social in an organized system of differences’.105 Discourses struggle to establish 
themselves as hegemonical – so dominant, and so entrenched, that their contingent nature 
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is all but forgotten – until they are revealed and disrupted through further struggle. By way 
of example, a recent speech given by the former Prime Minister, David Cameron, is the 
latest in a series of attempts to hegemonise the UK as (still) a Christian nation: 
I believe we should be more confident about our status as a Christian country, more 
ambitious about expanding the role of faith-based organisations, and, frankly, more 
evangelical about a faith that compels us to get out there and make a difference to 
people’s lives.106  
From a discourse-theoretical perspective, Cameron is using Christianity to give content to 
the otherwise empty concepts of ‘the nation’ and ‘the people’, and to cement Christianity 
as hegemonical within British society. However, ‘nodal points like “God” [and] “nation” 
are not characterised by a supreme density of meaning, but rather by a certain emptying of 
their contents, which facilitates their structural role of unifying a discursive terrain’.107 As 
Hook notes, ‘the strongest discourses are those which have attempted to ground themselves 
on the natural, the sincere, the scientific – on the level of the various correlates of the ‘true’ 
and reasonable’.108 However, attempts to represent societal unity tend to reveal conflicts 
and antagonisms that have hitherto been masked, or papered over. It is the possibilities of 
meaning, outside of this supposed unity, that provide the opportunity for critical analysis 
and change; and these discursive changes are the means by which the social world itself is 
changed.
109
  
The theory of the subject is another important element in discourse theory. It is 
intrinsically related to the discursive struggle for hegemony and to the antagonism that is 
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inherent within this struggle. It is also important for this research, because the expansion of 
gay rights, particularly into the arena of goods and services, represents an upheaval of the 
hegemony of heteronormativity and theonormativity. And – as Torfing suggests – ‘one 
way to undercut fundamentalist reassertions is to question the whole idea of fundamental 
values and essentialist identities’.110 As discussed in Chapter 2, legal liberalism views the 
subject as a rational, self-aware agent who is the source of her own ideas, values and 
actions. In contrast, a structuralist understanding posits the subject as ‘interpellated’ or 
entirely constructed by the ideological practices in which they participate.
111
 Laclau and 
Mouffe base their own concept of the ‘subject’ both on a critique of the shortcomings of 
both approaches, and on an application of Lacan’s psychoanalytic theory.112 They 
introduce the idea of ‘subject positions’ whereby the subject is interpellated – brought into 
being or given identity to – in a number of different positions at once, such as ‘mother’, 
‘worker’, ‘black person’ etc.  
While acknowledging Althusser’s characterisation of such positions as the result of 
sedimented structures in social practice, Laclau and Mouffe do not equate them with the 
subject herself. Social agents understand the world, and their position(s) within it, through 
discourse. When discursive antagonism occurs, the hegemonic discourse loses its pretence 
to universality and objectivity. As a consequence, the thoughts and actions of subjects are 
no longer shaped by the hegemony and it is here that the ‘subject’ emerges. Part of this 
research looks at the respective subject positions of ‘homosexual’ and ‘Christian’ within 
this discourse-theoretical framework, and considers the implications of the dislocation that 
the current conflict has caused. The current conflict between religion and sexual 
orientation lends itself well to a discourse-theoretical methodology. Interesting events are 
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taking place in this field of discursivity, which may prove pivotal in our future 
understanding of both sexuality and religious expression. 
This thesis does not use the traditional discourse analysis method, because the latter omits 
considerations of ‘knowledge, materiality and power’ in favour of looking solely at the 
language.
113
 Foucault warned against reducing discourse analysis to a simple reading of 
textuality, because ‘the history which determines us has the form of a war rather than that 
of language: relations of power, not relations of meaning’.114 The thesis is concerned with 
the broad range of discussion in society about the issue in question - the ‘macrodiscourse’ 
– rather than the ‘microdiscourse’ which is only concerned with the linguistic sense.115 It 
considers how ‘truths’ and ‘norms’ pertaining to sexual orientation and religious 
expression are constructed in law: what is deemed ‘normal’ or ‘good’, and what is 
pathologised? With reference to the knowledge/power symbiosis, the thesis questions 
whose interests are being served by these constructions, and what actions and identities are 
made acceptable by the mode of language used. This relates to the research framework set 
out in Chapter 1, which introduced Foucault’s five questions. It also reflects Goodrich and 
relates to the allegory of the master’s tools. 
Valverde’s observation that it may be more productive to consider inquiries into effects 
instead of focusing solely on interests is an interesting one. Taking up Nietzsche’s 
invitation to analyse social relations in terms of ‘deeds’, she argues that this can free us 
from ‘the tired dichotomies of agency and structure, freedom and constraint’.116 However, 
these ‘tired dichotomies’ are pertinent to the current conflict, not only because the 
                                                          
113
 Hook [n108], 36-7 
114
 Michel Foucault, ‘Two Lectures’ in C Gordon (ed), Power/knowledge: selected interviews and other 
writings by Michel Foucault 1972-77 (Pantheon Books, 1980), 114 
115
 John M Conley and William M O’Barr, Just Words: Law, Language and Power (University of Chicago 
Press, 2005), 7 
116
 Marina Valverde, ‘Some remarks on the rise and fall of discourse analysis’ (2000) Histoire Sociale/Social 
History 33, 65, 73 
104 
 
language employed by interested parties is often couched in terms of autonomy, freedom 
and restriction, but also because the conflict enables a critique of how these terms are being 
used.  What is persuasive about Valverde’s argument is her endorsement of the need to ask 
‘larger questions about governance and about forms of power that go beyond the local and 
the particular’.117 This is why the thesis looks at the role of the state in the current conflict.  
Methods 
It is important to note that neither Foucault, nor Laclau and Mouffe, ever prescribed a 
particular method for ‘doing’ a discourse-theoretical analysis. Nevertheless, there have 
been attempts to guide the researcher in the process. One example of such guidance is 
provided by Jorgensen and Phillips,
118
  who suggest a series to steps to follow. Firstly, 
identify the nodal points: which signs have a privileged status? Then, consider how other 
discourses define the same signs – floating signifiers – in different ways. By examining the 
competing content of the floating signifiers, we can begin to sketch out the struggles taking 
place over meaning. From there we consider which signs are subject to a struggle over 
meaning by competing discourses (floating signifiers), and which - if any - have relatively 
fixed, agreed meanings (moments). Through this we can understand how the discursive 
structure is constituted and changed.  
With reference to the current conflict, a discussion on group formation (“Christians” and 
“homosexuals”, for example) is also helpful. The process of the establishment of chains of 
equivalence leads to a reduction in possibilities which in turn constitutes a ‘group’.119 
Group formation has a role to play in ‘the struggle over how the myth about society is to be 
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filled with meaning’.120 In terms of method, we can search for the nodal point around 
which identity is organised in order to establish which (individual or group) subject 
positions are deemed relevant by the discursive structures – such as ‘Christian’ and 
‘homosexual’. We can then examine how the nodal point is filled with meaning by being 
equated with some and contrasted with others. As Jorgensen and Phillips conclude, ‘the 
construction of subject positions and hence identities is a battlefield where different 
constellations of elements struggle to prevail’.121  
Tensions and Critiques  
Several of the critiques of this approach hinge on Foucault’s conception of power. For 
example, Said argues that Foucault’s use of power ‘moves around too much, swallowing 
up every obstacle in its path… Resistance cannot equally be an adversarial alternative to 
power and a dependent function of it, except in some metaphysical, ultimately trivial 
sense’.122 Similarly, Dews argues that Foucault’s concept of power, ‘having nothing 
determinate to which it could be opposed, loses all explanatory content and becomes a 
ubiquitous, metaphysical principle’.123 Taylor suggests that Foucault’s idea of power “does 
not make sense without at least the idea of liberation’.124 It is true Foucault did not use the 
language of freedom and he was also skeptical of the idea of liberation. However, Foucault 
was concerned about freedom, if we understand it to mean the existence of the possibility 
of being otherwise.  
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It is certainly true that the meta-theoretical character of Foucault’s approach can be 
difficult to apply methodologically. As Torfing acknowledges, ‘discourse theory… has no 
ambition of furnishing a detailed framework for the study of all kinds of social, cultural 
and political relations’.125 However, it is still possible to use a Foucaultian and discourse-
theoretical approach to highlight where traditional concepts have floundered. From there, a 
new perspective can be attempted which is consistent with the assumptions of such an 
approach.  
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CHAPTER 4: A DISCURSIVE ANALYSIS OF STATUTE AND CASE LAW  
Power in our societies functions primarily not by repressing spontaneous sexual drives but 
by producing multiple sexualities… through the classification, distribution, and moral 
rating of those sexualities the individuals practicing them can be approved, treated, 
marginalized, sequestered, disciplined or normalized.
1
   
The conflict between religion and sexual orientation provides valuable insights into how 
legal norms are created and sustained; how they change; and the pressures this creates on 
legal liberalism. This conflict can also be seen as a microcosm of the wider relationship 
between law, religion and homosexuality, and the discursive techniques employed by legal 
actors. As such, it offers an opportunity to examine norm creation in its raw form. This 
chapter examines and critiques how law deals with the conflict between religious 
expression and sexual orientation.  
As explained in Chapter 3, the methodology used is based on a Foucaultian approach to the 
study of discourse. Thus the analysis 'is not about codes but about events: the law of 
existence of statements, that which rendered them possible – them and none other in their 
place’. 2 This is why the research uses Foucault’s five questions; to discover how and why 
some discourses relating to sexuality were abandoned while others persisted. Foucault 
views sexuality as an 'historical construct... a great surface network in which... the 
formation of special knowledges, the strengthening of controls and resistances, are linked 
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to one another, in accordance with a few major strategies of knowledge and power'.
3
 These 
resistances will be examined later on in the chapter. 
This chapter focuses on the statute and case law relating to sexual orientation under the 
employment and goods and services provisions of new equalities legislation. It highlights 
examples which reveal how equality law constructs both sexuality and religion. It 
examines how rights and equality discourses have influenced the relationship in this area 
between law, religion and sexual orientation, by analysing how conservative religious 
discourse has adapted both to influence the developing legal framework and to respond to 
it. The chapter also considers how rights and equality discourses have affected 
Strasbourg’s interpretation of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). This 
will provide a foundation for moving on, in subsequent chapters, to suggest how the 
relationship needs to change to ensure substantive equality for lesbians and gay men. 
Statute law 
Johnson and Vanderbeck’s discursive genealogy4 of UK statute law is a story of persistent 
religiously-inspired efforts to give legal voice to homophobia, by presenting Christian 
morality as established, objective and mainstream. Four broad discursive periods can be 
characterised by the dominance of particular religious discourses regarding homosexuality. 
First, in the wake of the Wolfenden Report,
5
 partial decriminalisation of homosexuality
6
 
was accepted by the religious establishment as a ‘pastoral solution to sexual deviancy’.7 
Removing the threat of criminal sanction rendered the (male) homosexual more available 
to moral regulation through the influence of the Christian churches. Moreover, the partial 
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decriminalisation of private homosexuality was traded for the primary concern: the 
increased legal regulation of public homosexuality. Furthermore, the 1967 Act did not 
merely commence a particular regime for regulating gay male sexual intimacy. Rather, it 
inaugurated the ‘homosexual’ as a legal figure.8 Thus, before the 1967 Act, the crime was 
‘buggery’ and it was not gender-specific. After the Act, sexual acts such as anal intercourse 
had discursively become the exclusive domain of gay men, and the link between sodomy 
and gay identity had been established in law (although it always threatens to unravel, given 
the actual complexity of sexuality). At the same time, the link between this practice and 
heterosexuals was erased. This is a good example of how law reform fails even as it 
succeeds, which is one of the themes of this research. Further, law’s emphasis on 
homosexual identity (albeit that crimes can only be committed by acts) might be viewed, in 
the present context, as a precursor of anti-discrimination law, vis-à-vis protected identity 
categories, and therefore as antithetical to Church teachings around sin and therefore acts.  
The post-Wolfenden emphasis on public regulation heralded a prolonged period of legal 
enforcement of religious morality at the expense of lesbians and gay men. One thinks of 
the moral panic surrounding HIV and AIDS, and the discursive spectre of children being 
‘corrupted’ and ‘endangered’ by homosexuality in schools, which gave rise to Section 28 
of the Local Government Act 1988.
9
 By the beginning of the 21st century, however, the 
discourse of ‘equality’ was in the ascendancy, and the debates that began in the 1990s 
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culminated in the repeal of Section 28,
10
 equalisation of the age of consent
11
 and – finally – 
full decriminalisation of homosexuality.
12
  
However, this discursive shift simply caused religious opponents of homosexuality to 
redefine their strategy, stepping back from explicit faith-based homophobia and grounding 
their opposition instead in pseudo-scientific, medical and “public morality” arguments. As 
Johnson and Vanderbeck argue,  
This denial that faith-based opposition to equality constitutes homophobia has 
become a central trope of religious opposition to law reform, and has underpinned 
efforts to resist legislative changes in respect of the adoption of children, education, 
employment, partnership rights and hate speech.
13
  
The final major discursive shift is an extension of this fear surrounding religious 
expression in the public sphere, as revealed in the contemporary concern over religious 
rights. There is now a perceived need by religious conservatives for protection from 
litigious gay people. This shift is expressed through a discourse that is again careful to 
disclaim homophobia, while bemoaning legal measures that extend the rights of lesbians 
and gay men at the expense of the religious conscience. As stated in Chapter 1, religious 
conservatives argue that their own rights are being compromised by restrictions upon the 
expression of faith in public life: in effect, their religiosity is being closeted. Yet the 
assertion of ‘religious rights’ against homosexual practice only makes sense if one accepts 
that there is some sort of special relationship between religion and sexual orientation which 
makes it necessary for Christian individuals to discriminate – that religious people have a 
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fundamental, incontrovertible need to oppose homosexuality. This is not always the case, 
as is shown later in this chapter. 
Sexual orientation equality and religious exemptions 
UK law has traditionally been more ready to embrace and formalise rights in favour of 
religion or belief than homosexuality. Even when gay rights have eventually been granted 
legal legitimacy, they have been diluted by religious exemptions and exceptions which 
effectively relegate lesbians and gay men to a lower rank of citizenship. This section 
discusses four strands of legislation that have extended the arm of anti-discrimination 
protection to lesbians and gay men: the Employment Equality (Sexual Orientation) 
Regulations 2003 (EESOR); the Equality Act 2006; the Equality Act (Sexual Orientation) 
Regulations 2007 (EASOR); and the Equality Act 2010. 
The Employment Equality (Sexual Orientation) Regulations 2003 
The 2003 Regulations were enacted as secondary legislation to give effect to a European 
Council Directive requiring equal treatment in employment and occupation.
14
 The 
Regulations made it illegal to discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation in 
employment and vocational training. They gave protection to lesbians and gay men from 
direct
15
 and indirect
16
 discrimination, victimisation
17
 and harassment.
18
 Prior to European 
intervention, various domestic attempts at protecting sexual orientation had failed. For 
example, MP Jo Richardson had argued unsuccessfully for sexual orientation employment 
rights during the Sex Equality Bill 1983: 
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There have been many disgraceful cases against both male and female homosexuals 
purely on the ground that they are homosexuals. No one can have any complaint 
about being denied a job because they are not qualified, or do not have the skills 
needed. However, to deny people the right to jobs purely because they are 
homosexual is wrong. The parliamentary assembly of the Council of Europe said in 
1981 that member states should assure equality of treatment, no more, no less, for 
homosexuals with regard to employment pay and job security, particularly in the 
public sector.
19
 
Baroness Turner subsequently made three unsuccessful attempts to prohibit anti-gay 
discrimination through the Sexual Orientation Discrimination Bill from 1995 to 1998.
20
  
During the 1998 House of Lords reading, Lord Arran gave a speech which captures some 
of the thinly-disguised hostility expressed towards the idea of lesbian and gay anti-
discrimination rights. He argued that it was for ‘those who are gay or of a different sexual 
orientation… to take care that they do not ostensibly, willingly and arbitrarily offend those 
with whom they work’.21 It is not clear what His Lordship meant by homosexuals 
‘ostensibly, willingly and arbitrarily’ offending their colleagues. If we translate his chosen 
words into synonyms, it seems that we are faced with the prospect of ‘apparent’ offence to 
colleagues, ‘eagerly’ and ‘capriciously’ caused by homosexuals. The description of 
homosexuals’ desire (and need) for protection from discrimination, victimisation or 
harassment at work as capricious implies that it has no legitimate basis in law.  
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Further, this translation reveals two homophobic discursive imaginaries: presumed 
‘offence’ - which is not quantified - to ‘others’ who are not specified; and a cohort of 
lesbians and gay men who are enthusiastically intent on keeping these ‘others’ on 
tenterhooks, waiting for the next psychic assault on their heterosexual sensibilities through 
having to witness lesbians and gay men ‘being’ homosexual in the public sphere. During 
the same debate, the Bishop of Wakefield expressed his concern for ‘some Christian and 
other religious charities which do not believe that homosexuality is compatible with 
Christian or other faith beliefs’.22 If we relate this argument to the four major discursive 
periods highlighted earlier in this chapter, we can see how it correlates to the first move by 
religious discourse away from explicit homophobia and towards more pseudo-objective 
intervention. 
EESOR 2003 Regulation 7(3) 
Following the first draft of the EESOR, religious organisations voiced worries that the 
exception regarding the ‘genuine occupational requirement’23 would compromise their 
wish to exclude lesbians and gay men from their employment. Baroness Young’s criticism 
that the Directive ‘represented another nail in the coffin of the whole Judaeo-Christian 
basis of our society’24 is a good example of the discursive device which presents faith-
based homophobia as an objective, transcendent ‘given’ and also as part of nationhood - a 
Christian England - despite the obvious reality of increasing secularisation. In this sense, 
                                                          
22
 HL debate, 5 June 1998, c. 649 
23
 Reg. 7 enabled an employer to discriminate on grounds of sexual orientation if ‘being of a particular sexual 
orientation is a genuine and determining occupational requirement’ and ‘it is proportionate to apply that 
requirement in the particular case’. The Regulation echoed Article 4.1 of Council Directive 2000/78/EC, 
which allowed member states to provide for a difference in treatment ‘where, by reason of the nature of the 
particular occupational activities concerned or of the context in which they are carried out, such a 
characteristic constitutes a genuine and determining occupational requirement, provided that the objective is 
legitimate and the requirement is proportionate’. 
24
 HL Debate, 30 June 2000, c.1189 
114 
 
the religious right invokes the past and the discourse of ‘the traditional’ for the purposes of 
protecting their interests in the present.  
Anxious to maintain their own vision of the basis of British society, the Church of 
England’s response to the draft Bill was aimed at widening the scope of the religious 
exception. They suggested that ‘nothing in… these Regulations shall render unlawful 
anything done for the purposes or in connection with an organised religion so as to comply 
with the doctrines of the religion or avoid offending the religious sensibilities of a 
significant number of its followers’.25 In fact, the religious exemptions granted in the final 
version of the EESOR went further than the ‘genuine occupational requirement’ 
exemption. 
Regulation 7(2) kept the original reference to an exemption applying when ‘being of a 
particular sexual orientation is a genuine and determining occupational requirement’ and 
‘it is proportionate to apply that requirement in the particular case’. On the other hand, 
regulation 7(3) exempts an ‘organised religion’ applying a requirement ‘related to sexual 
orientation’.26 It is possible that matters ‘related to’ sexual orientation could be used by 
religious conservatives to echo either Lord Arran’s imaginary of gratuitously offensive 
homosexuals, or perhaps to reactivate the tired heteronormative script that men and women 
should exhibit characteristics ‘appropriate’ to their sex. 
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The R (Amicus)
27
 case is a telling example of how religious influence has circumscribed 
laws aimed at extending homosexual citizenship to employment. In the judgment, Richards 
J observed that ‘Regulation 7(3) was not included in the detailed draft regulations… It was 
added as a result of the Churches’ intervention, in particular… the Archbishops’ Council of 
the Church of England’.28 Richards J referred to ‘evidence indicating that one reason for 
the different terms of regulation 7(3) is to encompass occupational requirements related not 
to sexuality as such but to sexual behaviour’,29 although a precise definition of ‘sexual 
behaviour’ was avoided. This 'evidence' was a letter signed on behalf of the General Synod 
and the Archbishop’s Council, which stated: 
The difficulty is that regulation 7(2) applies only where being of a particular sexual 
orientation is a genuine and determining occupational requirement. As explained 
above, we have no posts or offices where there is a requirement to be heterosexual 
(or indeed homosexual). Our requirements are in relation to behaviour, not 
sexuality itself. That is why the new regulations 7(3) and 16(3) refer to a 
'requirement related to sexual orientation.
30
   
It is unclear why the Archbishops’ Council thinks that orientation is equivalent to practice. 
It might be said that it fails to advance any material difference, and in this sense points to 
general confusion around the act/identity distinction . The same letter from the 
Archbishops demanded that the Church should have ‘freedom to determine what 
requirements in relation to sexual behaviour should apply’, not least with reference to 
celibacy and marriage. Such arguments represent a danger of reactivating earlier tropes 
regarding public displays of homosexuality. As one Member of Parliament put it during the 
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1967 debate on the Sexual Offences Act, ‘We cannot have homosexuals parading their 
homosexuality in public’.31 Concern to accommodate the religious dictum that sex outside 
(heterosexual) marriage is a sin has also created an opportunity for the reactivation of old 
stereotypes regarding how lesbians and gay men are understood to behave. As previously 
discussed, such stereotypes are constructed through the heteronormative gaze and thus 
relate to how ‘proper’ masculinity and femininity are expected to be performed.32  
The Church sought the exemption fully recognising that ‘this might otherwise constitute 
direct or indirect discrimination in relation to sexual orientation’.33  Lord Lester had argued 
(unsuccessfully) in the Lords for the removal of Regulation 7(3) precisely because of this. 
He said it was ‘both unnecessary and unlawful’, permitting discrimination beyond the 
remit of the Council Directive, the effect of which was ‘apparently permitting a religious 
body to refuse to employ not a priest but a cleaner or messenger because of their 
sexuality’.34 Furthermore, the proportionality requirement found in Regulation 7(2) is 
absent from Regulation 7(3), meaning that the exemption does not, on the face of it, have 
to meet criteria that prevent the use of a “sledgehammer to crack a nut”. In addition, 
Richards J rejected an argument made in Amicus that Regulation 7(3) breached the 
principle of legal certainty.
35
 Advocating a narrow construction of the wording, the judge 
saw no difficulty in interpreting them so as to comply with the Council Directive. 
However, he did not fully address what might be covered by matters ‘related to sexual 
orientation’. Thus he missed the opportunity to tackle religious interference with the rule of 
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law. The desirability of legal certainty will be returned to in the case law which is 
discussed later in this chapter.  
The debate in Amicus centred more on the perceived need to preserve ‘religious liberty’ 
than on any discussion of homosexuality or recognition of homophobia. Keeping the focus 
on sexual behaviour enabled religious conservatives ‘to make opaque their central concern 
about employing homosexuals’.36 Moreover, these arguments represent an attempt to 
dissociate sexual behaviour from sexuality itself. If sexual orientation is protected in law, it 
becomes necessary to distance orientation from behaviour in order to justify religious 
exemptions. This argument has been adopted repeatedly in the case law, as will be 
demonstrated later in this chapter. 
EESOR: an emerging hierarchy of rights 
As stated earlier in this thesis, conservative pro-religious discourse contends that the UK 
suffers from a ‘hierarchy of rights’ in which faith is relegated below sexual orientation. 
However, it can be argued that the EESOR 2003 actually began to establish a ‘hierarchy of 
rights’ in favour of religious privilege. The EESOR debates highlight the discourse that 
religious sensibilities are somehow special, and are as worthy of exemption from equality 
law as religious doctrines, which are similarly elevated. Religious organisations enjoy the 
privilege of a wider exemption regarding sexual orientation equality than that available to 
any other employer. The exemption for organised religion was retained, albeit in slightly 
modified form, in the consolidated Equality Act 2010
37
 which will be discussed later in 
this chapter. First, the following section charts the statutory genesis of the expansion of 
lesbian and gay equality rights into the arena of goods, services, facilities and premises. 
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The Equality Act 2006 and the Equality Act (Sexual Orientation) Regulations 2007 
The 2006 Act extended existing laws prohibiting discrimination in the provision of goods, 
services, facilities and premises on grounds of race so as to cover religion and faith. 
Section 57 of the Act permitted religious organisations to restrict membership, goods, 
services and premises if imposed, inter alia, ‘in order to avoid causing offence, on grounds 
of religion or belief to which the organisation relates, to persons of that religion or belief’. 
Despite religious opposition, the Act also included an amendment tabled by the House of 
Lords, requiring the government to introduce secondary legislation prohibiting 
discrimination and harassment on grounds of sexual orientation. The ensuing debate 
illustrates how religious conservatives were careful to disclaim homophobia, couching 
their opposition instead in terms of the need to balance ‘the right not to be discriminated 
against on the one hand and the right to freedom of religion on the other’, and calling for 
‘early discussions with the Churches and other faith communities on how their interests 
can be reflected in the provisions’.38 
There was also concern for how the law would affect “ordinary people” who provided 
goods and services such as bed and breakfast facilities in their own homes.
39
 As Johnson 
and Vanderbeck point out, ‘religious opposition to equality legislation was concerned with 
maintaining boundaries between homosexuality and private and domestic dwellings’,40 and 
the image of the beleaguered “ordinary person” who would have to suffer public 
homosexuality was a key feature of this opposition. However, the government’s 
consultation document stated that religious exemptions would not apply ‘where the sole or 
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main purpose of the organisation offering the service is commercial’,41 and that any 
exemptions would be ‘limited to activities closely linked to religious observance or 
practices that arise from the basic doctrines of a faith’.42  
Disavowal of homophobia was again present in the religious opposition to this proposal. 
Pressing for wider exemptions, the Catholic Bishops’ Conference asserted that ‘there 
appears to be little recognition in the consultation document of the difference between 
homophobia and a conviction, based on religious belief and moral conscience, that 
homosexual practice is wrong’.43 Note also the inclusion of ‘moral conscience’ here, as an 
augury of more recent arguments in favour of recognising religious ‘conscientious 
objection’. This is discussed later in the thesis. For now, it is important to note this 
discursive technique of disclaiming and denying of homophobia. 
Religious objections to the proposals culminated in significant exemptions for Northern 
Ireland. In an echo of the 2003 Regulations, restrictions against lesbians and gay men were 
permitted if ‘necessary to comply with the doctrine of the organisation’ or ‘so as to avoid 
conflicting with the strongly held religious convictions of a significant number of the 
religious followers’.44 Nevertheless, there were moves to have the Regulations annulled, 
with Lord Morrow arguing that they posed a threat to ‘religious liberty’: 
They make it possible for homosexual activists to sue people who disagree with a 
homosexual lifestyle because of their religious beliefs. Bed and breakfast owners 
and Christian old people’s homes will be sued for not giving a double bed to 
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homosexual civil partners. Wedding photographers will be made to pay 
compensation for not taking bookings for civil partnership ceremonies. Christians 
in business could even be sued for sharing their faith with customers. Worst of all, 
they require religious organisations to choose between obedience to God and 
obedience to the state.
45
 
Lord Morrow paints a vivid image of religious service providers being persecuted by 
organised homosexuals with a litigious agenda to promote their ‘lifestyle’ (whatever that 
may be). From the historical view, discussed in Chapter 2, that homosexuals suffered from 
an excess of desire, 'homosexual activists' now appear to be suffering from an excessive 
desire for equality.
46
  
We also see once again an appeal to conscience and to religious concern over a ‘hierarchy 
of rights’ – which religious conservatives see as operating in favour of homosexuality. This 
was successfully deployed in a judicial review of the Regulations in Northern Ireland.
47
 As 
Johnson and Vanderbeck observe in their discussion of the case, Weatherup J’s reasoning 
‘legitimises the view that religious believers require exceptions from anti-discrimination 
law relating to sexual orientation because of their need to manifest their religion through 
expressions about homosexuality’ and ‘endorses the view that curtailing the manifestation 
of faith-based hostility to homosexuality amounts to a form of discrimination’.48 These 
discourses construct religious believers as victims of both an oppressive state machine and 
a perceived eager horde of litigious gay activists. 
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These discourses continue to prevail. As a consequence of the faith-based furore over the 
Northern Ireland Regulations, provisions prohibiting harassment on grounds of sexual 
orientation were omitted from the EASOR 2007 which applied to the rest of the UK. 
Nevertheless, the 2007 Regulations were criticised for being ‘an assault on the freedom of 
conscience of millions of our fellow citizens’.49 This concern emanated from the perceived 
need to protect religious liberty to ‘promulgate the view that homosexuality is sinful or 
wrong’.50 One member of the House of Lords saw the legislation as proof that the 
government had ‘taken the view that gay rights trump religious rights’.51 The Archbishop 
of York also argued: 
The Government are venturing down an unconsidered path through the 
establishment of a new hierarchy of rights. Rather than levelling the playing field 
for those who suffer discrimination… this legislation effects a rearrangement of 
discriminatory attitudes and bias to overcompensate and skew the field the other 
way. 
52
 
This ‘hierarchy of rights’ discourse relies on the religious assertion of a ‘special 
relationship’ between religion and sexual orientation, which makes it absolutely essential 
for individual Christians to be able discriminate against homosexuals. This chapter 
analyses how this presumed 'special relationship' influences the case law arising out of the 
2003 and 2007 Regulations. First, it is necessary to bring this discussion of statute law up 
to date by considering the Equality Act 2010. 
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The Equality Act 2010 
Following reports from The Equalities Review
53
 and The Discrimination Law Review,
54
 
the Equality Act 2010 consolidated and replaced previous equality legislation.
55
 The 2010 
Act deems age, disability, race, religion or belief, sex, sexual orientation, gender 
reassignment, marriage and civil partnership, and pregnancy and maternity to be 'protected 
characteristics'.
56
  It forbids the use of these characteristics as a basis for both direct
57
 and 
indirect
58
 discrimination. Service providers are now prevented from discriminating against 
any of the protected characteristics.
59
 There is also a general duty on local authorities to 
promote equality.
60
  
The extension of this duty to encompass sexual orientation drew strong (albeit 
unsuccessful) protests from religious groups.
61
 Other religious protests against equality 
were more successful. For example, the Equality Bill sought to include a proportionality 
test to the employment exemption.
62
 The proportionality test would have required religious 
organisations to demonstrate that restrictions related to employees’ sexual orientation were 
a ‘proportionate means’ of adhering to religious doctrine or avoiding offence to the 
religious convictions of a significant number of the religion’s faithful.63 Following 
opposition from the Church of England and the Catholic Church, the proportionality test 
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was dropped. This gives religion a uniquely privileged status in the Equality Act 2010, 
because these bespoke provisions allow greater scope for anti-gay discrimination than that 
available to other employers. There is also a somewhat mixed message to the effect that, 
while Schedule 9 does not refer to proportionality, the Explanatory Notes (790-791) state 
that the exception must be applied in a ‘proportionate way’. This mixed message does little 
to reassure those who are concerned about legal certainty under the rule of law. 
During the passage of the Equality Act 2010, religious conservatives sought to widen the 
remit of religious exemptions that existed in the 2007 Regulations. Familiar arguments and 
tropes were reactivated in the course of this opposition to extended gay rights. For 
example, Lord Mackay attempted to include protection for those with a ‘genuine 
conscientious objection’ who wished to withhold goods and services from lesbians and gay 
men,
64
 while the Bishop of Chichester warned against the ‘profoundly dangerous tendency’ 
to try to ‘privatise belief’.65 These attempts may have failed, but the new Act nonetheless 
reproduced the broad scope of exemptions granted to religious organisations, enabling 
them to lawfully discriminate against lesbians and gay men in the provision and use of 
goods, services, facilities and premises.  
The 2010 Act prohibits a service provider from harassing a service user
66
 and also 
prohibits harassment in the exercise of a public function.
67
 However, it is worth noting that 
neither religion or belief nor sexual orientation count as ‘protected characteristics’ for the 
purposes of harassment. On the face of it, it could be argued that this represents parity in 
the provision – indeed, this was a central argument invoked by religious conservatives68 in 
the pursuit of ‘equality’ – but it is submitted that the possibility of harm was not taken 
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sufficiently seriously. While MP Diane Abbott argued in support of protection against 
harassment for sexual minorities, acknowledging that ‘some people use their religion as a 
vehicle for cultural bigotry’,69 MSP John Mason retorted that ‘one person’s bigotry is 
another person’s belief’ and extending harassment protection to homosexuals would 
‘create a risk to free speech’70 on the part of religious people. The relationship between 
homophobia and harm is returned to in Chapter 6 of this thesis. 
Statute law: future directions? 
The recent consultation by the Equality and Human Rights Commission is part of their 
three-year programme to ‘strengthen understanding of religion or belief in public life’.71 
Conservative religious campaign groups have encouraged their followers to respond, with 
the aim of ensuring ‘that freedoms for Christians are protected more effectively, whether at 
work, school, church or other public setting’.72 At this point it is instructive to refer back to 
the Equality and Human Rights Commission’s 2011 report Religion or belief, equality and 
human rights in England and Wales.
73
 In its exploration of the relationship of religion to 
the state, the report acknowledges the view that understanding the ‘importance of 
religion… and its manifestation will be implicit in the balancing exercise between the 
interests of religion, the state and individuals in particular instances where these appear to 
conflict’.74 The Report also poses the question ‘as to whether a hierarchical analysis is 
required in order to resolve what might otherwise be intractable conflicts’75 such as that 
between religion and sexual orientation, but notes that ‘most commentators, viewing rights 
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as indivisible and interdependent, reject this approach in favour of an analysis that seeks to 
balance and give importance to each right’.76 
The purported need for a ‘conscience clause’ was raised again in Parliament during Prime 
Minister’s Questions. With reference to the current Asher’s bakery dispute,77 Democratic 
Unionist Party (DUP) MP Gregory Campbell asked whether religious freedom should be 
protected by a conscience clause. The former Prime Minister, David Cameron, was 
apparently unaware of the dispute, although he did say: 
I do think a commitment to equality in terms of racial equality, in terms of equality 
to those of different sexes, equality in terms of people who have disabilities or 
indeed tolerance and equality of people with different sexualities, all of that is a 
very important part of being British.
78
 
It is interesting to note that ‘people with different sexualities’ are cited as the only people 
in need of ‘tolerance’ as well as equality. Presumably society has gone beyond the 
construction of women, minority ethnic people and people with disabilities as people 
whom we should merely ‘tolerate’, whereas lesbians and gay men are still hampered by 
this construction. The Prime Minister’s recent comments above can be compared and 
contrasted to a speech he gave earlier in 2014, in which he waxed evangelical about the 
role of Christianity in public life: 
I believe we should be more confident about our status as a Christian country, more 
ambitious about expanding the role of faith-based organisations, and, frankly, more 
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evangelical about a faith that compels us to get out there and make a difference to 
people’s lives.79 
Similarly, the former Faith Minister warned that ‘long standing British liberties of freedom 
of religion have been undermined by the intolerance of aggressive secularism’.80 This 
suggests that the discourse of ‘religious rights’ may spawn a reactivation of religiosity in 
the public sphere. Religious hostility towards homosexuality may have had to change its 
expression in the face of emerging discourses of equality and human rights. Nevertheless, 
religion remains central to the process of lawmaking and to legislation itself, the Same-Sex 
Marriage Act 2013 being the most recent example.
81
  
Case Law 
The developing discourses surrounding a hierarchy of rights and conscientious objection 
are also regularly being played out in case law. It has become common to claim that 
religious expression needs protection in cases that have come before the domestic courts 
and the European Court of Human Rights.
82
 Furthermore, the discourse of ‘religious rights’ 
may empower religious conservatives to plead future legal disputes on the basis of 
‘freedom of conscience’ under Article 9 of the European Convention.83 Although 
Parliament did not include a general conscientious objection clause in either the Equality 
Act 2010 or the Marriage (Same-Sex Couples) Act 2013, Article 9(1) may imply an 
absolute protection to freedom of conscience that is not otherwise available to religion or 
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belief.  It has already been suggested that even where Parliament has not expressly allowed 
for conscientious objection, such a provision needs to be read into equality legislation so as 
to be compliant with the Convention.
84
  
It is helpful first to sketch a brief genealogy of European case law relating to 
homosexuality. While the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has played a 
‘prominent role’ in developing human rights for lesbians and gay men, its moral reasoning 
about homosexuality has influenced its use of legal method, and the prevalence of 
heteronormativity has influenced the Court’s interpretation of the Convention.85 The 
ECtHR adjudicates complaints brought under the European Convention on Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms, which in turn guarantees those civil and political rights first 
set out in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted by the United Nations in 
1948. The Convention came into force in 1953, but the need to embed universal rights for 
LGBT people was only recognised by the Council of Europe in 2011, when they stated that 
‘there is considerable resistance among many people to discuss the full enjoyment of 
universal human rights by LGBT persons. Even if this may not be a popular human rights 
topic, the time has now come to take the discussion forward and make it concrete’.86 
Hall and Preddy v Bull – County Court87 
This case involved a gay male couple in a civil partnership, who were refused a double-bed 
room in a private hotel run by orthodox Christians. The men had booked the room by 
telephone and thus were not aware of the hotel's policy (stated on the website) that only 
married couples could be accommodated in double-bed rooms. The gay couple brought a 
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discrimination claim against the hotel owners under the Equality Act (Sexual Orientation) 
Regulations 2007. They also argued that their Article 8 right to privacy had been interfered 
with by the Bulls' refusal to allocate them a double bed. Mr Preddy was quoted as having 
been 'annoyed and upset' by this refusal, while Mr Hall 'was embarrassed, angry and felt 
humiliated'.
88
 The hotel owners denied direct or indirect discrimination on the basis that 
the restriction on having a double room had ‘nothing to do with sexual orientation but… 
everything to do with sex’.89 They relied on three Convention rights in their defence: 
Article 8 (privacy), Article 9 (freedom of religion) and Article 14 (anti-discrimination).
90
 
Mr and Mrs Bull's pleadings echo the discourse of “improper” sexual behaviours discussed 
earlier in this chapter, where anti-gay discrimination is disclaimed and homophobia is 
denied. 'It's not them as people; it's what they do in bed' is the thrust of the argument. But, 
as the judge observed, the hotel's policy meant that, in effect, 
Two persons of the same sex… in a sexual relationship and who have come to 
Cornwall intent on a sexually fulfilling weekend may enjoy that weekend to the full 
in a twin-bedded room. Putting it bluntly the hotel policy allows them to do so 
albeit in the confines of a smaller bed.
91
  
With this in mind, it is not entirely clear what the hoteliers aimed to achieve through their 
policy, other than sending a message to homosexual couples that they were not welcome. 
Rutherford J had the task of legal decision-making, and the judge's thought process makes 
for interesting reading. He began his judgment with a description of four statues to be 
found in a court building in The Strand: King Alfred, Moses, King Solomon and Jesus. 
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Speculating on the reasons for placing statues of these particular figures in a court 
building, the judge suggested that 'one was to emphasise the Judaeo-Christian roots from 
which the common law of England was derived'.
92
 He then acknowledged that 'those 
Judaeo-Christian principles, standards and beliefs which were accepted as normal in times 
past are no longer so accepted',
93
 and recognised that 'it is inevitable that such laws will 
from time to time cut across deeply held beliefs of individuals and sections of society for 
they reflect the social attitudes and morals prevailing at the time that they are made'.
94
 
Accordingly, 'it is no longer the case that our laws must, or should, automatically reflect 
the Judaeo-Christian position'.
95
 The judge quoted Laws LJ in McFarlane: ''The general 
law may of course protect a particular social or moral position which is espoused by 
Christianity, not because of its religious imprimatur, but on the footing that in reason its 
merits commend themselves.'
96
 
Here, Rutherford J (no doubt unconsciously) echoes Foucault in emphasising the 
contingency of Judaeo-Christian religious principles, and takes the opportunity to distance 
himself from the view that they should continue to prevail in law. At the same time, he 
recognises that legal decisions which reflect this contingency can have devastating effects 
on those who view the principles as fundamental and transcendent.  However, the judge’s 
subsequent choice of words is somewhat unfortunate. In expressing his awareness of 'the 
deeply held views on both sides'
97
 and in stating that 'each side hold perfectly honourable 
and respectable, albeit wholly contrary, views',
98
 the judge seems to equate religious belief 
with sexual orientation in the sense of their both being 'views', albeit ‘valid and 
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respectable’ ones. This fallacy meant that the remainder of Rutherford J's judgment 
focused on the technical aspect of the Regulations, rather than on the nature of the rights in 
question and the principles underlying them.  
Thus, the judge was prepared to view the running of a hotel along Christian principles as a 
manifestation of a religious belief.
99
 However, he viewed the fact that the two men were in 
a civil partnership as crucial. Regulation 3(4) of the 2007 Regulations (which treats 
marriage and civil partnership as equivalent for these purposes) applies to both direct and 
indirect discrimination: 'There is no material difference… between marriage and a civil 
partnership. If that is right, then on what basis do the defendants draw a distinction if it is 
not on sexual orientation?' 
100
 With reference to Article 8, the 'defendants’ right to have 
their private and family life and their home respected is inevitably circumscribed by their 
decision to use their home in part as an hotel'.
101
 Rutherford J was clearly correct in law to 
rely on Regulation 3(4) in his decision-making, but it did prevent him from having to 
consider the merits of all the arguments. In particular, there was no recognition of the 
heteronormativity implied in the equivalence of heterosexual marriage and homosexual 
civil partnerships. In effect, homosexual relationships are considered suitable for legal 
protection only if they mirror traditional heterosexual ones.   
The Regulations also emphasise that accommodation run on a commercial basis must be 
offered without discrimination against lesbians and gay men, and the judge recognised that 
'it is clear that homosexuals as a group are disadvantaged by the practice adopted by the 
defendants'.
102
 The Bulls had argued that a reasonable balance could be struck by not 
requiring them to promote what they believed to be sinful; such an exception could be 
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justified by the fact that it was necessary to enable them to live and work in their own hotel 
as practising Christians. Applying the discourse of a hierarchy of rights, they said that it 
'would be unfortunate to replace past legal oppression of one community (same-sex 
couples) with current legal oppression of another (persons holding the same beliefs as the 
defendants).'
103
 While upholding the men’s claim for discrimination on grounds of sexual 
orientation, Rutherford J granted the defendants leave to appeal, because ‘this decision 
does affect the human rights of the defendants to manifest their religion and forces them to 
act in a manner contrary to their deeply and genuinely held beliefs.’104 
Court of Appeal
105
 
The appellants based their appeal on Articles 8, 9, 14 and 17 (abuse of rights) of the 
ECHR, and on s 13 of the Human Rights Act 1998. This provision was inserted into the 
legislation following representations from religious organisations. Referring to the right to 
freedom of thought, conscience and religion expressed in Article 9, section13 states that 
‘the court must have particular regard to the importance of that right’. Again, the appellants 
argued that their religious objection to a particular sexual conduct - sexual relations outside 
marriage - was the basis for the restriction.
106
 The respondents relied on James v Eastleigh 
Borough Council,
107
 which held that the test for discrimination is objective and motive is 
irrelevant. Rafferty LJ regarded James as being ‘fatal to the Appellants’ case.’ This, along 
with the ‘clear decision’ to include hoteliers within the 2007 Regulations (in Regulation 
14), meant that direct discrimination was found to exist and it was therefore ‘not necessary 
to reach a conclusion on the issue of indirect discrimination’.108 While this reasoning 
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benefited the respondents, it represents a missed opportunity to discuss issues of 
justification with reference to indirect discrimination.
109
 Nevertheless, parts of the 
judgment are telling as regards how the Court of Appeal understands religion and sexual 
orientation. The judge referred back to the case of Williamson, which held that, to fall 
within Article 9, a belief must be ‘consistent with basic standards of human dignity or 
integrity, possess an adequate degree of seriousness and importance and be intelligible and 
capable of being understood’. 110 It could be argued that a belief which manifests itself by 
discriminating against a sector of the population is not quite ‘consistent with basic 
standards of human dignity or integrity’.  
Referring to the judgment in Ladele,
111
 Rafferty LJ stated further that ‘it is clear that the 
rights protected by the article are qualified, and that it is only beliefs which are ‘worthy of 
respect in a democratic society and are not incompatible with human dignity’ which are 
protected.
112
 Is discrimination against lesbians and gay men worthy of respect in a 
democratic society? Is it compatible with human dignity? Even if Begum
113
 holds that 
‘Article 9 does not require that one should be allowed to manifest one’s religion at any 
time and place of one’s own choosing’, the implication remains that homosexuality renders 
people second-class: they cannot have full citizenship rights if ‘democratic society’ deems 
beliefs which discriminate against them to be acceptable. Carl Stychin observed some time 
ago that there is little opportunity in law to examine ‘the offensiveness of some religious 
doctrine’.114 Yet the present judgment reveals that: 
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The Respondents were at pains throughout to acknowledge that the Appellants’ 
principled stand was intended to bear witness to their interpretation of Christianity. 
Arguments on both sides recognized that co-existence in society requires mutual 
acceptance of differing views and standards and each side readily bowed to the 
strongly held views of the other.
115
   
Once again, religious belief and sexual orientation are placed in a situation of equivalence 
for the purposes of a pluralistic balancing exercise. Furthermore, while it is seen to be 
‘reasonable’ to honour the importance of religious belief to the faithful, the idea that 
sexuality is merely a ‘view’ (albeit a ‘strongly held’ one), negates its importance and 
meaning for the people concerned. Indeed, it negates the people concerned, because it 
relegates homosexuality to a ‘choice’. The judge recognised that, ‘the manifestation of… 
religious beliefs cannot excuse direct discrimination’.116 However, his judgment in favour 
of the respondents nevertheless betrays a heteronormative attitude, with his observation 
that: 
… the rooms available to the guests are not in the part of the building Mr and Mrs 
Bull occupy as their home… they are not obliged to provide double bedded rooms 
at all, but if they do, then they must be prepared to let them to homosexual couples, 
at least if they are in a civil partnership.
117
  
The judge was reinforcing the point that the law obliges hotel owners to let their rooms 
without discrimination, and that calling a hotel ‘private’ does not mean it is not still a 
commercial enterprise and subject to equality law. Yet his wording might be seen as a 
subliminal message to lesbians and gay men that their sexuality is something that people 
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might not want to have sullying their home space. In addition, the reference to civil 
partnership status reflects the degree of inclusiveness of law at the time of the case. 
However, it also reflects the idea that homosexuality is best able to be protected if it is 
displayed in ways as close as possible to heterosexuality. Hooper LJ was the only Court of 
Appeal judge who considered that ‘it matters not in law whether the homosexual couple 
are in a civil partnership’.118 
Supreme Court
119
 
Lady Hale mentioned Black and Morgan v Wilkinson,
120
 another ‘bed and breakfast’ case 
which had by then been heard in the County Court. In that case the couple were not in a 
civil partnership, but the court had felt bound by the Court of Appeal’s decision in Preddy 
v Bull
121
 to find direct discrimination (they would have preferred to hold that the 
discrimination was indirect but not justified). Permission had been given to appeal to the 
Supreme Court so that both cases could be heard together, but in the event the hotel owner 
chose not to pursue her appeal. Therefore, as Lady Hale stated: ‘This court is therefore 
solely concerned to decide the issues as they arise in relation to a same sex couple who are 
civil partners’.122 This represents another missed opportunity to go beyond those gay 
relationships that simply mirror heterosexuality, because Lady Hale was thus able to say: 
‘it does make a difference that this couple were in a civil partnership’.123 She went on to 
say that, ‘with or without regulation 3(4), I have the greatest difficulty in seeing how 
discriminating between a married and a civilly partnered person can be anything other than 
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direct discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation’.124 In developing this theme, she 
added:  
Parliament has created the institution of civil partnership in order that same sex 
partners can enjoy the same legal rights as partners of the opposite sex. They are 
also worthy of the same respect and esteem. The rights and obligations entailed in 
both marriage and civil partnership exist both to recognise and to encourage stable, 
committed, long-term relationships. It is very much in the public interest that 
intimate relationships be conducted in this way.
125
  
Lady Hale is, no doubt, concerned to underline the parity of treatment required in law for 
both civil partnership and heterosexual marriage, and to emphasise that this demands a 
finding of direct discrimination which can never be justified in law. Yet her words 
unintentionally replicate the heteronormative view that relationships matter more when 
they are long-term, stable and akin to monogamous marriage. Perhaps she is also aware of 
the old tropes characterising homosexuals as promiscuous and capable only of intimacy of 
limited duration. Her words leave these tropes untouched with reference to lesbians and 
gay men who have chosen not to formalise their relationships, for whatever reason. This 
illustrates the difficulty that legal liberalism still has with relationships that do not conform 
to the standard model, and why it may benefit from conversations with Queer theory.  
Lady Hale’s judgment does include an important paragraph acknowledging the history of 
lesbian and gay oppression. Recognising that ‘the expression of sexuality requires a 
partner, real or imagined’,126 she stated: 
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Heterosexuals have known this about themselves and have been able to fulfil 
themselves in this way throughout history. Homosexuals have also known this 
about themselves but were long denied the possibility of fulfilling themselves 
through relationships with others. This was an affront to their dignity as human 
beings which our law has now (some would say belatedly) recognised. 
Homosexuals can enjoy the same freedom and same relationships as any others. 
But we should not underestimate the continuing legacy of those centuries of 
discrimination, persecution even, which is still going on in many parts of the world. 
It is no doubt for that reason that Strasbourg requires ‘very weighty reasons’ to 
justify discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation. It is for that reason that we 
should be slow to accept that prohibiting hotel keepers from discriminating against 
homosexuals is a disproportionate limitation on their right to manifest their 
religion. 
127
 
An important part of Lady Hale’s reasoning, therefore, is based upon a desire to remedy 
centuries of lesbian and gay oppression. This is a huge step forward for same-sex 
recognition rights. Her references to homophobia undermining gay people’s ‘dignity as 
human beings’ contrasts with the indulgence afforded to religious belief – including those 
beliefs which display antipathy towards alternative sexualities and ways of living. Law’s 
unwillingness to address this aspect of religious belief is ameliorated by the limitations 
imposed on the manifestation of belief by Article 9(2) of the Convention. Yet law will 
continue to struggle with religion’s interface with homosexuality, as long as it continues to 
assume a ‘special relationship’ between the two that enables discriminatory attitudes to 
appear valid. 
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In line with three of her fellow judges, Lady Hale found that the Bulls had discriminated 
directly against their prospective hotel guests. Two judges found that indirect 
discrimination was proven. All five judges agreed that, if it were indirect discrimination, it 
was not justified. Lord Neuberger, while agreeing with Lady Hale, departed from one 
aspect of her reasoning. He thought that regulation 3(4) simply established that, for the 
purpose of establishing direct or indirect discrimination, one must assume ‘no material 
difference’ between civil partnership and marriage. Of itself, it was not a reason for finding 
direct discrimination, given that it would have been indirect discrimination had the men not 
been in a civil partnership. Lord Neuberger felt it was important to keep the law in this area 
clear and consistent, not least so that ‘potential and alleged discriminators and victims, as 
well as their advisers, know where they stand’.128  
Lord Hughes set out a five-stage procedure in order to establish whether an act constituted 
direct discrimination, and highlighted what he saw as a flaw in the fourth stage with regard 
to the current case. Arguing that sexual orientation is the ground for the hoteliers’ less 
favourable treatment of the couple ‘concentrates on the characteristics of these claimants 
rather than on the defendants’ reasons for treating them as they did’.129  The judge 
described Mr Hall and Mr Preddy, in a civil partnership, as a ‘subset of the unmarried’. 
The hoteliers treated such people the same as the two other subsets of the unmarried: same-
sex couples not in a civil partnership; and opposite sex unmarried couples. For Lord 
Hughes, regulation 3(4) and the public interest in ‘stable publicly-committed unions of 
both kinds’ do not help resolve the question of which kind of discrimination is operating in 
this case. Lord Hughes, in categorising the same-sex couple as a ‘subset of the unmarried’, 
falls into the trap of regarding their relationship – and their sexuality – through the lens of 
the religious conservative. The Bulls elevated heterosexual marriage to a sanctified 
                                                          
128
 [n 105] [84]  
129
 [n 105] [88-92] 
138 
 
position and treated all other forms of relationship as less than worthy. Lord Hughes 
unwittingly does the same.  
Black & Morgan v Wilkinson – County Court130 
This case involved a claim in tort for breach of statutory duty under regulation 20 of the 
2007 Regulations. The gay couple in question were not in a civil partnership. As in the 
above case, the matter originated in the County Court, and it is worth looking at these 
proceedings which set out clearly the hoteliers’ arguments. Again, the defendant claimed 
that her problem was with ‘homosexual sexual relations’ (as opposed to homosexual 
orientation) because, along with heterosexual sexual relations outside marriage, they are 
“sinful”. This disclaiming of homophobic intent betrays another homophobic trope of 
“rampant” (particularly male) homosexuality. The defendant said she had turned away 
several unmarried heterosexual couples ‘where it was obvious that they were unmarried 
from the fact that they only wanted use of the room during the day for sex’. 131  If one 
believes that sex is necessarily linked to procreation within heterosexual marriage, one 
might conclude that a desire to have sex during the day reflected a concern more for 
pleasure than for baby-making. However, it does not explain why a gay couple who 
wanted a bed for the night would be presumed to be intent on having sex – unless one 
believes that all gay men are prone to constant sexual activity – which is itself another 
homophobic trope.  
Interestingly, the defendant does appear to have allowed some unmarried couples to stay in 
the double rooms because ‘it is impossible to know whether a heterosexual couple is 
married unlike with a homosexual couple and it would be offensive to pry into their 
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personal lives either when booking or on arrival’.132 This statement suggests that the 
defendant’s differential treatment of heterosexuals and homosexuals is actually grounded 
on sexual orientation rather than sexual behaviour. Here the act/identity distinction, 
whether rendered explicit or remaining implicit, appears to unravel. It also highlights the 
presumed privacy of heterosexual relationships as opposed to homosexual relationships 
which are subject to intrusive assumptions and prejudices. Nowhere was it argued that it is 
not acceptable to have any relationship choices subject to scrutiny by religious service 
providers. Furthermore, the double bedroom in question is ‘in the heart’ of the defendant’s 
home and she treats guests ‘as if they are members of her own family’. Accordingly, she 
has ‘sought to restrict the sharing of the double rooms to heterosexual preferably married 
couples’ and not permitting the gay couple to share a double room ‘in her home’ was a 
manifestation of her religious belief because she believed their behaviour to be sinful. Yet 
the word ‘preferably’ suggests again how it is sexual orientation and not marital status or 
behaviour that presents a problem for her in running her business.  
The judge found in favour of the claimants. He considered himself bound by Bull to find 
that the running of a hotel on Christian principles was a manifestation of belief, despite the 
claimants’ protestations to the contrary.133 Going on to discuss the case law with regard to 
the limitations imposed by Article 9(2), the judge felt able to distinguish Bull on the 
grounds that ‘the Defendant’s establishment is a bed-and-breakfast and not called a hotel, 
the rooms which are let by the Defendant are on the same floor as the Defendant’s own 
bedroom and the Claimants are not in a civil partnership.’ 134 In drawing these distinctions, 
the judge again missed an opportunity to challenge the homophobia present within them, 
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with the result that this case involved both instrumental and discursive loss. Echoing the 
Bulls’ arguments, Counsel for the defendant had suggested that: 
It is not, or should not, be the aim and function of modern human rights practice to 
cause one section of society to withdraw from participation, otherwise all that will 
have been achieved is to replace one set of predominant orthodox views with 
another different set of orthodox views.
135
 
However, the judge neglected to challenge the defendant’s argument based on an emerging 
‘hierarchy of rights’ and the attempt to make religious belief and sexuality matters of 
equivalence (in terms of their both being ‘views’) for the purpose of balancing such 
‘equivalent’ rights. This is another example of what is ‘lost’ in legal judgments: even 
where they do protect lesbians and gay men from discrimination, there are discursive costs.  
Court of Appeal
136
 
The hoteliers appealed the decision, but the Court of Appeal dismissed their appeal, 
finding that this was an instance of indirect discrimination which could not be justified 
with reference to Article 9(2) or Article 8. Once again, however, it is instructive to 
highlight some of the discursive tools employed in the reasoning which compromise the 
County Court victory of the gay men involved. The Master of the Rolls referred back to the 
Appeal Court’s reasoning in the Preddy case and expressed ‘some difficulty in agreeing 
with the view that the decision in James compels the conclusion that there was direct 
discrimination in Preddy… Preddy was not a case of direct discrimination in my view – 
but it was a case of indirect discrimination because the defendants’ policy in that case put 
homosexual couples at a disadvantage compared with heterosexual couples on the ground 
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of their sexual orientation’.137 He considered the case of Rodriguez to be more relevant, 
where the treatment of the gay couple was ‘a form of indirect discrimination which comes 
as close as it can to direct discrimination’.138 
On the matter of the respective rights of religious believers and homosexuals, the judge 
repeated the mantra that ‘neither is intrinsically more important than the other. Neither in 
principle trumps the other. But the weight to be accorded to each will depend on the 
particular circumstances of the case.’139 He quoted a speech given by Baroness Andrews 
before the House of Lords during consideration of the 2007 Regulations, where she said 
‘the Government have fully recognised what a difficult and complex journey it is to steer a 
path between the demands of religious conscience and those of individual rights’.140  
The judge also quoted Lord Bingham in the Countryside Alliance case: ‘The democratic 
process is liable to be subverted if, on a question of moral and political judgment, 
opponents of the Act achieve through the courts what they could not achieve in 
Parliament’.141 As the judge put it: 
The court should give weight to the fact that, after a wide consultation, the matter 
was carefully considered by the legislature, which produced a scheme which gives 
priority to religious belief, but only in certain narrowly circumscribed 
circumstances. The issue of how to strike the balance between the competing 
interests of homosexual couples and persons who, on religious grounds, believe 
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that sexual relations should only be permitted between married heterosexual 
couples involves difficult and controversial questions of moral judgment.
142
 
Here, the judge admits that the law gives priority to religious belief, but excuses it because 
the priority was tightly circumscribed following extensive consultation. He does not 
mention the extent of the influence of religious organisations on the drafting of this 
legislation, which was highlighted earlier in this chapter. To move on from that admission 
to stating a need to balance ‘competing interests’ is something of a jump, particularly when 
‘questions of moral judgment’ are brought into play. As the Court of Appeal said in Bull, 
‘the conferment of any legal protection or preference upon a particular substantive moral 
position on the ground only that it is espoused by the adherents of a particular faith, 
however long its tradition, however rich its culture, is deeply unprincipled. It imposes 
compulsory law, not to advance the general good on objective grounds, but to give effect to 
the force of subjective opinion’.143 
Furthermore, the Master of the Rolls explained that the courts’ reluctance to ‘make a 
judgment’ regarding the importance of the manifestation of a belief is based partly on ‘the 
insensitivity of making judgments of that kind’ because ‘how people choose to manifest 
their religious beliefs is a matter for their consciences’.144 Again, the professed need for 
sensitivity with regard to religious belief contrasts vividly with the historical record of the 
courts and the legislature with regard to the nature of homosexuality. 
 
 
                                                          
142
 [n 136] [49]  
143
 [n 105] [49] (emphasis added) 
144
 [n 105] [53] (emphasis added) 
143 
 
The European Court of Human Rights 
The ECtHR’s methodology 
The European Convention on Human Rights neither establishes nor binds the Court to any 
interpretive framework. Instead, the Court has developed a set of methods in an attempt to 
encourage judicial objectivity and maintain legal consistency: the margin of appreciation; 
consensus analysis; and the ‘living instrument’ principle.145 Consensus analysis, for 
example, can be criticised as ‘a construct through which the Court legitimises its moral 
interpretation and because of this its use is unpredictable and variable’.146 If no clear 
consensus exists among member states, the Court will generally maintain a state’s margin 
of appreciation (which is discussed in the next paragraph). The ‘living instrument’ 
principle is grounded in the Preamble to the Convention, which states a commitment to 
achieving the greater unity of European nations through the ‘maintenance and further 
realisation’ of human rights. It is suggested that the ‘living instrument’ principle is best 
understood as ‘a framework through which the Court legitimises its role as interpreter of 
the Convention and underwrites its moral reasoning’.147  
The margin of appreciation principle applies to the qualified rights of the Convention, ie 
Articles 8-11. A member state’s margin of appreciation is assessed with reference to the 
‘legality, legitimacy and necessity of any restriction by a public authority’.148 It is based on 
the assumption – enshrined in case law – that individual states are best placed to decide 
what limitations may be placed on rights as being necessary in a democratic society.
149
 
This method has been criticised by legal commentators such as Lord Lester, who called it 
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‘as slippery and elusive as an eel’ and ‘a substitute for coherent legal analysis of the issues 
at stake’ because ‘it removes the need for the Court to discern and explain the criteria 
appropriate to particular problems’.150 Bourdieu adds that the margin of appreciation 
enables the Court to mask the ‘fuzzy logic’ of its reasoning and thus preserve its 
appearance of objectivity.
151
  
Eweida and Others v UK
152
 
This case involved four separate applicants, all of whom were Christians. The common 
argument was that UK domestic law had failed to protect their rights to manifest their 
religion. The first applicant, Ms Eweida (a British Airways employee), and the second 
applicant, Ms Chaplin, (a nurse), were restricted from wearing visible Christian crosses 
around their necks while at work. The third applicant, Ms Ladele (a Registrar of Births, 
Marriages and Deaths), and the fourth, Mr McFarlane, (a Relate counsellor) had been 
dismissed for refusing to perform work that they felt would condone homosexuality, which 
they believed was incompatible with their religion. The two relevant cases in this hearing 
are McFarlane
153
 and Ladele, and so these will now be discussed in more detail.
154
 Lilian 
Ladele was a registrar employed by the London Borough of Islington prior to the 
introduction of civil partnerships for same-sex couples. She was unwilling to participate in 
civil partnership ceremonies and was eventually dismissed in line with the local authority’s 
‘Dignity for All’ equality and diversity policy. Gary McFarlane was a Relate counsellor 
who was unhappy about providing counselling and psycho-sexual therapy to same-sex 
couples. He was eventually dismissed in line with the organisation’s diversity policy. 
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Ladele 
Initially, an Employment Tribunal upheld Ms Ladele’s complaints of direct and indirect 
discrimination and harassment. It held that the local authority had ‘placed a greater value 
on the rights of the LGBT community than it placed on the rights of Ladele as one holding 
an orthodox Christian belief’. An Employment Appeal Tribunal (EAT) reversed the 
decision, holding that the local authority’s actions had been a proportionate means of 
achieving a legitimate aim - providing the registrar service on a non-discriminatory 
basis.
155
 The Court of Appeal upheld the EAT’s decision on the following grounds: Ladele 
was employed by a public authority to perform a purely secular task, which was being 
treated as part of her job; her refusal was discriminatory and caused offence to at least two 
of her gay colleagues; her objection was based on her view of marriage, which was not a 
core part of her religion; and the local authority’s requirement did not prevent her from 
worshipping as she wished. The court ruled that Ms Ladele’s desire to have her religious 
views respected should not be allowed to override Islington’s concern to ensure all its 
registrars manifest equal respect for everyone. From the time the 2007 Regulations came 
into force, Ladele was designated a Civil Partnership Registrar (as were all Islington’s 
registrars). From this point on the council was not merely entitled but obliged to require 
her to perform civil partnerships.
156
 Leave to appeal to the Supreme Court was refused.
157
 
Ladele complained to the ECtHR under Article 14 taken in conjunction with Article 9. She 
argued that, in failing to treat her differently from those staff who did not have a 
conscientious objection to registering civil partnerships, the local authority had indirectly 
discriminated against her and they could reasonably have accommodated her religious 
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beliefs.
158
 Her ‘conscientious objection’ was to participating ‘in the creation of a legal 
status based on an institution that she considered to be marriage in all but name; she did 
not ‘manifest any prejudice against homosexuals’. Ladele also argued that the local 
authority (on behalf of the State) did not adequately take into account its ‘duty of 
neutrality’: it ‘failed to strike a balance between delivering a non-discriminatory service 
while avoiding discriminating against its own employees on grounds of religion’.159 This 
was, she argued, in spite of the fact that the State had chosen not to be neutral by protecting 
certain categories of people from discrimination.  
McFarlane 
Mr McFarlane had expressed disquiet to his employer about counselling same-sex couples 
due to his Christian beliefs. He was eventually persuaded by his supervisor that this did not 
necessarily imply endorsement of same-sex relationships. He had subsequently voluntarily 
undertaken a postgraduate diploma in psycho-sexual therapy. It was not possible for him to 
filter clients, and he failed to convince Relate that he would be able to offer sex therapy to 
same-sex couples.  His supervisor had also been contacted by other Relate therapists 
concerned that one of the organisation’s counsellors was unwilling to work with same-sex 
clients on religious grounds. McFarlane acknowledged that there was a conflict between 
his religious beliefs and psycho-sexual therapy with same-sex couples. Dismissing him for 
gross misconduct, Relate concluded that McFarlane had paid ‘lip service’ to the policy, but 
he had no real intention of offering therapy to same-sex clients.  
The Employment Tribunal dismissed his claim of direct and indirect discrimination, unfair 
dismissal and wrongful dismissal. They found no direct discrimination and indirect 
                                                          
158
 [n 154] [70] 
159
 [n 154] [72] 
147 
 
discrimination was justified as a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim.
160
 This 
was upheld by the EAT, and the Court of Appeal refused leave to appeal against that 
decision, stating that he had no realistic prospect of succeeding in light of the appellate 
decision in Ladele. Following the Supreme Court’s refusal to allow leave to appeal in 
Ladele, McFarlane renewed his appeal application, which was refused because it could not 
sensibly be distinguished from Ladele.
161
 McFarlane based his ECtHR case upon Article 9 
taken alone and in conjunction with Article 14. The relevant domestic law was regulation 3 
of the Employment Equality (Religion or Belief) Regulations 2003, and regulation 3 of the 
Equality Act (Sexual Orientation) Regulations 2007. 
ECtHR Judgment 
The majority dismissed the appeals. They based their decision on the body of case law 
regarding the manifestation of religious belief and the margin of appreciation afforded to 
member states. In order to count as ‘manifestation’, the act must be ‘intimately linked’ to 
the religion or belief. The existence of a ‘sufficiently close and direct nexus between the 
act and the underlying belief must be determined on the facts of each case’.162 Regarding 
Ms Ladele, it was found that because the local authority and the domestic courts had not 
exceeded the wide margin of appreciation generally given to member states, resolution of 
the case required ’striking a balance between competing Convention rights’.163 
McFarlane’s voluntary enrolment on the diploma was ‘not determinative’ but was to be 
‘weighed in the balance’ when assessing whether a fair balance was struck between 
competing rights. In striking that balance, the Court emphasised that ‘the most important 
factor is that the employer’s action was intended to secure the implementation of its policy 
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of providing a service without discrimination’.164 The wide margin of appreciation enjoyed 
by member states had not been exceeded. 
Interestingly, the Court departed from its earlier jurisprudence which had held that ‘the 
possibility of changing job would negate any interference’ with the right to manifest one’s 
religion. It concluded that ‘the better approach would be to weigh that possibility in the 
overall balance when considering whether or not the restriction was proportionate’.165 The 
Court was not persuaded by the argument put forward by the National Secular Society (one 
of the intervening parties) that ‘freedom to resign is the ultimate guarantee of freedom of 
conscience’.166 This perhaps represents a recognition of the difficulty of finding alterative 
employment in harsh economic times.  
Dissenting judgment 
Two of the ECtHR judges did find a violation of Article 9 in conjunction with Article 14 in 
Ladele. They submitted a strongly-worded dissent on the matter of freedom of conscience, 
which is notable for the absence of any attempt to mask underlying homophobia. For them, 
‘conscience – by which is meant moral conscience – is what enjoins a person at the 
appropriate moment to do good and to avoid evil… Conscience may come into collision 
with the word of a Pope, and is to be followed in spite of that word.’167 With these words, 
the judges are elevating conscientious objection above religious expression, and are 
attempting to separate the two in order to avoid the restrictions placed on the manifestation 
of belief by Article 9(2). They also appear to place Mrs Ladele on the side of ‘good’ and 
the extension of relationship rights to homosexuals on the side of ‘evil’.  
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The judges blamed ‘a combination of back-stabbing by her colleagues and the blinkered 
political correctness of the Borough of Islington (which clearly favoured ‘gay rights’ over 
fundamental human rights)’ for Ladele’s eventual dismissal.168 Constructing the feelings of 
Ladele’s gay colleagues as ‘back-stabbing’ and the Islington’s equality and diversity policy 
as ‘blinkered political correctness’ once again evokes the trope of litigious homosexual 
activists – this time in league with left-wing councils – that might not seem out of place in 
a tabloid newspaper. Moreover, excluding ‘gay rights’ (a phrase which they placed within 
inverted commas) from ‘fundamental human rights’ illustrates their homophobic (as 
above) stance: gay rights are not to be treated as real, much less equivalent to other human 
rights. The judges stated that ‘freedom of conscience has in the past all too often been paid 
for in acts of heroism, whether at the hands of the Spanish Inquisition or of a Nazi firing 
squad.’169 This appears disingenuous at best, when one considers that the Spanish 
Inquisition was a religious-inspired exercise aimed at controlling and eliminating dissent, 
and the Nazis were themselves anti-gay (and supported by the Catholic church).
170
 
Case law: future directions? 
This chapter has already discussed the possibility of religious reliance on ‘conscientious 
objection’ being developed as a means of avoiding the limitations of Article 9(2). There is 
also some dissatisfaction with the distinction between direct and indirect discrimination. In 
a recent speech, Lady Hale considered the lack of a general defence of justification to be a 
problem, which has become more acute with the expansion of protected characteristics and 
the consequent increased possibility of conflict.  She argued that ‘a general defence of 
justification in discrimination law would enable courts and tribunals to get down to 
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addressing the real issues – legitimate aim, rational connection, proportionality – rather 
than looking for distinctions which mean that they hold that there was no discrimination at 
all.’171 In her view, it would be simpler if employers had to make reasonable 
accommodation for the right of their employees to manifest their religious beliefs, and 
suppliers of services had to make reasonable accommodation for the right of their would-
be customers to use them.  
Chapter 5 examines the concepts of conscientious objection and reasonable 
accommodation in more detail, as part of the analysis of liberal rights discourse undertaken 
in this thesis. As explained in previous chapters, rights discourse is based on the liberal 
conception of individuals each possessing essential and universal features common to the 
whole of humanity. This concept has had consequences for the recognition of both sexual 
orientation and religious belief as protected rights. It became important to argue that sexual 
orientation was innate and immutable rather than fluid and on a spectrum, and that 
religious belief was more fundamental and fixed than a matter of choice. For gay rights 
campaigners, the argument from essentialism was also an important means of contesting 
the historical construction of homosexuals as ‘dangerous, abnormal and monstrous 
deviants who embody and propagate disease and perversion.’172 It can be argued that there 
is some gap in logic here, because if one can prove a monster is born a monster, it does not 
become any less monstrous.
173
 Instead, the key argument here may be that essentialism 
enables a law reform argument that uncouples homosexuality from culpability. It responds 
to problematic ideas that take their cue from certain moral philosophical ideas. Essentialist 
arguments (though problematic) serve to garner legal and political sympathy and detract 
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from choice (and therefore blame) arguments.  However, as MacDougall argues, the 
essentialist position is both persistent and potentially dangerous when it comes to law: 
There are real strengths to the essentialist position, in particular because it does not 
lend itself to the foible quality many judges assume about homosexuality. While a 
thoughtful understanding of the constructionist approach does not in fact lead to 
this conclusion, unfortunately judges (like many others) will search only for the 
essence of constructionism in which contingency will be construed to mean simply 
‘choice’ and ‘changeability’.174 
Queer theorists would like to replace the need for essentialist arguments with a concern to 
protect sexual choice. It should be emphasized, however, that Queer theory does not equate 
choice with autonomy, because it rejects liberal notions of ‘the subject’ upon which the 
idea of autonomy depends. The feminist concept of ‘agency’175 is perhaps more useful 
here, for its recognition that ‘choice’ can be exercised in circumstances of constraint, and 
within particular historical conditions and contingencies.
176
  
The struggle for lesbian and gay citizenship 
This chapter has offered examples of how the conflict between religion and sexuality has 
discursive origins and discursive consequences. What is at stake is more than a clash of 
rights; it is also a question of citizenship. As Stychin observes, the current struggle for 
lesbians and gay men is to ‘construct meaningful categories of belonging’ and to 
‘challenge and undermine the fixity of boundaries’ through which they have often been 
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excluded.
177
 The area of access to goods and services – still being contested through case 
law – is one crucial field in which this occurs. While ‘coming out of the closet is the basis 
for asserting a human right to have one’s “admitted” and “avowed” private life protected’, 
it also ‘continues to render individuals excluded from civil institutions’.178 The remainder 
of this thesis explores the meaning and significance of citizenship rights for lesbians and 
gay men; how religious conservatism seeks to limit this citizenship; and how the law 
should respond. Examples of same-sex clerical challenges to religious exemptions are also 
presented as examples of resistance to prevailing modes of religious domination. 
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CHAPTER 5: ACCOMMODATION, OBJECTION, AND RESISTANCE 
I tell you, commander, it's true that some of the most terrible things in the world are done 
by people who think, genuinely think, that they're doing it for the best, especially if there is 
some god involved.
1
  
A personal anecdote 
The John Lewis seasonal advertising campaign has become something of a modern 
tradition. In 2014, the advert featured a toy penguin being given a mate for Christmas by 
his young owner, who had noticed his lovesick expression.  The heteronormativity of the 
happy couples surrounding Monty the penguin in the advert was notable, particularly in 
view of the observation that penguins are somewhat known for their same-sex proclivities.
2
 
I was in what I had considered a safe social environment when this topic arose, but a 
comment made during the ensuing conversation left me feeling disturbed: “Well, it’s 
understandable – it is a family advert, after all.” I realised that, even amongst people who 
are supportive of my same-sex relationship, it may still not be considered suitable for all 
contexts. Lesbians and gay men remain in the position of the “other”, whose validity is 
contingent on whether it is deemed appropriate for the (hetero)norm. We can be “othered” 
at any time, without warning, as this anecdote illustrates.  
Aims of this chapter 
This chapter will examine how “reasonable accommodation” and “conscientious 
objection” are used in current debates to “other” lesbians and gay men in order to maintain 
inequality. Chapter 4 charted the discursive shift in conservative religious opposition to 
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reforms which have enhanced the legal position of lesbians and gay men, and highlighted 
the move over recent decades from explicitly homophobic language towards a vocabulary 
of rights and equality.  This shift is an expression of two developments: first, a response to 
society’s increased distaste for discriminatory language in general; and second, a desire to 
maintain conservative religious influence over statute and case law. Current equality law is 
perceived by religious conservatives as going too far, creating a hierarchy of rights in 
which the expression of religious belief is relegated below homosexuality. Chapter 4 
argued that religious exemptions from anti-discrimination law preserve the existing 
heteronormative and theonormative hierarchies, which relegate lesbians and gay men to 
inhabit a relatively ‘narrow space of juridical toleration’,3 in spite of the advances made in 
equality law. 
This chapter goes on to consider the current arguments are being deployed to assert the 
case for (further) religious rights. The chapter analyses the discourses employed by 
scholars and other legal and extra-legal actors who seek either “reasonable 
accommodation” of religious expression and/or an extension to the conscientious objection 
principle to encompass religious-based discrimination against lesbians and gay men. This 
is important because, just as the gay rights campaign is all at once an activist, legal and 
scholarly enterprise, so too is conservative religious opposition to same-sex equality. The 
chapter examines how the scholarly and activist discursive strands of this opposition relate 
to and inform those in the legal field. This chapter is intended as a bridge between the 
Foucaultian analysis of legal discourse in Chapter 4 and the Foucaultian examination of the 
link between homophobia and harm in Chapter 6. It contends that “reasonable 
accommodation” and “conscientious objection” operate, in terms of power relations, as 
harmful homophobic weapons dressed up in the guise of religious equality rights. The 
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chapter then goes on to consider the resistances that have arisen to this discourse, from 
non-heterosexual people of faith, and examines how they are challenging the notion of a 
special relationship between religion and opposition to gay equality. 
The analysis in this chapter is undertaken conscious of the overarching normative question 
posed by this thesis, regarding how law should respond to the conflict between religion and 
sexual orientation. It recognises that law seeks to establish, at least provisionally, ‘a single 
normative position to govern relations within a given social milieu, despite the continuing 
existence of normative disagreement’.4 The existence of any normative order depends upon 
some matters being governed by a collective position; we acquiesce so that we can obtain 
the benefits of living in an ordered society governed by a sense of justice, not just by the 
will of the strong.
5
 One characteristic of a legal normative order is the act of defining a 
common position in the midst of disagreement. One might think that collective positions 
could be achieved fairly straightforwardly in matters of equality and anti-discrimination. 
However, equality law often appears to be highly contestable, as illustrated by cases where 
religion and sexual orientation conflict.  
Certain factors will be weighed and interpreted differently by different parties. In doing so, 
it becomes clearer that norms are always constructed, always to some extent artificial. In 
law, judges decide cases by drawing from case law and from their reflection on the issues 
raised, in order to reach an outcome that provides what they see as a fair interpretation of 
society’s norms on the question.6 This chapter engages in a discursive analysis of the 
normative options proposed by religious conservatives and their supporters, in order to 
critique their underlying assumptions and their implications for lesbians and gay men. 
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Such an analysis leads us on a journey through the realm of norm creation, towards the role 
of law in a society where rights come into conflict.   
Law’s accommodation of moral pluralism 
The concept of moral pluralism plays something of a dual role in the conflict between 
religion and sexual orientation. On the one hand, moral pluralism is invoked by religious 
conservatives as a dilution of national characteristics (or ‘British values’). On the other 
hand, it is also used as an argument in favour of religious exemptions to equality law. It is 
helpful first to explain what is understood by moral pluralism and how it relates to 
normative discussions regarding what law should do. Webber identifies four main themes 
of lpluralism: hermeneutics, plurality, adaptiveness and decentredness.
7
 These themes 
recognise that norms are formed within particular social contexts, and as such are not 
universal or abstract. Because normative arguments take place within historical, social and 
geographical contexts, they will vary across the globe, and this context-dependency means 
that norms will have adapted to be especially suitable for those contexts. Finally, state law 
is viewed as merely one normative order among several possibilities which may be 
negotiated. However, at least moderate pluralists recognise that there may be valid reasons 
to bring certain normative orders under the umbrella of the state, and ‘one will often work 
back towards a re-justification of the state, perhaps significantly reorganised on more 
plural foundations’.8  
Equality and anti-discrimination law has attempted to do this, by including sexual 
orientation as a protected characteristic alongside religious belief. Pluralism can appear to 
be an attractive solution in such situations, as it aims to be sensitive to the particular 
contexts in which equality law might function. Indeed, it could be argued that the ECtHR’s 
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jurisprudence in the field of religion and sexual orientation represents pluralism in action, 
particularly with regard to the ‘margin of appreciation’ doctrine outlined in Chapter 4. 
However, it is the attempt at a pluralist approach that has caused religious conservatives 
such consternation. Yet it is also plurality that religious conservatives are using to ground 
their claims by appealing to “reasonable accommodation” and/or “conscientious 
objection”. This double-edged nature of pluralism limits its ability to resolve conflict, 
which suggests that something more than an appeal to plurality is needed. Indeed, 
pluralism’s limitations may stem from its failure to recognise that the development of 
norms always involves a certain level of imposition, whereby people abide by norms that 
they would not necessarily have chosen themselves: after all, ‘it is only through such 
narrowing of the normative options that norms come into being’ in the first place.9  
The safe functioning of a plural society necessitates regulation in order to protect the 
liberties of others. Equality law is concerned with the overall equality of lives lived, and to 
permit one group to discriminate against another protected group would contravene the 
very principles of equality and democracy. However, supporters of religious exceptions to 
these principles maintain that the current law is unfair and exclusionary, and that the courts 
have underestimated the personal significance of individual religious convictions. Some 
take the argument from plurality as far as advocating that ‘religions and the state… be 
thought of, in some sense, as coequal in law’.10 Other, more moderate pluralist observers 
have suggested that the law needs to take a more pragmatic approach to ‘reasonable 
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accommodation’, such as that found in Canadian jurisprudence,11 which would ‘allow for 
more nuanced fact-specific conclusions which do not constrain subsequent cases’.12  
This raises the question: is the ‘triumph of pragmatism over principle’13 acceptable? It has 
been noted that a pragmatic accommodation of religious discrimination could lead to a 
request to accommodate other religiously-motivated discrimination, such as racism.
14
 It is 
interesting to observe how raising the spectre of racism can be persuasive against 
accommodation arguments – as it should be – but it seems that the spectre of homophobia 
is not, by itself, sufficient to give pause. This brings up two points: first, as discussed 
earlier, the presumed ‘need’ for religious conservatives to be homophobic (whereas we no 
longer countenance a religious ‘need’ to be racist); and second, the implication that 
homophobia is somehow more ‘understandable’ than racism.15 It is argued in this thesis 
that there is no pragmatic or contextual distinction to be made, because the result is the 
same: homophobic discrimination.  
Stychin contends that ‘balancing and accommodation demands some form of contextual 
analysis, which engages with the competing interests on the particular facts’.16 It should be 
added that any such contextual analysis should include the historical and contemporary 
context in which heteronormativity and theonormativity combine to produce results which 
perpetuate homophobia. The Christian idea of “loving the sinner while hating the sin” is – 
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and should remain – protected as a belief. It is only when a person seeks to act publicly 
upon the hatred of that “sin”, and to discriminate on grounds of sexual orientation, that the 
principle of equality requires the law to intervene. The state has an obligation, perhaps its 
primary obligation, one in fact upon which its legitimacy depends (according to Hobbes), a 
responsibility to create conditions of safety for its citizens and religious exceptions from 
equality law implicate the state in perpetuating homophobia, heteronormativity and 
theonormativity.  
The following section begins with a discursive analysis of how the Clearing the Ground 
report,
17
 produced by the Christians in Parliament Group, uses particular discursive 
strategies – including an appeal to pluralism – to make the case for further religious rights. 
Although the report was commissioned by a parliamentary group, it illustrates well the 
interplay between the legal and the extra-legal in terms of how legal norms are influenced 
by religious conservatives. The analysis reveals how the report’s arguments appear factual, 
reasonable, and objective, while acting as a rallying cry for urgent change. 
“Clearing the Ground” 
The Clearing the Ground report’s key finding is that ‘Christians in the UK face problems 
in living out their faith… mostly caused and exacerbated by social, cultural and legal 
changes over the past decade’.18 Indeed, the words ‘challenges’ and ‘problems’ are 
employed five times on the first page of the Executive Summary. The report paints vivid 
images of embattled Christians struggling for survival in a hostile environment, and urges 
intervention to support them. By identifying problems and presenting them as having an 
external cause, the report achieves two things: it side-steps the challenge that problems 
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may in fact have arisen from Christians’ own discriminatory activities (against gay people, 
for example); and it presents a case for immediate legal action to be taken so that 
Christians are free to manifest their religion, notwithstanding the impact of such 
manifestation on others.  
Religious illiteracy 
The report contends that ‘religious illiteracy’ is behind the failure to understand or 
accommodate religious belief and its manifestation, leading to a ‘hierarchy of rights’ in 
which faith is relegated below sexuality.
19
 The report draws heavily on this concept of 
religious illiteracy; however, the concept is never clearly explained in the course of the 
report. ‘Illiteracy’ is a word loaded with negative connotations. It sounds much more 
serious than mere ‘misunderstanding’, for example, because it implies an inability to do 
something, rather than something which could easily be rectified through communication. 
Several examples of this ‘illiteracy’ are advanced through a series of quotes from 
participants, with emotive language to bring their experiences to life and add to their 
impact. The report argues that ‘widespread religious illiteracy means that the existence of 
and necessity for exceptions for religious groups in equalities legislation in order to make it 
workable is customarily met with hostility, ignorance, misunderstanding and opposition’.20  
These words paint a picture for the reader of a huge problem suffered by the religious 
across the country. They face an unfriendly, almost alien environment under this new 
equality regime, and must therefore be protected by legal exemptions.  
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Impartiality and rationality  
The overarching discourse in the report is one of impartiality and rationality, which is used 
to emphasise its grounding in evidence-based research and thereby to lend weight to its 
arguments. The report repeatedly cites ‘evidence’ in support of its argument. The word 
itself aims to give a sense of authenticity and objectivity to its findings. For example, the 
report states that its authors ‘sought to maintain a healthy scepticism to ensure we did not 
too readily accept perceptions within the faith community, without examining the 
evidence’.21 The report gives the impression of consensus in the figures it quotes. For 
example, ‘Research published by the Evangelical Alliance in 2011 showed that 77% of 
evangelical Christians felt that it was becoming harder to live as a Christian. A further 81% 
agreed that Britain was a Christian country and that this should be reflected in its laws.
22
 
The significance of the word ‘evangelical’ may be missed by the casual reader, who might 
then be persuaded that the vast majority of Christians felt that they were suffering under 
current equality law. Yet, according to the 2011 census,
23
 most Christians are not 
evangelical, in the sense that they do not feel they have a mission to spread the Gospel in 
their daily lives. Nor is there consensus as to what this mission or duty would entail.  
Furthermore, the report’s use of the word ‘inquiry’ itself implies an objective exploration 
into the situation, when it was actually compiled by a group with an interest in promoting 
the interests of evangelical Christianity. The report glosses over the limits that the ‘inquiry’ 
itself placed on the gathering of information:  
This was not a general call for evidence. However, we were delighted that a 
number of individuals from churches across the UK did submit evidence of their 
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experience and opinions… A further restriction on the call for evidence was that we 
specifically invited only Christian organisations to participate.
24
  
The discourse of war  
The war metaphor is one Foucault uses often, such as his references to tactics and 
strategies discussed earlier in the thesis. It is instructive to consider how the Clearing the 
Ground report uses the discourses of history and nation to bolster its arguments that 
Christians are embattled. Having identified recent changes in law and society as a 
challenge to Christians, the report goes on to present Christianity as a venerable contrast to 
the vicissitudes of modernity, by grounding Christianity in claims to historical authority. 
The report uses this as a counterpoint to the authority of secular law. This step is necessary 
because the report contends that modern secular law has unjustly restricted the liberties of 
Christians to manifest their beliefs. Christianity is presented as embedded in the very 
character of the nation, with the implication that it is fundamental to its make-up: 
‘Christianity has a rich cultural heritage in the UK. For more than 1600 years, it has shaped 
the way people in the British Isles think and act, both personally and publicly. It is by far 
the most significant single historical influence on our social and political culture...’25  
The final paragraph of the report’s Executive Summary is given over to a quote from the 
former Prime Minister, David Cameron. It uses the language of ‘we’ to give the impression 
of consensus and thereby to give moral authority to its claims. It also uses the idea of 
historical pedigree as a rationale for protecting Christianity from contemporary threats:  
We are a Christian country. And we should not be afraid to say so… the Bible has 
helped to give Britain a set of values and morals which make Britain what it is 
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today. Values and morals we should actively stand up and defend… I believe the 
Church – and indeed all our religious leaders and communities in Britain – have a 
vital role to play in helping to achieve this.
26
  
This is stirring language, not dissimilar to what a Prime Minister might be expected to use 
on the eve of war. It presents British values and morals as a “set”, implying coherence and 
ignoring the plurality that exists. It bases these values and morals largely on the Bible, 
ignoring the plethora of pre-Biblical sources of morality (from classical Greece and Rome, 
for example). Finally, it renders religion a vital instrument in protecting the whole country. 
Overall, the report builds its argument by repeated focus on the ‘problems’ and 
‘challenges’ reported by Christian organisations and individuals; by citing the cause as 
‘religious illiteracy’ and a legal failure to understand or accommodate Christianity; and by 
concluding that urgent action is needed to prevent restrictions on the freedom of Christians 
to manifest their beliefs: 
The experiences of Christians in the UK seeking to live out their beliefs and speak 
freely illustrate a very real problem in the way religious belief, and in particular 
Christianity is understood and handled. The problem is a pressing challenge to our 
idea of a plural society.
27
         
In this paragraph, Christianity is highlighted as requiring particular attention. Yet the next 
sentence references pluralism, even though the plurality of influence on British values and 
morals was previously overlooked. Moreover, the words ‘our idea’ leave open to 
interpretation exactly whose idea is being lauded as worthy of protection. Is it ‘our’ as in 
Britons’ idea, or as in conservative Christianity’s idea? It is possible that this was left 
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intentionally vague to encourage the reader to believe it is the people’s idea, so that she or 
he is more ready to buy in (perhaps unwittingly) to what is actually the position of political 
Christianity. It is akin to the discourse used by a political leader who seeks to persuade a 
nation that military action is necessary to preserve liberty. A speech made by former 
British Prime Minister Tony Blair, advocating military intervention in Kosovo, provides a 
useful comparison. For example, Blair asserted that:  
No longer is our existence as states under threat. Now our actions are guided by a 
more subtle blend of mutual self-interest and moral purpose in defending the values 
we cherish. In the end values and interest merge. If we can establish and spread the 
values of liberty, the rule of law, human rights and an open society then that is in 
our national interests too. The spread of our values makes us safer.
28
  
The word ‘values’ is deployed four times in this passage, indicating his belief that foreign 
policy should be grounded in morality. The appeal to liberty and to human rights echoes 
the modern liberal arguments that have been co-opted by conservative Christianity. 
Moreover, the repeated use of the word ‘spread’ perhaps reflect Blair’s own evangelical 
belief that these ‘values’ must be disseminated globally, for the good of the whole world. 
The report cites a series of quotes which provide vivid descriptions of restrictions that have 
been placed on Christians’ dissemination of their beliefs. For example: ‘I lost my teaching 
position for offering prayer to a student who was very ill… I didn’t proceed with the prayer 
as her mother said no… I am sad that it is hard to offer prayer to students’29 and ‘I am in 
trouble with the GMC for offering Christianity to a patient who had left his own faith… It 
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seems to me that Christians are actively discriminated against… we need some defence’.30 
These examples are intended to be powerful in eliciting sympathy. Most people would 
probably be inclined to give this teacher and doctor the benefit of the doubt, and perhaps 
conclude that the law was indeed treating Christians unfairly. Indeed, one of our 
fundamental legal principles is that a person is innocent until proven guilty, and the reader 
might well be persuaded that Christians do need to be protected against such a travesty of 
justice. There is also quite a vivid sense of Christians as lone, vulnerable victims in a 
hostile environment, facing attack on several fronts by illiberal forces. This is intended to 
support their argument that religion is being ‘closeted’ as homosexuality once was. To 
extend the war metaphor, it might be said that conservative Christian groups have a “siege 
mentality”.  
Summary 
Clearing the Ground offers a useful insight into how discursive tropes can be manipulated 
to support and justify a campaigning position. The combination of impartial and emotive 
language is intriguing. It recalls debates held around British involvement in war zones like 
Iraq and Syria, where reliance was placed both on evidence (or the lack of) for a regime’s 
wrongdoing and also on the urgent needs of the suffering people in those countries. Of 
course, the report is not pressing for a war on non-religious people. However, it is 
interesting that the presentation of evangelical Christians’ experience has a similar effect of 
encouraging the reader to think that something must be done, and quickly. This 
“something” is the granting of further rights and protections to religious people and 
organisations. These rights and protections are “reasonable accommodation” and a 
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“conscience clause”. The following section examines the discourses surrounding each in 
turn. 
Reasonable accommodation 
Equality law already provides for religious exceptions to the prohibition on sexual 
orientation discrimination were employment is for the purposes of an organised religion,
31
 
which gives religious organisations ‘a zone of liberty to… hire their own members and 
enforce their own lifestyle norms that are otherwise discriminatory’.32 The case law 
discussed in Chapter 4 highlights the increasing calls for a similar exception to be granted 
to individuals seeking personal relief from those equality provisions they consider 
burdensome. Interestingly, Moon has noted a growing discourse of “dignity” in equality 
law in general,
33
 and advocates of reasonable accommodation often use this to enhance 
their arguments. For example, Vickers argues that religion is ‘closely related to an 
individual’s concept of identity and self-respect’, which is ‘protected because it is a key 
aspect of personality and autonomy, based on personal choices about conceptions of the 
good.’34 She views the link between autonomy, human dignity and equality as grounds for 
the legal accommodation of difference. In the current conflict, of course, both sides will 
claim that their dignity has been compromised, which shows again how the liberal 
language of autonomy and the pluralist language of accommodation of difference are of 
limited assistance in determining whose rights should prevail.  
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Supporters of individual religious exceptions from sexual orientation discrimination law 
argue that the current law is unfair and exclusionary. For example, in Ladele,
35
 the Court of 
Appeal held that the Sexual Orientation Regulations 2007
36
 (under which proceedings 
were brought) took ‘precedence over any right which a person would otherwise have by 
virtue of his or her religious belief or faith, to practise discrimination on the ground of 
sexual orientation’.37 Citing cases like Ladele,38 McClintock39 and McFarlane,40 Gibson 
asserts that a ‘rapidly expanding corpus of UK equality jurisprudence has seemingly 
diluted the protection of religion or belief interests at work where individual divergence 
from a norm is required’.41 It is argued that this dilution is due to the courts having 
“underestimated the importance of individual religious convictions”.42 Rivers makes the 
point most strongly, and it is worth examining his language and its implications in some 
detail. He says, ‘courts have shown… bifurcation between an essentialising view of 
sexuality and a choice model of religion that has rendered irrelevant the concerns of those 
with tender consciences about complicity in behaviour they consider immoral’.43 Rivers’ 
sentiment is echoed in the Clearing the Ground report, which helps to show the interplay 
between the legal and the extra-legal: ‘Although sexuality is widely acknowledged in 
society to be intrinsic to identity, religion is not, and our legal categories have come to 
reflect this contradiction. The reality is that sexuality is more fluid and religious 
commitment less fluid than the law assumes’.44 Here, it is important to acknowledge that 
this religious claim is consistent with aspects of Queer theory. Queer recognises the 
                                                          
35
 Ladele v London Borough of Islington [2009] EWCA Civ 1357 
36
 SI 2007/1263 
37
 [n 35] [69] 
38
 [n 35] 
39
 McClintock v Department of Constitutional Affairs [2008] IRLR 29 
40
 McFarlane v Relate Avon Ltd [2010] EWCA Civ 880 
41
 [n 11] 
42
 N Hatzis, ‘Personal Religious Belief in the Workplace: how not to define indirect discrimination’ (2011) 
Modern Law Review 74, 287, 292 
43
 Julian Rivers, ‘The Secularisation of the British Constitution’ (2012) 14 Ecclesiastical Law Journal 371, 
390 
44
 [n 17] 29 
168 
 
complex relationship (which both sexual orientation and religious belief have) with choice 
and with more determining considerations. Spivak’s idea of ‘strategic essentialism’45 can 
be useful here. It can be argued that Christians are playing the game of ‘strategic 
essentialism’, and perhaps overplaying the embeddedness and lack of choice involved. It is 
interesting that lesbian and gay identity persists, despite the many attempts to oppress and 
eradicate it; whereas religious belief can lapse despite huge attempts at indoctrination.  
Returning to Rivers, it is not clear precisely what Rivers imagines a ‘tender conscience’ to 
consist of, although the word ‘tender’ evokes something that is delicate and in need of 
protection. The word ‘conscience’ is chosen to suggest that this concerns something which 
is of a higher order than mere feelings or sensibilities. The sentence as a whole can be 
construed to say, “We are not prudish or old-fashioned. Nor are we opposed to 
homosexuality due to prejudice. We are not prejudiced. We consider sexuality a deeply 
moral issue, and morality in turn is grounded in Christianity. This is a matter of 
conscience, which speaks to something greater than us. Therefore, we deserve protection 
because we are ourselves seeking to protect something vital”. Rivers’ use of the word 
‘complicity’ assists this construction: registering civil partnerships or counselling same-sex 
couples does not render one complicit in homosexual relationships any more than 
registering opposite sex marriages or couples involves complicity in their relationships. 
Yet, if we follow the argument that religious opponents of homosexuality are subject to a 
higher power than earthly law, it becomes clearer why Rivers chose that word. Overall, 
Rivers’ arguments present a valuable example of how conservative religious discourses are 
developing.  
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There appears to be a backwards direction of travel to some extent, towards the view that 
religion is special and therefore should be subject to a lighter legal touch by the state.
46
 
What religious conservative arguments seem to be saying is that “homosexuality is 
contrary to God’s law”, and as God’s law is necessarily higher than (mortal, human) state 
law, they should not be compelled to countenance homosexuality in the course of their 
working lives.   Moon has suggested that ‘the requirement of accommodation may rest on 
the view that there is something special or significant about religious beliefs in that they 
are deeply rooted.
47
 The idea that religion is deeply rooted within the individual lends 
support to the argument in favour of “reasonable accommodation” on an individual, rather 
than solely organisational, basis. The idea that religion is deeply rooted also grounds the 
arguments in favour of extending the “conscience principle” to religiously-based 
objections to sexual orientation equality, which will be discussed later in this chapter. 
Echoing the “religion is special” trope, Sandberg offers a critique of what he describes as 
‘the juridification of religion.48 His concern is less with the justice of recent legal decisions 
than with the reasoning behind them. Looking at Article 9 of the ECHR, he differentiates 
between the right to believe and to manifest that belief and the qualification to that right 
contained in the second paragraph.
49
 Using the reasoning in Begum
50
 as an example, he 
expresses concern that there will never be a breach of Article 9(2) as long as a religious 
belief can be manifested in another way. Sandberg’s contention that religious people 
should not be required to choose between their faith and their legal rights is the basis for 
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his proposal to extend the principle of “reasonable adjustment” in disability law51 to 
religious belief.  
However, as Gibson
52
 points out, the reasonable adjustments duty pertaining to disability is 
by nature asymmetrical. The accommodations granted to an employee with a disability 
cannot be used by an able-bodied colleague as grounds for a claim against the employer.
53
 
The “disability” model is consequently not ideal. Certainly, approaching religious belief 
(or no belief) in the same way as disability would not resolve the current conflict. It may 
even open the floodgates to new conflicts, as members of other protected groups attempt to 
argue that their characteristic is also a “disability” and should be treated accordingly. It 
would also devalue the particular meaning and experience of disability itself. Furthermore, 
people with disabilities do not generally seek to use equality law to discriminate against 
other protected groups: they merely seek the opportunity to live and work on an equal basis 
with able-bodied people. Similarly, lesbians and gay men do not generally seek to 
discriminate against religious people or organisations. It is religious conservatives who 
seek additional privileges over and above general equality principles. Reasonable 
accommodation provisions would leave lesbians and gay men remaining vulnerable to 
discrimination dressed up in the guise of religious freedom. 
Conscientious objection 
Several of the arguments supporting reasonable accommodation also inform calls for a 
‘conscience clause’ in equality law. The traditional form of conscientious exemption was 
from military involvement, generally bestowed upon pacifists (typically Quakers). 
However, conscientious objection has also been sought from laws governing drug use, 
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school uniform requirements, prison, animal slaughter, Sunday trading, and the provision 
or receipt of medical care. Such provisions have generally been justified in legal liberalism 
out of respect for the objector’s autonomy or respect for his or her freedom of religion.54 
The current conflict has also precipitated calls for a religious conscience-based exception 
to laws protecting sexual orientation as a characteristic. These calls are based on the 
premise that a person compelled by conscience to act, or to refrain from acting, does not 
have a genuine choice. Such a person seeks a legal right to act upon this conscience – to 
have the right to do what he or she would do anyway, because of the experience of an 
absence of choice.  
It is interesting to note that conscience can matter from both a religious perspective and 
also as part of a critique of the traditional schema of liberal rights. For example, Stychin 
concedes that liberal, choice-based understandings of religion are limiting because they do 
not reflect how religion is actually experienced by the faithful. A religious conscience is 
not experienced as a choice, and ‘the test of whether the manifestation of belief impacts 
upon the rights of others also may not be relevant when one is faced with the compulsion 
to act’.55  Stychin is clearly concerned that attempting to qualify the protection given to 
religion may involve privatisation of belief. This is seen as important because, as Leiter 
argues, ‘Many of the arguments trade, at bottom, on a simple idea: namely, that being able 
to choose what to believe and how to live… makes for a better life. Being told what you 
must believe and how you must live, conversely, makes lives worse’.56 It is true that we do 
not (yet) know why and how a person develops one kind of conscience and not another. 
One can also accept that a person cannot change their beliefs at will, and appreciate that a 
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conscientious objector does not experience a genuine choice about whether to act 
according to conscience, because the consequences of not so acting would be experienced 
as distressing. However – as discussed later, in Chapter 6 – it is not clear that distress is 
considered robust enough to constitute harm.  
Nevertheless, to have a genuine choice (a concept questioned by Queer theory) implies the 
existence of a sufficient number of meaningful choices, but the objector feels that the only 
meaningful choice is to act upon his or her conscience. The lack of sufficient valuable 
choices means that the objector does not experience a genuine choice. However, it is 
important to note that the ‘lack of choice’ argument applies equally to religious 
conscientious objections and to non-religious ones, which underlines the point that religion 
is not special. It may be more useful to look at the values that might lie behind the 
objection, and the following section considers some of the ‘perfectionist’ liberal arguments 
regarding values. 
Conscience and values 
This thesis has developed the argument that faith-based objections to sexual orientation 
equality are homophobic, notwithstanding the disclaiming of homophobia by the Christian 
right. The normative question, ‘how should law treat the conflict between religion and 
sexual orientation?’ becomes ‘how should the law treat faith-based homophobia?’ As 
Nehushtan observes, ‘The demand to respect the other… or to consider him as equal is a 
proper demand but far-fetched for the homophobe, and therefore politically useless.’57 
Indeed, if the religious and the secular are, for all intents and purposes, speaking different 
languages,
58
 the question again becomes one about incommensurability: is a common 
language and understanding possible? Nehushtan suggests that a ‘realistic and reasonable 
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initial demand’ would be to refrain from harming the ‘other’, grounding this demand in the 
principles of tolerance: 
Demanding that the homophobe be tolerant applies a certain (yet very limited) 
understanding towards the homophobe. It appreciates the fact that the homophobe 
is required to make a sacrifice and to suffer, as the homophobe is required to rise 
above any good reason he might have in his view to harm the other and to accept 
the other’s right not to be harmed despite his ‘wrong’ way of life.59  
This scenario describes an ideal liberal-democratic state in an ideal liberal-democratic 
society. However, just as the term ‘homophobe’ is rejected by conservative Christianity, 
the term ‘intolerant’ is considered by some not to be the sole preserve of the right-wing. 
For example, McConnell accepts that a homophobe who supports the use of the law to 
restrict homosexuality is intolerant. Yet he maintains that a gay person who supports the 
use of the law to ‘legitimise’ same-sex desire is also intolerant.60 He concludes that neither 
should use the law to promote their views. This is a false equivalency, which can be 
challenged by using an adult version of “you started it” as a means of guiding legal 
decision-making:  ‘who was the first to restrict (in the broadest sense possible) the freedom 
of the other because he has a negative opinion of the other or of his values?’61 As an 
illustration, homosexuality (insofar as it can be defined) does not involve the denial, 
condemnation or exclusion of others’ ways of life. Moreover, the ‘legitimisation’ of 
homosexuality through the law does not involve judging others negatively and using this as 
a basis for harming them. The same cannot be said for religious or conservative 
homophobia, which – on the contrary – involves negative judgments and the desire to 
exclude homosexuals and homosexuality from civic life.  
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In his own discussion of tolerance and harm, the liberal theorist Raz argues that the 
government should not criticise negative portrayals of homosexuality that arise in response 
to the move towards legitimising gay people. He equates this with the negative portrayals 
of Muslims that arose in response to the Satanic Verses furore.
62
 However, there is a false 
equivalency between these two examples, because:  
One can argue that by avoiding condemnation of attacking speech against gays, the 
government can be seen as sustaining such speech. It is not far-fetched to interpret 
non-condemnation as support, and while supporting (by not condemning) attacks 
on Muslims’ intolerant response to offending literature coincides with the limits of 
liberal tolerance, supporting (by not condemning) attacks on gays fails to respond 
properly to intolerant views and results in harming the non-intolerant powerless.
63
 
This passage reflects Popper’s well-known argument that, in a liberal society, the limit of 
tolerance is intolerance.
64
 One can go further, and argue that the passage also reflects 
Kendall Thomas’s characterisation of individual and organisational homophobia as 
constructive delegation of state power. As discussed in Chapter 6, homophobia is a harm; 
organisational homophobia is expressed in religious exemptions to equality law; individual 
homophobia is expressed in hate crime but also in faith-based conscientious objections to 
equality provisions; if the state permits exemptions or objections it is not condemning 
them, and – as the passage above says – ‘it is not far-fetched to interpret non-condemnation 
as support’.  
Value-based liberalism, then, provides a useful perspective on the debate around this case. 
Insights from a class-informed Foucaultian/Queer perspective can add a further layer of 
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understanding. Chapter 2 argued that a Foucaultian understanding of rights is possible and 
can be used to enhance the liberal approach. Foucault’s prioritisation of ‘difference’ led 
him to argue that forms of difference that strongly conflict with furthering such ethical 
goods as equality are not legitimate. Given the flexibility of modern power, it may prove 
difficult to specify a particular set of threats to human difference,
65
 but when such threats 
are identified a Foucaultian concept of rights can aid their evaluation. Where rights 
conflict, the right to difference has priority and would thus trump other, lesser rights 
(although conflict that did not involve this ‘elemental’ right would be more difficult to 
resolve).
66
 While this approach has merits, it does not provide the whole answer to the 
problem. Chapters 6 and 7 discuss the problem in more detail, framing them in terms of 
harm, constructive delegation of state power, and sexual citizenship in a consumer-oriented 
society. This chapter concludes with a brief assessment of possible future directions for 
conscientious objection, before highlighting the resistances that are happening from gay 
people of faith.  
Conscientious objection – future directions? 
It is useful to look at how ‘the struggle for control of discourses’67 is conducted in this 
debate. Johnson and Vanderbeck point to factors external to Parliament, including 
‘increasingly active conservative lobby groups’.68 This is highly pertinent in light of the 
recent consultation by the Equality and Human Rights Commission (EHRC) as part of 
their programme to ‘‘strengthen understanding of religion or belief in public life’’.69 
Conservative religious campaign groups strongly encouraged their followers to respond, to 
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ensure ‘that freedoms for Christians are protected more effectively, whether at work, 
school, church or other public setting’.70  
The Ashers Bakery case
71
 is the latest dispute (this time from Northern Ireland) to involve 
faith-based claims for exemption from equality law on grounds of conscience. An appeal 
from the County Court has already been heard in the Court of Appeal; at the time of 
writing judgment has not been handed down, but it is likely to develop significantly the 
jurisprudence regarding conscience clauses. Ashers, a Christian-owned bakery, refused a 
request from a gay rights campaigner to bake a cake bearing a slogan in favour of same-sex 
marriage, illustrated by an image of the Sesame Street characters Bert and Ernie. The 
refusal was on the basis of religious objection to any change to the traditional legal 
definition of marriage as being between one man and one woman.   
The Equality Commission instituted proceedings against the bakery for contravening anti-
discrimination legislation, while the bakery was supported by the Christian Institute, which 
campaigns for individual religious exceptions to equality provisions.  As part of its Ashers 
campaign, the Christian Institute paid for advertising space in several newspapers seeking 
donations. The wording of the advertisement is instructive: 
We’re supporting Ashers Baking Co as they face court for upholding marriage. The 
taxpayer-funded Equality Commission is taking Ashers Baking Company to court 
for refusing to decorate a cake with the message ‘support gay marriage’. The 
Christian Institute’s Legal Defence Fund supports Christians facing difficulties for 
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holding to their religious beliefs in an increasingly secular society. Help us help 
Ashers and others like them.
72
  
The bakery is elevated to the position of ‘upholding marriage’, and – echoing the 
discourses deployed in the Clearing the Ground report – religious conscientious objectors 
are painted as lonely stalwarts, bravely standing up to increasing challenges from 
secularism. Reminding readers of the newspaper that the Equality Commission is publicly 
funded feeds off the contemporary concern over public spending.  The case is discussed in 
detail in Chapter 7 of this thesis.  
So far this thesis has shown how, once the appropriation of rights discourse by religious 
conservatives had proved less than successful in the case law,
73
 a different strategy was 
adopted – the appeal to conscience, and to a higher ‘natural’ law.74 This appeal is made 
against the backdrop of a resurgent discourse of ‘Christian values’.75 However, this modern 
‘higher authority’ discourse differs from the discourse of medieval institutional theocracy, 
where the church governed all aspects of an individual’s life. Modern appeals for 
reasonable accommodation and conscience clauses now take place at the crossroads of the 
individual and the institutional; the private and the public. This crossroads is now the main 
site of battle in the conflict between religion and sexual orientation. The growth of human 
rights discourse since the Enlightenment had already placed the individual in an elevated 
position vis-à-vis the state. Latterly, the legal protection of sexual orientation has enabled 
lesbians and gay men to move from the private into the public sphere: they are increasingly 
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visible as students, teachers, employees, and as buyers of goods and services. In response, 
institutional religious conservatism
76
 is beginning to rebrand the old Christian discourse of 
individual suffering and martyrdom to enhance its appropriation of individual rights 
discourse. These have been re-deployed to press for wider anti-gay exemptions from 
equality law through devices such as ‘conscience clauses’. However, these discursive 
strategies and tactics have been met with resistance. The final section of this chapter looks 
at current challenges to the idea of a special relationship between religion and opposition to 
homosexuality.  
Resistances 
Foucault holds that discourse transmits and produces power/knowledge. Discourse can 
reinforce power/knowledge, but discourse also ‘undermines and exposes it, renders it 
fragile and makes it possible to thwart it.
77
 This possibility relates to the ‘tactical 
polyvalence of discourses’78 in that they can be used as opportunities for resistance. This 
chapter has considered the arguments in favour of accommodating religious belief. It has 
highlighted the familiar tropes that religion and homosexuality are mutually exclusive; that 
religion and homosexuality are equivalent in terms of rights claims; and that religious 
believers are oppressed by the state. However, it is also important to recognise the 
resistances that are taking place within religious organisations and communities, with the 
voices of gay people of faith now beginning to be heard. The old tropes have been 
challenged by religious individuals, some of whom are also gay. For example, Reverend 
Sharon Ferguson of the Lesbian and Gay Christian Movement states that ‘no one religion 
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should be able to influence to such an extent the laws that we put into place.’79 The 
Christian policy organisation, Ekklesia, observed that ‘the Church has become conditioned 
to think theologically and practically from a top-down perspective using instruments of the 
state to get what it wants… It has to have its arguments accepted on merit rather than 
privilege; it has to lead by example.
80
 
A significant aspect of this resistance is to do with clergy’s desire to have and to formalise 
their same-sex relationships. For example, the current Bishop of Grantham is the first 
Bishop to declare that he is in a same-sex (albeit celibate) relationship.
81
 Notably, a senior 
bishop from the Church’s evangelical wing has called for far-reaching change in the 
church’s attitudes to homosexuality and a welcome to Christians in same-sex 
relationships.
82
 Unfortunately, words have not translated into Church action so easily. 
Jeremy Pemberton, a gay clergyman, was prevented from taking up a post as a hospital 
chaplain after marrying his partner. He recently lost an employment tribunal against the 
Church, but has been given the right to appeal.
83
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CHAPTER 6: HARM AND CONSTRUCTIVE DELEGATION OF HOMOPHOBIA 
Homophobia is like racism and anti-Semitism and other forms of bigotry in that it seeks to 
dehumanize a large group of people, to deny their humanity, their dignity and 
personhood.
1
 
Chapter 4 charted how the justification for homophobia in religious anti-gay discourse has 
undergone a shift from an explicitly religious imperative, through the discourses of 
‘contagion’ discourse surrounding HIV and AIDS and the ‘corruption of youth’ around 
Section 28, to the appeals to heteronormative family life made to oppose same-sex 
marriage. It also showed how Christianity’s historical influence on determining sexual 
citizenship
2
 persists in current statutory religious exceptions and in the principles of 
reasonable accommodation and proportionality developed through case law. Chapter 5 
considered how this influence persists in the case law and argued that perpetuating 
influence by allowing individuals to use religious ‘conscience’ to deny goods and services 
is problematic. It allows religious conservatives to dictate legal policy and use equality law 
to restrict lesbians’ and gay men’s access to that which is offered to others.  
This chapter develops the argument that, by permitting religious discrimination against 
non-heterosexuals in equality law, the state is itself implicated in perpetuating 
homophobia. There are three reasons for this. First (as the political theory of Hobbes 
makes clear), the first duty of the state is to ensure the safety and security of its citizens,
3
 
and homophobia denies lesbians and gay men equal rights to safety and security as 
embodied individuals. Second, law’s historical relationship with religion continues to be 
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the vehicle whereby ambivalence or even distaste for homosexuality finds expression in 
the statute book. The disclaiming of homophobia and the assimilation of rights arguments 
by conservative religion disguises what is still a discourse grounded in heteronormativity. 
Third, homophobia denies lesbians and gay men equal sexual citizenship and thus equal 
dignity as human beings. A political and legal regime that professes to be concerned with 
equality should attend to those parts of the law that compromise equal citizenship, dignity 
and security by legitimising homophobia.  
The chapter argues that homophobia is a harm – the scope and degree of which is analysed 
by examining a variety of sources. It is argued that a Foucaultian analysis of harm offers 
greater analytical precision while also opening up further possibilities as to how harm can 
be assessed. The chapter continues to engage with liberal analysis, but also argues that a 
straightforward pursuit of reform – for example, through Article 3 of the ECHR4 – can fail 
to account for key issues of sexual citizenship.  The concept of homophobia as a threat to 
sexual citizenship was introduced in Chapter 1. At this point, it is helpful to revisit the 
concept and discuss in more detail both institutional and individual homophobia. 
Homophobia revisited 
The leader of the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) recently suggested that the 
need for race equality legislation had passed.
5
 Farage’s rationale echoes the discursive shift 
which has arisen in response to increasing equality for gay people: these people - these 
‘others’ - now have too much equality; the pendulum has swung too far the other way and 
the law must redress the balance.
6
 These emerging discourses share three broad 
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similarities. First, they are both grounded partly in a narrative that beckons a return to 
‘British values’7 which espouse rights and justice through the rule of law. There is an 
underlying caveat to this, however: the small print reminds us that hardworking, preferably 
white, Christian heterosexual families are the preferred model. Others may be tolerated 
magnanimously in the spirit of Western liberalism. Second, they both represent their 
proponents’ underlying desire to move away from structural understandings of inequality 
and discrimination towards a more individual approach. This is manifested in the rise of 
arguments from conscience being employed by individual goods and service providers to 
justify excluding lesbians and gay men. Finally, they both illustrate how vulnerable legal 
rights are to such discursive shifts whereby liberal rights discourse is appropriated to 
achieve illiberal aims.  
The term ‘homophobia’ is commonly used to describe a range of negative attitudes and 
behaviours towards same-sex desire and relationships. It can be manifested in critical or 
hostile words or behaviour, from distaste or disapproval, through discrimination, to verbal 
and physical violence. As this thesis contends, these negative attitudes and behaviours have 
become so sedimented within legal, social and political discourse that, even when equality 
provisions are extended to LGBT+ people, they remain tainted by homophobia. 
Introducing the debate on the Wolfenden Report,
8
 which paved the way for the partial 
decriminalisation of homosexuality,
9
 Kenneth Robinson MP stated: 
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I have no wish to suggest that I regard homosexuality as a desirable way of life… It 
is undesirable because it leads so often to unhappiness, to loneliness and to 
frustration, because it entails in many cases heavy burdens of guilt and shame on 
those affected by it and because it seldom provides a basis for a stable emotional 
relationship. It may also possibly be undesirable on moral grounds because it is a 
sin, but these are matters on which I am not competent to pass judgment. Surely all 
this suggests that these unfortunate people deserve our compassion rather than our 
contempt.
10
  
It might be expected that these tropes of the lonely homosexual, burdened by shame and 
sin and unable to form ‘normal’ relationships, would prevail amongst even the supposedly 
enlightened back in the 1950s and 1960s. Yet, as illustrated in previous chapters, such 
tropes persist even as the discourse shifts in response to changing societal mores. As 
Goodall notes,  
In 1960 – even with the growing support of broadsheet editors and moderate 
clergymen – it was a brave decision to speak in favour of the motion. Today, it is 
opponents of equality who regard themselves the brave ones to speak out. The 
arguments they use, from accusations of paedophilic tendencies
11
 to the description 
of same-sex sexual orientation as a sin and an abomination,
12
 were however used 
almost fifty years ago.
13
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The psychologist George Weinberg, who is credited with the origin of the term, described 
homophobia in medical terms.
14
 Interestingly, he also defined it with explicit reference to 
religion; it was ‘a fear of homosexuals which seemed to be associated with a fear of 
contagion, a fear of reducing the things one fought for – home and family. It was a 
religious fear and it had led to great brutality as fear always does’.15 “Holy” books can be 
used as authority for a range of prejudices. For example, as Curtis argues, faith-based 
homophobia echoes the biblical justifications for racism and sexism historically relied 
upon by religious conservatives in the United States: ‘Slavery, racial discrimination and 
segregation, and opposition to women’s rights were all supported by strong religious 
arguments bolstered by citations to the Bible.’16 Selected passages from the Christian bible 
were cited by a US Senator in opposition to the 1964 Civil Rights Act,
17
 and in 1967 a US 
judge reasoned that his god had put the races on separate continents because ‘he did not 
intend for the races to mix’.18 As Curtis recognises, ‘as with race and gender, the greatest 
harm may be to the human spirit, the harm inflicted when gays internalize the message sent 
by hostility and discrimination.’19   
The internalisation of homophobic discourse can also affect people from religious 
backgrounds. A recent study found that students who came from rigidly anti-gay domestic 
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 See Foucault (1978): 104-5 for discussion on how sexuality became subject to medicalisation through a 
discursive process of categorisation. ‘Homosexuality’ only came into existence when it was categorised as 
deviant, as a perverse pleasure. It could be argued that the resistance to the term ‘homophobia’ as a medical 
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people towards the discourse of rights as individual bearers of conscience.  
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 George Weinberg, Society and the Healthy Homosexual (St Martin’s Press, 1972) 
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 See for example MK Curtis, ‘A Unique Religious Exemption From Antidiscrimination Laws in the Case of 
Gays? Putting the Call for Exemptions for Those Who Discriminate Against Married or Marrying Gays in 
Context.’ Wake Forest Law Review, 5 April 2012 http://wakeforestlawreview.com/2012/04/a-unique-
religious-exemption-from-antidiscrimination-laws-in-the-case-of-gays-putting-the-call-for-exemptions-for-
those-who-discriminate-against-married-or-marrying-gays-in-context/#_ftn82 (accessed 30 March 2015) 
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backgrounds were the most likely to reveal repressed same-sex attraction.
20
 Religious 
edicts against homosexuality permeate society and its laws to the extent that they have 
become enmeshed and embedded within them. As a consequence, homophobia can be 
perpetrated by people who do not profess any particular religious belief, yet have 
internalised religious and patriarchal messages concerning masculinity and femininity. The 
researchers suggested that this is why some religious conservatives who denounce 
homosexuality are subsequently found to have clandestine same-sex relations: ‘these 
people are at war with themselves and are turning this internal conflict outward’. It is 
interesting to note how the reference to war echoes the discourse used by religious 
conservatives to present themselves as embattled victims of equality law.
21
 
Institutional Homophobia 
Institutional homophobia includes both religious and state-sponsored homophobia. Indeed, 
in many countries there is a strong correlation between the two. In 2014, the International 
Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans and Intersex Association (ILGA) published its most recent 
report on state-sponsored homophobia.
22
 State-sponsored homophobia comprises 
criminalisation, hate speech from government members and other forms of discrimination, 
violence and persecution of LGBTI people. The report finds that ‘in many places, LGBTI 
people are still living under intensive situations of homophobia which is directly or 
                                                          
20 ‘Why Homophobes Hate’. http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/homophobes-might-be-hidden-
homosexuals/ (accessed 3 March 2015). See also Wilkerson, JM et al (2012) ‘Religiosity, internalized 
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implicitly sponsored by unfavourable state law’.23 Private, consensual homosexual acts are 
illegal in over 75 countries; five states (and parts of two others) punish homosexuality with 
the death penalty; and four more may also be implementing the death penalty for 
homosexuality under the Sharia code.
24
 Since the report was published we have been 
subjected to news reports of gay men being executed for their sexuality in the Islamic 
State, which is vehemently homophobic.
25
  
Yet there are other acts of state-sponsored homophobia that do not directly result in the 
death of gay people, but which contribute to an environment in which to be gay is to enjoy 
less than full citizenship.
26
 For example, nine UN countries have laws prohibiting the 
‘promotion’ of homosexuality, usually grounded in morality arguments and fears around 
the ‘corruption’ of children. 16 states retain different ages of consent according to sexual 
orientation. Only 61 countries prohibit discrimination against non-heterosexuals in 
employment; a mere 14 permit same-sex marriage; and 15 allow adoption by same-sex 
couples. Very few nations (27) recognise sexual orientation as an aggravating factor in hate 
crime, and only 28 prohibit incitement to hatred on sexual orientation grounds.
27
 As with 
the Human Rights Watch report on Russia, the ILGA report found some evidence to 
indicate a link between institutional homophobia (laws restricting gay citizenship) and 
individual acts or expressions of social homophobia. ILGA’s report specifically notes that 
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‘in Uganda and Nigeria the situation got worse with the passing of new anti-gay laws’.28 
This suggests a link between state-sponsored homophobia and harm.  
It is also worth noting the recent Human Rights Watch report
29
 on violence towards LGBT 
people in Russia since a law was passed ‘aimed at protecting children from information 
promoting the denial of traditional family values’.30 The report was based on field research 
conducted in seven Russian cities and on via email, telephone and Skype interviews with 
participants across Russia. In-depth interviews were conducted with 78 LGBT people who 
had experienced violence because of their sexual orientation or gender identity, and 46 
LGBT activists who were attacked or harassed by counter-demonstrators, including 30 
who were detained by the police.
31
 The data reveals that the number of homophobic attacks 
has since risen and that their brutality has worsened.
32
 Although the Russian law does not 
have an explicitly religious basis, the discourses employed by Putin’s government in 
justification nonetheless echo the discourses historically employed by religious 
conservatives in the UK. Appeals to traditional family values and the need to protect 
minors from corruption have their counterparts in the rationale behind Section 28 of the 
Local Government Act 1988.
33
 The report highlights the influence of the church on law in 
post-Soviet Russia: 
Russian Orthodox Church leaders have made public inflammatory statements about 
gay people, and the strong and growing influence of the […] Church fuels existing 
homophobic sentiments. In 2014, for example, one high-level church official said 
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29 ‘License to Harm: Violence and Harassment against LGBT People and Activists in Russia’ 
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/russia1214_ForUpload.pdf (accessed 14 March 2015) 
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 Federal Law of June 29, 2013 No. 135-FZ, ‘On Amendments to Article 5 of the Federal Law on Protecting 
Children from Information Harmful to their Health and Development’  
<http://www.rg.ru/2013/06/30/deti-site-dok.html> accessed 14 March 2015 
31 ‘Licence to Harm’: 11 
32 ‘Licence to Harm’: 14 
33
 See Chapter 4 for further discussion.  
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that same-sex relations should be ‘completely eliminated’ from Russian society, 
preferably through ‘moral persuasion’ but if necessary through a public referendum 
on recriminalizing homosexuality.
34
 
The contents of the report, based on the lived experience of Russian LGBT people, do 
suggest a causal link between the new law and increased homophobic violence, 
exacerbated by the authorities’ reluctance to prosecute the perpetrators. It also implicates 
the church in the creation of an environment where homophobia is able to grow. Thus an 
empirical claim about the relationship between homophobic law and harm begins to form. 
Such a claim does not solely apply to other, less “democratic” jurisdictions; it can also be 
made of the UK. In the three months following the recent UK referendum, which approved 
the UK’s exit from the European Union, it was reported that homophobic hate crime had 
risen 147%, as well as a spike in hate crime against ethnic minorities and foreign 
nationals.
35
 
The relationship between institutional and individual homophobia 
The writer of LGBT television series ‘Cucumber’ recently said that ‘To live as a gay man 
in the world, even here in the west, means skirting round violence every day’.36 A recent 
episode of the drama contained a viscerally disturbing scene in which a character was 
bludgeoned to death by a man who was clearly wrestling with his sexual orientation and 
his own internalised homophobia. Homophobia can be internalised when a person projects 
inwards the negative stereotypes, stigma and prejudice about gay people, whether or not 
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that person identifies as gay themselves. Internalised homophobia also includes conscious 
or unconscious behaviours that let a person conform to societal expectations of 
heteronormativity. As in ‘Cucumber’, this can involve extreme repression and denial, 
coupled with external displays of heteronormative or anti-gay behaviour, including 
extreme violence and murder. It can also be expressed in much more subtle, but no less 
‘othering’, behaviours. As Owen Jones observes:  
Reminders... that you’re not quite equal are pervasive: the look of horror on a 
straight man’s face when he’s “accused” of being gay…; the use of gender-neutral 
“partner” because it’s been a long day and you can’t be bothered coming out again 
for the 987
th
 time; someone’s OTT attempts to prove that they’re OK with people 
being gay, a form of being patronised that reminds an LGBT person of their 
inferior status nearly as much as straightforward abuse. For some, the background 
noise of homophobia can feel like living under an authoritarian regime underpinned 
by informants, forcing them to remain undercover. You don’t dream of holding 
hands with a partner: a graph of “likelihood of being verbally or physically 
assaulted” appears in your head, and the line surges upwards if you do… 
[Cucumber] tapped into a profound, embedded sense of our own vulnerability and 
precariousness, even now, in Britain, in 2015.
37
 
This is a vivid description of some of the challenges that gay people face in attempting to 
live out an authentic existence, and why the ‘closet’ continues to be both a place of refuge 
and oppression.  
Several studies, here and in the US, have identified a link between homophobic 
discrimination and harm suffered by lesbians and gay men. A systematic review of mental 
                                                          
37
 [n 36] 
190 
 
disorders, suicide and self-harm amongst LGB (lesbian, gay and bisexual) people in 
England found that ‘the social hostility, stigma and discrimination that most LGB people 
experience is likely to be at least part of the reason for the higher rates of psychological 
morbidity observed.
38
 Citing ‘difficulties growing up in a world orientated to heterosexual 
norms and values and the negative influence of social stigma against homosexuality’, a 
lead researcher suggested that ‘people who feel discriminated against experience social 
stressors, which in turn increases their risk of experiencing mental health problems’, 
adding that greater efforts are needed to prevent these issues arising.
39
 
These greater efforts should include active work on behalf of the state to challenge 
homophobic violence. A previous Hate Crime Report on homophobia, biphobia and 
transphobia in London
40
 found that 1 in 8 LGB people experience homophobic or biphobic 
crime each year; and 1 in 14 experience violence each year (compared with 1 in 33 
heterosexuals). 57% of these victims do not report it, and 25% of those who do are 
dissatisfied with the police response. Here, it becomes possible to argue that the state is 
implicated in homophobic violence through the relative failure of its police force to tackle 
homophobic crime. It can also be argued that the state is implicated in harm caused to gay 
people through discriminatory laws. For example, a US study investigated ‘the modifying 
effect of state-level policies on the association between lesbian, gay or bisexual status and 
the prevalence of psychiatric disorders’. The results indicated that:   
Compared with living in states with policies extending protections [to non-
heterosexuals], living in states without these policies predicted a significantly 
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stronger association between lesbian, gay or bisexual status and psychiatric 
disorders in the past 12 months… Policies that reduce discrimination against gays 
and lesbians are urgently needed to protect the health and well-being of this 
population.
41
          
A 2011 survey conducted by the Lesbian and Gay Foundation
42
 serves as a useful 
illustration of how the closet continues to operate in the present day. 42% of their 
respondents said that they had realized that they might be lesbian, gay or bisexual between 
the ages of 13 and 15, but only 14% had ‘come out’ at that age. A quarter of those 
surveyed had not yet come out by the age of 25, and 3% of all respondents had never come 
out at all. This is perhaps understandable when one considers the extent of homophobic 
bullying (verbal and physical) and discrimination in schools, colleges and workplaces. 
Homophobic verbal bullying and discrimination in the workplace was reported by around a 
third of the survey respondents: 13% had experienced verbal bullying and 18% had 
experienced discrimination from their boss, while 15% and 13% had experienced these 
from customers at work. The report also indicates the impact of homophobia on the 
emotional wellbeing of lesbians and gay men, with 59% of respondents reporting that they 
had experienced three or more mental health problems.
43
 
In schools and colleges, half of respondents had experienced verbal bullying; nearly 1 in 3 
physical bullying; and 44% discrimination from other students. 11% had experienced 
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verbal bullying and 16% had experienced discrimination from teachers or other staff while 
at school.
44
 Teachers and leaders at some schools have also faced a backlash from parents, 
apparently fuelled by religious conservatism, when they have attempted to implement 
diversity programmes such as Challenging Homophobia in Primary Schools (CHiPS).
45
 
Ofsted has described Sex and Relationships Education (SRE) in schools as ‘not yet good 
enough’,46 with the quality even lower with regard to LGBT+ pupils. This has precipitated 
an ongoing campaign to make age-appropriate SRE compulsory in all schools, with a legal 
requirement to address the needs of LGBT+ young people.
47
 An amendment to the 
Children and Families Bill, which would have achieved this, was defeated by the 
Government in the House of Lords in 2014. When the Sex and Relationships (Curriculum) 
Bill was introduced to Parliament later that year, in a second attempt to introduce 
compulsory SRE, it faced opposition going so far as to call for all sex education to be 
abolished. The opposition was led by Phillip Davies MP, who is a member of the 
Cornerstone Group, a grouping of Conservative MPs dedicated to ‘faith, flag and family’ 
and to upholding ‘traditional marriage’.48 The influence of traditional ‘spiritual values’49 
on Cornerstone’s opposition to inclusive SRE is clear. This is one example of the 
continuing legacy of Section 28.
50
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Homophobic Speech 
(i) On the Buses 
A recent judicial review case
51
 demonstrates the courts’ recognition of a link between anti-
gay speech, homophobia, and the risk of harm to lesbians and gay men. The case 
concerned an advertisement which the Core Issues Trust sought to run on London buses. 
The Core Issues Trust is a Christian organisation that ‘works with people who seek to 
change from a ‘gay’ lifestyle to a gender-affirming one’.52 The advert’s slogan: ‘Not gay! 
Ex-gay, post-gay and proud. Get over it!’53 was partly intended as a riposte to a bus advert 
by Stonewall which had run previously, using the slogan: ‘Some people are gay. Get over 
it!’54  
In the course of protracted legal proceedings, the court upheld the ban placed on the 
Trust’s advert by Transport for London, finding, inter alia, that Article 9 ECHR was not 
engaged and there was no interference with ECHR Article 10. It was held that the advert 
was likely to have caused widespread offence and interference with the Article 8 rights of 
lesbians and gay men;
55
 it was also liable to ‘encourage homophobic views, and 
homophobia places gays at risk.’56 Lord Bingham considered that the Stonewall advert 
‘was intended to promote tolerance of homosexuals and discourage homophobic bullying’, 
whereas the Trust’s message was ‘encouraging “gay rejection” by implying offensively 
and controversially that homosexuality can be cured.’57 Lord Bingham’s idea of risk is 
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useful here; even if concrete harms cannot be demonstrated, serious risks cannot be 
ignored by the state, especially if those risks pertain to injuries of some gravity.  
Lord Justice Briggs, while conceding (obiter) that Stonewall’s advert was aimed at 
promoting tolerance and discouraging bullying, expressed concern at the effect of such a 
slogan on religious conservatives: 
There are many people… who have been brought up and taught to believe that all 
homosexual conduct is wrong… many… continue sincerely to hold that belief, and 
some regard a departure from it as inconsistent with the maintenance of their faith. 
Some would rather give up their jobs, or discontinue their businesses, than act in a 
way which they believe condones such conduct… the advice to ‘get over it’ is a 
confrontational message which is likely to come across to many… as at least 
disrespectful of their sincerely held beliefs…58 
There does appear to be a genuinely-held view amongst some religious people that faith-
based opposition to homosexuality is not equivalent to homophobia, being based on a 
belief in the ‘revealed word’ of their god, and not simply on an irrational fear of gay 
people. The ‘holy’ books of the world’s three main creedal religions59 can be interpreted as 
forbidding homosexuality, and many believers accept these interpretations as moral 
imperatives. Leaving aside the argument that religious belief is inherently irrational,
60
 this 
denial of homophobia is not only an example of sophistry; it also negates the lived 
experience of lesbians and gay men who have suffered – and continue to suffer – at the 
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hands of religious conservatism.
61
 It is also worth noting here that Christian religious texts 
that refer to same-sex practice are very limited; the meaning of those that do exist (such as 
the story of Sodom and Gomorrah) has also been contested.
62
 In other words, even if we 
are to take seriously religious belief, it should not be conceded that the texts are static or 
unquestionable. They have been contested, reworked, reinterpreted over time and so their 
meanings have shifted. This does not (necessarily) mean that believers are insincere in 
their beliefs; however, it does permit a challenge to religious claims in their own terms. 
That is, they are not only problematic in terms of rights conflicts, but also in terms of 
internal consistency and logic. Their followers’ argument that they are bound by a 
fundamental, unchanging and unchangeable text does not bear scrutiny in broader 
historico-cultural-political terms.  
In any event, such arguments would no longer be acceptable with regards to faith-based 
edicts on race, yet they doggedly persist with reference to sexual orientation. The reference 
to ‘homosexual conduct’ buys in to the old trope that sexual orientation is akin to a 
‘lifestyle choice’ and thus can be changed – which is precisely what ‘gay cure’ 
organisations such as the Core Issues Trust seek to propagate. The governing bodies of 
mental health professionals have now publicly opposed this type of therapy. For example, 
the Royal College of Psychiatrists state: ‘There is no sound scientific evidence that sexual 
orientation can be changed. Furthermore, so-called treatments of homosexuality create a 
setting in which prejudice and discrimination flourish’.63 Furthermore, suggesting that 
Stonewall’s message might be ‘confrontational’ echoes the modern trope that gay people 
now have too much equality and are using their position to attack the rights of religious 
                                                          
61
 See comments made by drag artist and gay rights campaigner, Panti Bliss, in response to religious 
conservatives in Ireland: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WXayhUzWnl0> accessed 28 January 2015 
62
 See John Boswell, Christianity, Social Tolerance, and Homosexuality Chicago University Press, 1980 
63
 Memorandum of Understanding on Conversion Therapy in the UK: published Jan 2015  
<http://www.psychotherapy.org.uk/news/memorandum-of-understanding> accessed 10 March 2015 
196 
 
believers. Briggs LJ’s comments serve as an illustration of my contention that, even where 
gay people can toast ‘victory’, there are still discursive costs.  
(ii) Derby Pride 
Three men were convicted in 2012 of distributing threatening written material intended to 
stir up hatred on the grounds of sexual orientation, contrary to the Criminal Justice and 
Immigration Act 2008,
64
 which amended the 1986 Public Order Act to include sexual 
orientation.
65
 The men had distributed hundreds of leaflets through letterboxes in 
residential areas during the lead-up to Derby’s annual Gay Pride event. Two versions were 
not the subject of criminal charges, because they were not explicitly threatening, albeit 
offensive: ‘G.A.Y. God Abhors You’ and ‘Turn or Burn’.66 The leaflet which was subject 
to charges, titled ‘The Death Penalty?’, contained an image of a mannequin hanging from a 
noose, accompanied by Islamic texts advocating capital punishment – whether it be 
burning, throwing from a high place, or stoning – as the only way to rid society of the 
corrupting influence of homosexuality. Evidence adduced at the trial included testimony 
from four gay men, all of whom had felt threatened by the leaflets. The judge’s comments 
on harm, made in the course of sentencing, are instructive: 
I have to consider not only the culpability of the offender, but also the harm that 
was caused, or was intended to be caused, or might foreseeably have been 
caused…. Looking at the harm done, I have considered the threat felt by the 
individuals that gave evidence at the trial, and the likelihood that others were 
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similarly affected. I have borne in mind that the residents of the streets who 
received this leaflet do not seem to have changed their attitude or behaviour 
towards their gay neighbours… That said, you have been convicted of intending to 
stir up hatred. It follows that your intention was to do great harm in a peaceful 
community… No-one seems to have been tempted to copy you… However, it is 
hard to ascertain exactly how much harm you have caused by distributing this 
leaflet outside the Mosque.
67
 
So, according to Burgess J, it is not necessary to be able to measure the precise level of 
harm caused by homophobic speech. The fact that intent to foment hatred was proven was 
sufficient to find that ‘great harm’ was also intended. Hatred on grounds of sexual 
orientation is viewed judicially as harm.   
(iii) The Stoke-on-Trent ‘Monk’ 
The Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) recently declined to press charges against a man 
dressed as a monk who distributed anti-gay leaflets in Stoke-on-Trent and elsewhere. The 
leaflets contained homophobic statements such as: ‘The practice of homosexuality is both 
blasphemy against God and rebellion against nature’; ‘Homosexuality, as well as being a 
sin and a vice, is essentially a neurosis, a pathological condition, the result of several 
factors including childhood experiences’; and ‘Homosexualism has become a cult, and by 
the indoctrination of school children and regular propaganda through the media, it seeks 
converts.’68  
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The CPS justified their refusal to prosecute under the 2008 legislation because ‘While 
these leaflets were ill-informed and caused offence to members of the community targeted 
by this individual, they did not cross the high criminal threshold for prosecution…’.69 The 
CPS recommended alternative means of dealing with the man’s behaviour; however 
Staffordshire Police declined to bring proceedings for an Anti-Social Behaviour Order or a 
civil injunction, stating that there was ‘insufficient evidence’ to do so. The CPS based its 
decision on Schedule 16 to the 2008 Act, which states (at paragraph 14): ‘In this Part, for 
the avoidance of doubt, the discussion or criticism of sexual conduct or practices or the 
urging of persons to refrain from or modify such conduct or practices shall not be taken of 
itself to be threatening or intended to stir up hatred’. This is generally known as the “free 
speech” defence.  
It is accepted that the contents of these leaflets is not as incendiary as the contents of the 
Derby leaflets, to the extent that there is no call for gay people to be put to death. However, 
the wording once again reactivates old tropes concerning contagion and the spectre of a 
‘gay agenda’. It also hints at the need for the kind of ‘gay cure’ that was found by the court 
in Core Issues Trust
70
 to be homophobic and therefore harmful. This type of publication 
does little to make gay people feel safe, and yet it is not seen to be threatening unless it 
explicitly exhorts death. It is submitted that the CPS should pay closer attention to the 
reasoning in Core Issues Trust and in Ali, Javed and Ahmed before making similar 
decisions in future. 
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Eric Heinze has written extensively
71
 on the free speech debate, arguing that bans on ‘hate 
speech’ have no legitimate role in democratic societies.72 For the purposes of this 
discussion, this section will focus on his analysis of the relationship between hate speech 
and harm. Heinze refutes claims that hate speech necessarily harms those groups on the 
receiving end of the hatred, arguing that ‘no statistically reliable causation from patterns of 
publicly aired hate speech to patterns of hate crime has been demonstrated...’.73 However, 
the UK law requires evidence of the stirring-up of hatred, not of any crime that may have 
been caused by the stirring-up of hatred, perhaps recognising the difficulty of proving 
causation in the absence of a violent homophobe announcing that it was the leaflet that 
made him or her physically attack a gay person. Goodall points to research on racist 
discourse by way of response to Heinze:  
The impact of repeated discriminatory speech operates in an insidious way… when 
it is successful, hate discourse acts as strategic persuasion, reinforcing and 
regenerating prejudiced beliefs and unequal treatment, and promoting – or more 
accurately, undermining – social solidarity by distinguishing outsiders.74  
Making the link between racist and homophobic discourse, she recognises that ‘the current 
UK incitement laws have been enacted where there is some evidence of a history or culture 
of stirring up hatred against those particular groups’, because ‘homophobic aggression 
remains a serious problem’.75 At this point, it is necessary to consider in more detail the 
concept of harm itself. The following section looks first at the classic liberal position and 
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considers Raz’s ‘perfectionist liberal’ critique. It then moves on to considering a 
Foucaultian analysis of harm, drawing on Thomas’s analysis of sodomy laws in the United 
States and using it to argue that this approach offers some interesting possibilities for 
ensuring the continued protection of sexual minorities in equality law. 
Harm 
The liberal position 
The ‘harm principle’ as espoused by Mill holds that the need to prevent harm to persons 
other than the actor is the only morally relevant reason in support of state coercion of the 
individual.
76
 The general liberal position is that the need to prevent harm to others is 
always a relevant reason to engage the criminal law, if not necessarily fully 
determinative.
77
 In his extended study of the moral limits of the criminal law, Feinberg 
distinguishes between normative and non-normative senses of harm: the latter involves 
some sort of setback to a person’s interests,78 whereas the former, normative sense 
involves a wrong which is a violation of a person’s rights. He sees the harm principle as 
applicable only to setbacks to interests that are also wrongs, and only to wrongs which also 
involve a setback to interests. He explains: 
Interests can be blocked or defeated by events in impersonal nature or by plain bad 
luck. But they can only be ‘invaded’ by human beings… It is only when an interest 
is thwarted through an invasion by self or others, that its possessor is harmed in the 
legal sense… One person harms another… by invading, and thereby thwarting or 
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setting back, his interest. The test… of whether such an invasion has in fact set 
back an interest is whether that interest is in a worse condition than it would 
otherwise have been in had the invasion not occurred at all.
79
 
In terms of what does and does not count as ‘harm’, Feinberg rules out ‘mere transitory 
disappointments, minor physical and mental “hurts” and a miscellany of disliked states of 
mind… as harms’ in the sense of wrongful setbacks to interest.80 Further, moral 
indignation does not count as harm. Feinberg also distinguishes between general and 
normative senses of ‘offence’: general offence comprises myriad discomfiting mental 
states, whereas normative offence refers only to those states caused by the wrongful – 
right-violating – conduct of others.81 Nehushtan’s broader definition of harm recognises 
that it ‘can be emotional, mental, and physical… caused by condemning the other… 
avoiding his presence [and] discriminating against him’.82 This thesis contends that the 
definitions proposed by Feinberg and Nehushtan both lead to the conclusion that anti-gay 
discrimination does involve harm to lesbians and gay men, when understood within the 
societal framework of heteronormativity and homophobia.  
At the same time, this thesis contends that these definitions preclude religious 
conservatives from using the harm principle as the basis of a purported right to 
discriminate on grounds of sexual orientation. The classic liberal position holds that the 
harm and offence principles between them exhaust the class of good reasons for criminal 
prohibitions and together delineate the moral limits of the criminal law.
83
 It does not 
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countenance legal paternalism
84
 or legal moralism.
85
 Thus classic liberalism offers no 
comfort to people suffering profound offence on religious grounds: people like the Bulls, 
who were fundamentally opposed to letting double-bedded rooms to guests other than 
heterosexual married couples.
86
 If they view homosexuality as a sin, such people can be 
deeply offended by the idea of same-sex intimacy happening even in private, but Feinberg 
points out that ‘if his impersonal moral outrage is to be the ground of legal coercion and 
punishment of the offending party, it must be by virtue of legal moralism – to which the 
liberal is profoundly opposed’.87 There is a distinction to be made here between the 
construction of harm for the purposes of allowing criminal intervention (religious offence 
being insufficient) and a religious right to ‘free speech’ (and the harms which might result 
and therefore lead to a qualification of the right).    
Liberal Neutrality and the Harm Principle 
Classic liberalism, then, defines the limits of state interference with individual liberty in 
accordance with the harm principle. Determination of the moral worth of an act, on this 
definition, is not a relevant consideration. Closely linked with this is the liberal idea that 
the state should be neutral between competing conceptions of the moral good.
88
 Raz 
challenges both tenets of classic liberalism and instead advances a kind of ‘perfectionist’ 
liberalism, which is based on two propositions: (i) the state cannot be neutral – indeed, the 
very idea of liberal state neutrality is ‘chimerical’;89 and (ii) the harm principle itself 
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assumes a moral position.
90
 Liberal neutrality cannot be neutral between values which are 
consistent with fundamental liberal ideals and those which contradict them. As Sadurski 
points out, individuals are free to adopt their own conception of the good, such as a 
religion. However, ‘they cannot expect that any such conception will be equally supported 
by the legal system’.91 Sadurski goes on to acknowledge that some individuals will thus 
find this challenging, and specifically mentions religion in this context: ‘What is the point 
of persisting in a religious belief which requires the imposition of your beliefs upon ‘non-
believers’ and calls for the use of the state apparatus for this goal, if your state is totally 
non-responsive to this aim?’92  
Judith Jarvis Thomson’s distinction between different types of distress93 is worth 
considering here (as well as her interesting observation that ‘we all quite enjoy’ feelings of 
moral indignation at times!).
94
 For Thomson, there is simple distress (in the sense of a 
feeling that one dislikes having) and then there is distress that is caused because we have a 
certain belief. Belief-mediated feelings can be held rationally or irrationally, and people 
bear some personal responsibility for how long they have these feelings and how intense 
they are.
95
 Even if the feeling is not irrational, Thomson does not view belief-mediated 
distress as a harm. The very word ‘harm’ has a tendency to ‘slither’,96 enabling people to 
say they have suffered a harm whenever something happens that they would prefer not to 
have happened. Indeed, harm is loaded with moral significance, so it can be a useful 
strategy or tactic if one wants another to stop doing a particular thing to say that thing is 
causing them harm. Where should the line be drawn? One of Thomson’s examples of the 
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‘slithering of harm’ is particularly relevant to the conflict under discussion in this thesis: 
the extension of harm to include the worsening of a person’s condition via a worsening of 
status. Lilian Ladele and Gary McFarlane lost their jobs because of their refusal to provide 
services to gay people (civil partnership and counselling respectively), and the Bulls had to 
sell their hotel as a result of their refusal to let double rooms to same-sex couples.
97
 
According to Thomson, it is not an infringement per se to cause someone to lose their job 
(unless the loss were caused by an infringing act such as spreading lies about them):, 
because ‘the gravamen of the charge against one who causes a status worsening lies in the 
means used. If those means are no infringement of a claim, then causing the status 
worsening is not either. Thus status worsenings are not themselves harms.’98 This is why, 
on a Thomsonian view, Ms Ladele, Mr McFarlane and the Bulls were not harmed. 
Perhaps religious conservatives are right to be concerned. Reliance on liberal rights 
discourse has so far proved a less than effective tool for religious conservatives. It has 
failed to erode those rights and protections only recently granted to lesbians and gay men 
in the Equality Act. This explains the move towards conscience clauses, by relying on 
something purportedly ‘higher’ than human law. The Enlightenment, at least in this sense, 
has come full circle. There may not be a medieval theocracy, but there remains a pervasive 
theonormativity, which is the reason why appeals to discriminate based on conscience can 
even be voiced. It is submitted that theonormativity and heteronormativity operate in a 
discursive alliance, together providing a basis for unequal power relations that harm queer 
people by limiting their citizenship and thus their agency.
99
 Our understanding of harm can 
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be further improved through a Foucaultian perspective that recognises the importance of 
relations of power and their sedimentation through time. 
A Foucaultian analysis of harm and power 
If power is examined through a Foucaultian lens, it is revealed as that which characterises 
relations between parts of any given society – and between individuals in that society – as 
relations of struggle.
100
 This approach conceptualises power not as a top-down mode of 
domination, but as ‘a dynamic situation, whether personal, social or institutional… a 
strategic, unstable relation’.101  It better describes the changing relations of power that have 
operated between law, religion and sexual orientation since the latter half of the twentieth 
century. It accounts, with greater analytical precision, for the discursive shifts that have 
taken place in religious conservatives’ opposition to increasing equality for lesbians and 
gay men. Furthermore, the Foucaultian approach offers a means of critiquing this 
opposition and suggests a different way forward for sexual orientation equality. 
In applying a Foucaultian understanding of power to equality law, this thesis takes 
inspiration from Thomas’s argument that US anti-sodomy laws102 legitimised the 
homophobic violence perpetrated by citizens and individual state officers, through the 
‘constructive delegation of state power’.103 Taking a Foucaultian perspective, Thomas 
contends that we need a broader appreciation of the interests at stake than arguments based 
on privacy permit. This chapter suggests that religious exemptions to equality legislation 
can be understood in a similar vein. Further, Article 8 of the ECHR is no longer a 
satisfactory mechanism for the protection of non-heterosexuals. Pitting two qualified 
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Convention rights - Article 8 (privacy) against Article 9 (freedom of religion) - contributes 
to the zero-sum game that has hitherto dogged scholarly approaches to this conflict.  
Using Thomas’s approach, this chapter contends that homophobia continues to be 
legitimised by the state through religious exemptions in equality law, and through the 
theonormative and heteronormative frameworks that these exemptions support. Religious 
exemptions provide a space where homophobia is permissible. For the state to allow 
‘reasonable accommodation’ for religious conservatives means the amounts to state 
facilitation of sexual prejudice in the public sphere.  It enables old anti-gay myths and 
tropes to be reactivated at both institutional and individual levels. Any consideration of a 
‘conscience clause’ for individuals would exacerbate this problem. It would enable state-
legitimised homophobia to be constructively delegated to individuals. At this point, a 
discussion on the relationship between privacy and power is necessary. 
Privacy and Power 
The liberal understanding of privacy sees it as a haven from the external world, including 
the state. This is indeed the image one sees if one looks through a heteronormative lens. In 
the liberal state, heterosexuals have always been able to enjoy privacy as an unqualified 
good; as a zone in which they can express their intimate needs and desires without 
interference. This has not been the case for non-heterosexuals, who have had to hide or 
‘closet’ their sexual orientation in order to survive within society. As Halperin observes, 
the closet offers a zone of protection ‘from the many and virulent sorts of social 
disqualification that one would suffer were the discreditable fact of one’s sexual 
orientation more widely known’.104 At the same time, this need for individual self-
protection enables society to maintain its heteronormative structure. As Sedgwick 
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recognises, privacy for lesbians and gay men has enabled society to enjoy ‘the 
epistemological privilege of unknowing’,105 whereby the veneer of heterosexuality is not 
tarnished by a forced recognition of the homosexual ‘other’. Thus the closet serves as a 
reminder of the relations of power that exist with regard to sexuality.
106
 As Thomas argues, 
privacy for non-heterosexuals ‘has always been both a tool and a trap, insofar as privacy 
has functionally served as a cornerstone for the very structure of domination that the 
principle has been used to attack’,107 and it is this structure of domination that is criticised 
here.  
This is precisely why the extension of sexual minority rights beyond the private sphere, 
into employment, education, and into the marketplace of goods and services, has provided 
such a flashpoint for conflict with religion. Religious conservatives have bemoaned their 
legal losses, and it is tempting to view sexual orientation as the winner. However, focusing 
on court decisions in case law can cloud our understanding of the forces that do (or should) 
motivate the law.
108
 This is why an analysis of the power relations involved is important, 
and why Thomas advocates a focus on political power when considering the implications 
of homosexual sodomy statutes – or, in this case, of religious exemptions to anti-
discrimination law. Thomas reminds the reader us that lesbian and gay history ‘is a story of 
homophobic aggression and ideology. Its central theme is the fear, hatred, stigmatization 
and persecution of homosexuals and homosexuality’.109 He likens the constant, underlying 
threat of homophobic violence to living under the threat of terrorism: 
As in the case of terrorism, much of the force of violence against gay men and 
lesbians lies in its randomness: individuals may know that the assertion or 
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ascription of gay or lesbian identity marks them as potential targets of homophobic 
violence, but they cannot know until too late whether or when they will actually be 
hit. Like the terrorist, the perpetrator of homophobic violence strikes without giving 
warning. A second characteristic common to terrorism and homophobic violence is 
its utter impersonality. Like perpetrators of terrorist acts, those who attack gays and 
lesbians do not know, and are most often unknown to, their victims.
110
 
Chapter 5 discussed how religious conservatives have used the discourse of war to describe 
their experience. Thomas uses the discourse of terrorism to provide a useful insight into the 
lived experience of lesbians and gay men around the world – including the UK. This is a 
bold comparison, which may seem overly dramatic or exaggerated at first glance
111
 and 
may explain why the jurisprudence of the ECtHR has been loath to use Article 3in the 
context of gay rights. The following section considers Article 3 in more detail. 
Inhuman and degrading treatment: Article 3 ECHR 
There has not, as yet, been a successful complaint under Article 3 relating to sexual 
orientation. Complaints continue to be made under Article 8, often in conjunction with the 
general anti-discrimination provisions in Article 14. The ECtHR has stated that Article 3, 
(unlike Articles 8-11) is an absolute and unqualified right.
112
 However, the Court’s case 
law has found guidance in principles such as the ‘margin of appreciation’113 which have 
allowed an element of relativity and subjectivity to seep into its jurisprudence. As Addo 
and Grief point out, the Court’s practice under Article 3 ‘is based not on objective criteria 
but on the effects of various subjective factors on the particular facts of each case, leading 
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to decisions which can be hard to reconcile’.114 Nevertheless the European Commission 
has provided assistance as to the meaning and extent of Article 3: 
The notion of inhuman treatment covers at least such treatment as deliberately 
causes severe suffering, mental or physical, which, in the particular situation, is 
unjustifiable… Treatment or punishment of an individual may be said to be 
degrading if it grossly humiliates him before others or drives him to act against his 
will or conscience.
115
  
This wording could be construed as offering hope to religious conservatives who seek to 
rely on a ‘conscience clause’, because they could argue that a legal obligation to provide 
gay people with goods and services constitutes ‘treatment’ that causes a person of faith to 
act against their will or conscience. Again, a parallel can be drawn with race 
discrimination, which no is longer justified (at least in the UK) with a biblical imprimatur. 
We do not describe racists who seek to act out their prejudices as being punished or treated 
wrongly, and we do not countenance a racist who tries to justify such acting out by 
reference to a ‘holy’ book. As previously stated, ‘holy’ books are not static or stable; they 
can be interpreted and reinterpreted, and have been historically. This organic feature of 
religion might be something that the courts can take advantage of. In a sense it is much like 
the common law, despite claims to the contrary. As Johnson argues, the historical 
treatment of homosexuality makes it surprising that Article 3 has not been a successful 
vehicle for rights claims on sexual orientation grounds. He suggests that the Court has 
sought to maintain a minimum level of severity before Article 3 can be engaged, so as ‘not 
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to trivialize the substance of the provision or encourage rights inflation under it’.116 The 
possibility of religious conservatives attempting to deploy Article 3 in order to justify 
appeals to conscience would be an unfortunate by-product of any possible rights inflation. 
This would have to be resisted strongly if the zero-sum game that has resulted from current 
treatment of the conflict (Article 8 v Article 9) is not to be replicated under Article 3.  
The Court has defined inhuman treatment as treatment which may ‘cause either actual 
bodily harm or intense physical or mental suffering’,117 and degrading treatment as that 
which can ‘arouse in the victim feelings of fear, anguish and inferiority capable of 
humiliating and debasing them’.118 The Commission has stated that the minimum level of 
severity for ‘inhuman treatment’ is treatment that inflicts ‘severe mental or physical 
suffering’.119 It is unfortunate that the threshold for severity might prevent relief being 
granted in situations other than where homosexuality is criminalized and gay people are 
subject to torture. A better way forward would be to focus on ‘degrading’ rather than 
‘inhuman’ treatment. As Johnson argues, ‘this focus on actions that create feelings of fear, 
anguish and inferiority that humiliate and debase individuals provides scope to evolve the 
Court’s interpretation of the Convention in respect of sexual orientation’.120 Furthermore, 
the Court views the Convention as a ‘living instrument’ which recognises the ‘increasingly 
high standard being required in the area of… human rights and fundamental liberties 
correspondingly and inevitably requires greater firmness in assessing breaches of the 
fundamental values of democratic societies.’121 Once again, a parallel can be drawn with 
race discrimination. In Moldovan and Others v Romania (No 2), the Court reiterated that 
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‘discrimination based on race can of itself amount to degrading treatment within the 
meaning of Article 3 of the Convention’. 122 
Using Article 3 as a basis for sexual orientation discrimination claims represents a 
synthesis of both the harm principle and the idea of the constructive delegation of state 
power into an approach that better captures the harm suffered by sexual minorities in the 
public sphere. It would mean that sexual orientation rights claims are no longer closeted as 
‘private’ matters pertaining solely to Article 8, thereby recognising the citizenship rights of 
gay people. There are signs of some, if insufficient, movement in this regard. For example, 
in Smith and Grady v UK,
123
 the applicants claimed that they had been subjected to 
discriminatory treatment during investigations into their sexual orientation by the armed 
forces. They argued that the investigations were ‘based on crude stereotyping and 
prejudice [that] denied and caused affront to their individuality and dignity’;124 and that the 
questioning during the investigation was ‘hurtful and degrading… prurient and 
offensive’.125 The applicants did not succeed in meeting the ‘minimum severity’ threshold, 
but nonetheless the judgment did recognise that, because degrading treatment causes the 
recipients ‘feelings of fear, anguish and inferiority capable of humiliating and debasing 
them,’126 the Court would ‘not exclude that treatment which is grounded upon a 
predisposed bias on the part of a heterosexual majority against a homosexual minority… 
could, in principle, fall within the scope of Article 3’.127  
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More recently, the case of Identoba
128
 was the first time that the ECtHR has recognised 
that 'hate crime' committed against individuals based on sexual orientation amounts to a 
violation of Article 3 taken in conjunction with Article 14 ECHR. Article 3 (taken in 
conjunction with Article 14) imposes a positive obligation on member states to ensure that 
all individuals within their jurisdiction are protected against all of prohibited forms of ill-
treatment, including ill-treatment administered by private individuals. States must 
adequately protect LGBT people from ‘hate speech and serious threats’ and ‘physical 
abuse’ that cause them to feel ‘fear, anxiety and insecurity’.129 The judgment means that 
Article 3 requires states to put in place both preventative and investigative measures to 
protect LGBT people who peacefully assemble in public. As Johnson observes, ‘the 
Court's message is that states must have a robust framework of law enforcement that 
protects LGBT individuals from ill-treatment motivated by homophobia.’130 It will be 
interesting to see to what extent the application of Article 3 to peaceful assembly in public 
can be built upon in order to protect generally gay people in public space. In any event, 
Identoba can be seen as the start of a process whereby gay people have the right not to 
experience degrading public treatment because of their sexual orientation.   
On a more global level, the United Nations has recently accepted that: 
… members of sexual minorities are disproportionately subjected to torture and 
other forms of ill-treatment because they fail to conform to socially constructed 
gender expectations. Indeed, discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation or 
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gender identity may often contribute to the process of the dehumanisation of the 
victim, which is often a necessary condition for torture and ill-treatment to take 
place.
131
  
The UN’s analysis should not only apply to states which have the most draconian anti-gay 
legislation. As stated in Chapter 1, it is not helpful to say to gay people in the UK, ‘aren’t 
you lucky you don’t live in Uganda?’ Socially constructed gender expectations permeate 
Western democracies just as they do elsewhere; the difference is only a matter of degree. 
Religious exemptions implicate the state in the perpetration and perpetuation of 
homophobia, through constructive delegation of state power to religious organisations and 
individuals. Conscientious objection, viewed in terms of power relations, is one example of 
the state’s constructive delegation of (responsibility for enforcing) homophobia. 
Concluding remarks 
The concept of harm is typically discussed with reference to the moral limits of the 
criminal law. This chapter has sought to argue that, while equality law does not intervene 
only when harm (or offence) is found, consideration of harm is taken into account in 
matters of discrimination. The arguments presented in this thesis regarding equality law do 
not necessarily hinge on establishing the existence of harm, but nevertheless harm is still 
important when thinking about inequality. These concluding remarks aim to draw these 
arguments together and explain why the thesis engages with a discussion of harm in the 
context of equality law. 
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 United Nations Human Rights Council, Discriminatory Laws and Practices and Acts of Violence Against 
Individuals Based on their Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity: Report of the UN High Commissioner for 
Human Rights, 34 
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Harm is not necessary 
In the context of goods and services provision, equality law has two purposes. First, the 
law aims to prevent service providers from discriminating against customers on the 
grounds of their protected characteristics. The second, broader purpose is to prevent 
service providers from acting upon their discriminatory views when they provide services 
to the general public. Service providers are thus prevented from refusing to provide a 
service, if their refusal is based on an adverse judgment about others because of their 
protected characteristics.  
With regard to both purposes, the consequences of the discriminatory act – including 
whether harm is caused – are not necessary for a finding of discrimination. Equality law 
holds (direct) discrimination to be inherently wrong regardless of its actual consequences, 
because service providers are not allowed to put their discriminatory views into practice – 
whether or not harm (or offence) is caused. The purpose of equality law is broader than 
preventing harm or offence; its purpose is to prevent service providers (for example) from 
discriminating in the provision of services. This is clear when we consider that a refusal to 
provide a service because the service provider holds homophobic views is illegal, 
regardless of whether the customer is actually gay.  
Harm is still important 
Nevertheless, it remains important to recognise the harm that is caused by homophobia, 
and not just within the scope of the criminal law. As this thesis contends, homophobia 
finds expression in laws that have restricted gay people’s access to full and equal 
citizenship. Notwithstanding the extension of equality law to include gay people in its 
embrace, religious exemptions remain. Allowing religious exemptions is itself an 
expression of homophobia at an institutional level; an expression that is based on the 
215 
 
hetero- and theo- norms that continue to pervade society. Therefore, while the overarching 
argument of this thesis does not hinge on establishing harm, harm is still relevant in both a 
real and a symbolic sense. Refusal of service on sexual orientation grounds is not simply 
an affront to the victim’s dignity – it produces and perpetuates discursive effects on a 
societal level. 
This chapter has characterised ‘homophobia’ as encompassing a range of negative attitudes 
and behaviours towards gay people, expressed through critical or hostile words or actions 
from distaste or disapproval, through discrimination, to verbal and physical violence. It has 
argued that all these expressions of homophobia constitute harm. Homophobia can be both 
individual and institutional; indeed, as the chapter has demonstrated, in many countries 
there is a strong correlation between the two. The chapter acknowledges that much of this 
institutional homophobia is expressed through the mechanism of the criminal law, with 
private consensual acts being illegal in over 75 countries, some of which impose the death 
penalty on those caught. However, this chapter also highlights how some institutional 
homophobia operates outside the criminal law, but nonetheless contributes to an 
environment which compromises or limits the sexual citizenship of gay people. This 
restriction on citizenship also represents harm.  The Human Rights Watch and ILGA 
reports cited earlier suggest a link between homophobic laws – including those outside the 
criminal framework – and individual acts or expressions of homophobia. Moreover, the 
review of mental health issues suffered by LGB people in England (also cited earlier in this 
chapter) found that discrimination is likely to be at least partly responsible for the higher 
rates of mental ill-health observed in LGB people.  
These are real harms which do need to be recognised in the context of equality law, not 
least to counter the arguments put forward by religious conservatives that gay people now 
have ‘enough’ equality – and that, indeed, the pendulum has swung too far the other way, 
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so that the religious conscience is now ‘closeted’ instead of the gay person.  There is also 
the issue of symbolic harm to consider. A legal regime concerned with equality needs to 
recognise where the law compromises equal citizenship by legitimising homophobia 
through religious exemptions. Symbolic harm is no more necessary for a finding of 
discrimination than real harm, but it remains important to recognise its role with reference 
to individual and institutional homophobia.  If, as is argued, the state has a responsibility to 
treat its citizens equally, and to ensure their dignity, safety and security, it must pay 
attention to both the ‘symbolic meanings attaching to social practices and the symbolism of 
its own pronouncements and silences’.132 This point relates back to Goodrich’s concern 
with “who speaks?” and with Foucault’s “five questions”, which underpin the research 
framework for this thesis.
133
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
132
 [n 132] Elisabeth Boetzkes, ‘Symbolic Harm and Reproductive Practices’ in Law and Medicine: Current 
Legal Issues Vol 3 (Oxford University Press, 2000) 327-340, 327. Here the author applies the concept of 
symbolic harm to ethical issues in medicine. This thesis argues in favour of a similar recognition in equality 
law that symbolic harm is important, even in the absence of actual, physical harm. 
133
 See Chapter 3 
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CHAPTER 7: ‘CAKE OR DEATH?’134 CONSCIENCE, CLASS AND 
CITIZENSHIP  
People imagine that if you say ‘Oh, he’s a homophobe’ that he’s a horrible monster who 
goes around beating up gays. You know that’s not the way it is. Homophobia can be very 
subtle… What it boils down to is, if you’re going to argue that gay people need to be 
treated in any way differently than everybody else or should be in anyway less, or their 
relationships should be in anyway less, then I’m sorry – yes, you are a homophobe.135 
This chapter undertakes a critique of the most recent legal conflict between religious 
expression and sexual orientation: the Ashers Bakery case.
136
 It aims to go beyond the 
rights-based arguments around religious conscientious objection and freedom of 
expression that have hitherto characterised the debate around this case. The case itself 
concerns gay people as citizens in a consumer, capitalist society, and the extent to which 
they are able to participate – as gay people – in the quotidian activities of everyday life 
without encountering faith-based homophobic resistance. The chapter contends that class 
and socio-economic status  have a direct effect on access to full citizenship in a consumer-
oriented society. 
This critique examines the concepts of both class and citizenship through a Foucaultian-
informed, Queer lens, and aims to show why liberal rights discourse blurs the issues that 
still prevent lesbians and gay men participating fully in public space. Using the case as a 
springboard for discussion, the chapter restates and refines the argument that conscientious 
                                                          
134 ‘Cake or death?’ is a line from a satirical sketch by the comedian Eddie Izzard, in which he explains how 
Church of England fundamentalism would be unlikely, as it would involve little more than the dictum, ‘You 
must have tea and cake with the vicar or you die!’ <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rMMHUzm22oE> 
accessed 3 March 2016 
135
 http://www.broadsheet.ie/2014/01/16/wisdom-is-bliss/ Transcript of interview with drag artist and 
LGBT+ campaigner Panti Bliss (Rory O’Neil) (accessed 28 January 2015) 
136 Lee v Ashers Baking Co Ltd & McArthur & McArthur [2015] NICty2 
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objection operates, in terms of power relations, as a homophobic weapon cloaked in the 
garb of religious equality rights. It adds a further layer of analysis by arguing that social 
class operates as an additional limitation on lesbian and gay citizenship. The refusal to 
provide goods or services on the grounds of religious conscience harms particularly those 
lesbians and gay men who are less economically privileged and, as a consequence, have 
fewer consumer choices. Not only are working-class
137
 non-heterosexuals particularly 
vulnerable as they walk down the high street,
138
 they can be vulnerable even as the bell 
chimes on the shop door.  
This chapter is comprised of three parts. Part One analyses the judgment in the Ashers 
case, in the context of the increasing call for conscientious objection to be accommodated 
in equality law – and in particular the call by Northern Ireland’s Democratic Unionist Party 
(DUP) for a ‘conscience clause’. Part Two suggests how Foucault’s concept of pastoral 
power can inform a Queer critique of the case. Finally, Part Three highlights the 
commercial and consumerist terrain in which this latest conflict between religion and 
sexual orientation is being played out. It argues for a better integration of social class into 
Queer theory, because social class has a bearing on access to participation in society.  
Why does class matter to sexual orientation equality? How does an understanding of class 
relate to Queer theory? 
Equality legislation in general glosses over structural inequality in favour of individuals 
who possess certain protected characteristics. The European Convention on Human Rights 
makes no mention of socio-economic disadvantage. The Equality Act 2010 does not 
recognise economic marginalisation as a protected characteristic. Section 1 of the Act 
                                                          
137 See the discussion on class definitions later in this chapter. 
138 Corcoran et al (2015) ‘Hate Crime, England and Wales, 2014/15’ Home Office Statistical Bulletin 05/15, 
8. For further discussion on homophobia as harm, see Chapter 6. 
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simply requires public bodies, when making strategic decisions, to ‘have due regard to the 
desirability of exercising them in a way that is designed to reduce the inequalities of 
outcome which result from socio-economic disadvantage’. This duty was aimed at 
reducing the gap between rich and poor, and ensuring ‘that public bodies systematically 
and strategically take account of people who are poor and disadvantaged’.139 As the 
Solicitor General observed, ‘poverty and powerlessness make it much harder to battle with 
discrimination and discrimination itself can undoubtedly generate poverty and 
powerlessness’.140 The Declaration of Principles on Equality, drawn up by the Equal 
Rights Trust, contains the principle that ‘as poverty may be both a cause and a 
consequence of discrimination, measures to alleviate poverty should be co-ordinated with 
measures to combat discrimination, in pursuit of full and effective equality’.141 The 
provision in Section 1 of the Act was opposed by the Conservative Party (then in 
opposition), because ‘the remedies and powers to prevent discrimination are quite different 
from solutions to socio-economic disadvantage’.142  
Section 1 was never brought into force by the Coalition government of 2010-2015, and it is 
highly unlikely to be given effect by the current Conservative government, which is 
pursuing a programme of ideologically-driven decimation of state-funded public services, 
in favour of privatisation and voluntarisation. It can thus be argued that we should be 
somewhat suspicious of the government’s supportive stance on sexual orientation equality. 
It represents a distraction from the government’s war on public spending, because ‘the 
primary goal of the political elite is to starve the public sector to death’.143 Gay rights do 
                                                          
139
 House of Lords debates, 15 December 2009 col 1407 
140
 Public Bill Committee (Equality Bill) 6
th
 sitting, 11 June 2009, col 156 
141
 Declaration of Principles of Equality (Equal Rights Trust, 2008), Principle 14 
142
 Public Bill Committee (Equality Bill) 5
th
 sitting, 11 June 2009, col 129 
143 John D’Emilio, ‘Creating Change’. The Scholar and Feminist Online, issue 10.1-10.2 ‘A New Queer 
Agenda’ Fall 2011/Spring 2012 <http://sfonline.barnard.edu/a-new-queer-agenda/creating-change/> accessed 
29 July 2015 
220 
 
not cost ‘the taxpayer’ money, so they are acceptable to a government whose main concern 
is to extinguish demands made on the state through public provision. The government’s 
LGBT-friendly image can be contrasted with its ideological commitment to austerity and a 
small state. The government’s unwillingness to allocate state resources to ‘welfare’ (in its 
broad sense) has heralded an increase in voluntary and charity provision. This has, in turn, 
provided opportunities for faith groups to be directly involved in service provision, 
providing more scope for religious influence over working-class, poor and disabled people. 
The discourse of ‘gentrified gays’ can be contrasted with the experience of average gay 
people who want to be able to participate in average activities such as booking hotel rooms 
and buying cakes. However, ‘conscience’ discourse threatens to bring about a re-
emergence of the closet for gay people. Eddie Izzard’s comedy ‘cake or death’ sketch takes 
on a new significance if we appreciate that the closet renders gay people as less than 
citizens – as ‘socially dead’.144 
Part One: the Ashers Bakery case  
Ashers is a Christian-owned bakery chain in Northern Ireland, employing approximately 
80 staff. It does not operate as a religious organisation but as a business for profit.
145
 In 
2014, one of its branches accepted (but then refused to fulfil) an order placed by a 
returning customer, Gareth Lee, for a cake bearing a slogan in favour of same-sex marriage 
alongside an image of the Sesame Street characters Bert and Ernie. Lee is a member of a 
voluntary organization called QueerSpace, which supports LGBT people in Northern 
Ireland. QueerSpace ‘seeks to increase visibility of the LGBT community in a positive 
manner and to counteract the disregard and negative images presented to the general public 
                                                          
144 M Blasius, Gay and Lesbian Politics: Sexuality and the Emergence of a New Ethic (Temple University 
Press 1994), 172 
145 [n 3] [12] The company’s Memorandum and Articles of Association contain no religious objectives. 
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over the past centuries.’146 The Northern Ireland Assembly had recently rejected (for the 
third time) the introduction of same-sex marriage, this time by a narrow margin, which was 
felt to be encouraging. Mr Lee wanted the cake made for an event marking anti-
homophobia week and noting the slow but sure momentum towards same-sex marriage. 
Having bought goods from Ashers previously, and seen a leaflet advertising the service, he 
knew that he could have a cake there incorporating his own graphic image.  
The bakery’s ultimate refusal to bake the cake Lee had ordered was, they said, grounded in 
a religious conscientious objection to any change in the traditional view of marriage as 
being between one man and one woman. The Equality Commission subsequently began 
proceedings against Ashers for contravening anti-discrimination legislation.
147
 The bakery 
itself was supported by the Christian Institute,
148
 which had placed advertisements in the 
Belfast press seeking donations in order to contest the proceedings. Their choice of words 
is revealing: readers are told that the ‘taxpayer-funded Equality Commission’ is taking the 
bakery to court ‘for upholding marriage’, and the bakery’s owners are, like other 
Christians, ‘facing difficulties for holding to their religious beliefs in an increasingly 
secular society’.149 A small business is thereby elevated to the position of ‘upholding 
marriage’ (on whose behalf it is not clear) and, echoing the discourses deployed in the 
Clearing the Ground report,
150
  religious  conscientious objectors are painted as lonely 
stalwarts, bravely standing up to increasing challenges from a secular state. Furthermore, 
                                                          
146 [n 3] [3] 
147 The Equality Act (Sexual Orientation) Regulations (Northern Ireland) 2006 and/or the Fair Employment 
and Treatment (Northern Ireland) Order 1998 
148 The Christian Institute has a long history of campaigning against the extension of rights for lesbians and 
gay men, including the repeal of Section 28, the equal age of consent, same-sex adoption, civil partnerships, 
the Equality Act, and the Same-Sex Marriage Act. 
149 Lindsay Fergus, ‘Gay marriage cake: Christian Institute seeks donations for Ashers Bakery legal battle’ 
Belfast Telegraph <http://www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/news/northern-ireland/gay-marriage-cake-christian-
institute-seeks-donations-for-ashers-bakery-legal-battle-30952360.html> (Belfast, 31 January 2015) accessed 
7 September 2015 
150 Christians in Parliament, ‘Clearing the Ground inquiry: Preliminary Report into the freedom of Christians 
in the UK’ (February 2012) < http://www.eauk.org/current-affairs/publications/upload/Clearing-the-
ground.pdf > See Chapter 5 for a full analysis of the report. 
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the Christian Institute’s reminder to readers that the Equality Commission is publicly 
funded feeds into the contemporary austerity-driven discourse concerning the need to curb 
public spending.  
Daniel McArthur of Ashers was reported in the Belfast Telegraph as saying ‘We just can't 
believe that they're serious about this, that they're going to spend money taking us to court 
because we didn't make a cake. People are surprised that despite us being a small family 
business and making our principles clear that they are still commencing court 
proceedings.’151 As these words suggest, the case can be said to have a ‘superficial 
appeal’152 because people generally do not like to feel forced by law to deal with people 
that they would prefer to avoid. However, equality law has chosen to protect certain 
characteristics so that historically oppressed groups can conduct their lives without facing 
barriers that others do not have to face. Gay people and other social groups have 
historically suffered prejudice, stigmatisation and discriminatory treatment from people 
who would prefer not to deal with them. This is why Lady Hale said, in the course of her 
judgment in Bull,  
Homosexuals… were long denied the possibility of fulfilling themselves through 
relationships with others. This was an affront to their dignity as human beings 
which our law has now (some would say belatedly) recognised… But we should 
not underestimate the continuing legacy of those centuries of discrimination, 
persecution even, which is still going on in many parts of the world.
153
  
                                                          
151 Claire Williamson, ‘Gay cake: DUP MPs launch petition in support of Ashers bakery in Newtownabbey’ 
(Belfast Telegraph, 13 November 2014) <http://www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/news/northern-ireland/gay-cake-
dup-mps-launch-petition-in-support-of-ashers-bakery-in-newtownabbey-30742585.html> accessed 16 
February 2016 
152 Colin Murray, ‘Ashers Bakery loses “gay cake” discrimination case’ (Human Rights in Ireland blog, 19 
May 2015) <http://humanrights.ie/civil-liberties/ashers-bakery-loses-gay-cake-discrimination-case/> 
accessed 15 February 2016. This will be discussed further later in the Chapter.  
153 Bull and another v Hall and another [2013] UKSC 73 [52-3]  
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In the present case, Gareth Lee wanted to buy a cake for an event, paying the advertised 
price that the bakery charged for printing an image on it. The leaflet advertising the cake-
printing service contained no limitation to the graphics that could be applied.
154
 Although 
same-sex marriage is not (yet) legal in Northern Ireland, campaigning for it is not 
unlawful, and it appears that the requested graphic did not contravene any of Ashers’ terms 
and conditions. Yet it seems that the bakery’s management preferred to disregard “earthly” 
law in favour of what they understood to be a higher law: ‘We consider that it is necessary 
as Christians to have a clear conscience before God… we must live out our faith in our 
words and deeds and… it would be sinful to act or speak contrary to God’s law.’155 
Further, as Christians, they believed that the business ‘must be run by God’s wishes’.156 On 
the particular matter of same-sex marriage, the defendants stated: 
… the only divinely ordained sexual relationship is that between a man and a 
woman within the bonds of matrimony… No other form of marriage is permissible 
according to God’s law… according to God’s law, homosexual relations are 
sinful….157 
However, it appears that their god’s legal wishes are not completely clear. Mrs McArthur, 
who originally accepted the order from Mr Lee, had discussed the issue with her husband 
that evening. Mr McArthur ‘felt differently than his wife at the time and might have made 
the cake but, over the weekend, he spent one or two days wrestling with the issue in his 
heart and mind and came to the same view as his wife that the cake could not be made.’158 
It can be said that such mental and emotional struggle is an inherent part of religious faith 
and the search for spiritual truth and meaning. Indeed, this argument is a key aspect of the 
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view that the religious conscience is a unique burden that must be respected in (earthly) 
law, because religious believers may not experience themselves as having any choice over 
what their conscience compels them to do. On the other hand, it can be argued that 
religious believers should themselves bear the cost of their religious commitments; the 
faithful should take responsibility for situations they might find themselves in, outside of 
their place of worship. The argument from choice has been discussed in Chapter 5, but it is 
worth restating here that – as the McArthurs have shown – there is room for ‘epistemic 
discretion’ in religious questions, and indeed this is the very idea behind the notion of 
freedom of religious belief.
159
   
Mr Lee said in evidence that, as a middle-aged gay man he was no stranger to homophobia, 
but Ashers’ ‘blatant refusal of a service’ made him feel like ‘a second-class citizen’: 
It is not at all nice to think that a business will discriminate in the way that they 
provide services to me because I am gay or because I have political views about the 
need for legislation to support gay marriage or because I did not share their 
religious views… I was not asking the Defendants to share or support my perceived 
political views on gay marriage… I was simply asking them to provide me with the 
service they advertise in their shops.
160
 
This is the crux of the issue. Ashers’ refusal of service to the plaintiff not only made him 
feel like a second-class citizen, it actually rendered him a second-class citizen. This is an 
example of how ‘performatives’ actually do perform what they say; the heteronormative 
attitude displayed by the bakery proprietor had the effect of making the customer an 
                                                          
159 “Freedom of religion” makes more sense to the ear than “freedom of race”, for example. For a detailed 
discussion, see Peter Jones, ‘Paying for another’s belief: the law on indirect religious discrimination’ in 
Religion and Law (Theos, 2012), 43-50. See also the judgment of Laws LJ in McFarlane v Relate Avon Ltd 
[2010] EWCA Civ 771 [23]. Laws LJ’s judgment was also cited in Ashers (n xx) [79] 
160 [n 3] [11] 
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‘other’, someone whose request could be denied.161 It is important to recognise that, for a 
gay person, feeling able to campaign for equal marriage (and celebrate progress in the 
move towards equality) is part of what it means to be a citizen in a democratic society.
162
 
As Laws LJ stated in McFarlane: 
The precepts of any one religion… cannot, by force of their religious origins, sound 
any louder in the general law than the precepts of any other. If they did, those out in 
the cold would be less than citizens; and our constitution would be on the way to a 
theocracy… The individual conscience is free to accept such dictated law; but the 
State, if its people are to be free, has the burdensome duty of thinking for itself.
163
  
In McFarlane, Laws LJ provided clear justification for the primacy of secular law over 
theocratic law, grounded in the importance of equal citizenship. This is a clear statement of 
values and of the law’s role in a liberal, secular democracy. However, Laws LJ retreated 
from categorising religious distaste for homosexuality as homophobia:  
The judges have never, so far as I know, sought to equate the condemnation by 
some Christians of homosexuality on religious grounds with homophobia, or to 
regard that position as "disreputable". Nor have they likened Christians to bigots. 
They administer the law in accordance with the judicial oath: without fear or 
favour, affection or ill-will.
164
  
The judge’s words here may be understood as placatory, intended to reassure the appellants 
that all parties are subject to the neutral gaze of the rule of law. The liberal legal theorist, 
                                                          
161
 For further discussion on the performance of gender, for example, see Judith Butler, Gender Trouble: 
Feminism and the Subversion of Identity (Routledge, 1990) 
162 This is the case even though not all LGBT people are in favour of same-sex marriage. For further 
discussion, see for example Ryan Conrad (ed), Against Equality: Queer Critiques of Gay Marriage (Against 
Equality Publishing Collective, 2010). 
163 McFarlane v Relate Avon Ltd [2010] EWCA Civ 771  [24] (emphasis added) 
164 [n 29] [18] This statement is made in response to the submissions made by Lord Carey, former 
Archbishop of Canterbury, at [17] 
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Ronald Dworkin, argued similarly that the preferences and beliefs of legal actors were 
neutralised by such principles. Dworkin did, however, acknowledge that legal 
interpretation is essentially political: ‘There can be no useful interpretation… that is 
independent of some theory about what political equality is and how far equality is 
required by justice... reliance on political theory is not a corruption of interpretation but 
part of what interpretation means.’165 It is regrettable that Laws LJ missed the opportunity 
to challenge the religious disavowal of homophobia. It is submitted that it would be more 
helpful – and more intellectually honest – if judges were generally clearer about their 
political values in the field of equality law. Lady Hale has alluded elsewhere to the 
difficulties judges face in discrimination cases, where they must tailor their reasoning to 
meet the requirements of anti-discrimination legislation:  
Courts and tribunals have a natural eye for what they see as the merits of the case. 
If they think that there is a good reason for a difference in treatment they will try 
and find a reason why it is not unlawful. How much more satisfactory it would 
be… if there were to be a general defence of justification in discrimination law, so 
that courts and tribunals could get down to addressing the real issues – legitimate 
aim, rational connection, proportionality – rather than looking for technical 
distinctions which would mean that there was no discrimination at all.
166
 
Whenever a judgment is handed down in a discrimination case, any initial excitement 
usually peters away as it is read. The judgments are invariably technical and – save for the 
few pearls from the likes of Laws and Hale LJJ – lacking in any real analysis of what it is 
that equality law should be aiming to achieve.  
                                                          
165 Ronald Dworkin, ‘Law as Interpretation’ (1982) Critical Inquiry 9(1) 179, 199  
166 Lady Hale, ‘The Conflict of Equalities’ Alison Weatherfield Memorial Lecture at the Employment 
Lawyers Association, 10 July 2013 <https://www.supremecourt.uk/docs/speech-130710.pdf> accessed 5 
April 2016. Under the Equality Act 2010 direct discrimination can never be justified (s 13), whereas indirect 
discrimination can be, if it is a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim (s 19).  
227 
 
The Ashers Judgment 
There are two limbs to Brownlie J’s judgment: (i) the law on discrimination on grounds of 
sexual orientation
167
 and (ii) the law on discrimination on grounds of political opinion.
168
 
These two limbs will be considered in turn in this Chapter, beginning with discrimination 
on grounds of sexual orientation. 
a) Discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation 
 Ashers had maintained in their defence that making a cake with a “Support Gay Marriage” 
message upon it could be construed as their supporting gay marriage. However, as 
Brownlie J noted: 
They were contracted on a commercial basis to bake and ice a cake with entirely 
lawful graphics and to be paid for it. The Plaintiff was not seeking support or 
endorsement. Whilst the graphics were contrary to their genuinely held religious 
beliefs, the provisions of the 1998 Order allow for no exceptions in these 
circumstances.
169
 
Moreover, such an occurrence was specifically mentioned by the Office of the First 
Minister and Deputy First Minister (OFMDFM) in a consultation response, following the 
enactment of the 2006 Regulations:  
Where businesses are open to the public on a commercial basis, then they have to 
accept the public as it is constituted… In respect of “Christian businesses”… the 
Government is firmly of the view that any person or organization which opens a 
business to the public … has to be prepared to accept the public as a whole no 
                                                          
167 Equality Act (Sexual Orientation) Regulations (Northern Ireland) 2006, Regulations 2, 3, 5, 16, 23 and 24 
168 Fair Employment and Treatment (Northern Ireland) Order 1998 , Articles 2, 3, 28 and 31 
169 [n 3] [62] 
228 
 
matter how that public is constituted… These Regulations do not prohibit people 
from turning down business from any source, but they do protect people from 
having their sexual orientation used as the reason for turning the business down.” 
170
 
The judgment was heralded on the one side as ‘a good result for equality’171 and on the 
other as ‘a dark day for justice and religious freedom in Northern Ireland’.172  
Here it is worth noting what this brings up for me as a researcher who is, to paraphrase the 
comedian Dara O’Briain, an atheist, but an ethnically Catholic atheist.173 As discussed later 
in this Chapter, the willingness of the researcher to understand her own situatedness within 
the topic is an important component of Queer theory. It is also worth noting that the 
framing of the case on the basis of religion versus sexual orientation
174
 has been called into 
question by some. For example, it could be argued that the fact that a belief against same-
sex marriage is grounded in religion is irrelevant to the decision not to provide goods and 
services, because an atheist might oppose same-sex marriage and refuse to bake such a 
cake on political grounds. Yet an ‘alarming trend’ has been detected ‘with the Christian 
Institute and Christian Concern to get this conflicting rights paradigm in the public 
imagination, even at the cost of justice for their clients’.175  The activism of these 
organisations has already been highlighted,
176
 and it does appear that political Christianity 
                                                          
170 Cited by Brownlie J in Ashers (n 7) [32]. See later in this Chapter for a discussion on people turning 
down business in other circumstances (xx-xx). 
171 As tweeted by Sinn Féin MLA and Deputy First Minister Martin McGuiness, cited in  Henry McDonald, 
‘Northern Ireland bakers guilty of discrimination over gay marriage cake’(The Guardian, 19 May 2015) 
<http://www.theguardian.com/society/2015/may/19/northern-ireland-ashers-baking-company-guilty-
discrimination-gay-marriage-cake> accessed 16 February 2016 
172 Traditional Unionist Voice leader, Jim Allister, cited in Henry McDonald (n 43) 
173 Dara O'Briain interview - Laughter lines (The Scotsman, 21 November 2008) 
< http://www.scotsman.com/lifestyle/dara-o-briain-interview-laughter-lines-1-1301444> accessed 7 April 
2016 
174 [n 3] [14-15] set out the religious grounds for Ashers’ refusal to provide the cake that was requested. 
175 Ian Paul, ‘The “Gay cake” ruling’ (Psephizo, 20 May 2015) <http://www.psephizo.com/sexuality-2/the-
gay-cake-ruling/> accessed 15 February 2016 
176 See Chapter 5 
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can be opportunistic in its support of various causes. However, as has been noted 
elsewhere, ‘the case, at its root, is about the ability to do the banal and ordinary things in 
life without these activities becoming the subject of public opprobrium’.177  
In this context, the words ‘Queer Space’ (the name of the organisation whose event the 
cake was for) take on a particular significance. This case is very much to do with religious 
objection to gay people visibly occupying space in society. Daniel McArthur, Ashers’ 
general manager, had argued that there had been no discrimination on sexual orientation 
grounds:  
We’ve said from the start that our issue was with the message on the cake, not the 
customer and we didn’t know what the sexual orientation of Mr Lee was, and it 
wasn’t relevant either. We’ve always been happy to serve any customers that come 
into our shops.
178
  
Ashers’ management may indeed be happy to serve gay people in their outlets, but only, it 
seems, if they are not campaigning to take up more space than is deemed appropriate. This 
touches on the concept of citizenship – and sexual citizenship in particular – which was 
discussed in Chapter 2 and is also discussed in more detail later in this Chapter. For now, it 
is worth stating that a basic component of citizenship is ‘the right to access and use specific 
kinds of space within a given territory’.179 People may be excluded as citizens ‘by virtue of 
the boundaries between particular types of spaces, which are sites for the exercise of power 
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and the construction of difference’.180 The “inappropriate” space, in the current context, is 
in the wedding ceremony. Married heterosexuals in Northern Ireland may (rightly or 
wrongly) view their wedding day as the ‘best day of their lives’, but it is nevertheless the 
case that heterosexual marriage is a banal and ordinary occurrence. Equal marriage 
campaigners would like same-sex marriage to be just as ordinary an event. Citizenship is 
not only about rights (and any correlative duties); it also involves an ‘ideal of the citizen’, 
ie the ‘good citizen’.181 The view that marriage should remain as the union of one man and 
one woman is based on one particular interpretation of religious scripture and teaching 
linked to religious conservatism and its own determination of what constitutes a “good 
citizen”.  
Ashers’ management belong to the Trinity Reformed Presbyterian Church, whose website 
illustrates how its views are aligned at the conservative end of the Christian spectrum. The 
Church calls homophobia ‘the silver bullet of debate’, designed to shut down anyone ‘who 
just disagrees on principle with the practice of homosexuality’. It also re-enacts old tropes, 
arguing that accepting same-sex desire ‘would seem to leave the door wide open to incest, 
polygamy, paedophilia, bestiality or whatever in an even more “enlightened” future’. 
Quoting Leviticus 20:13, we are told that ‘If a man lies with a male as with a woman, both 
of them have committed an abomination; they shall surely be put to death; their blood is 
upon them’. It is unclear from the article whether the Church itself calls for the death 
penalty for gay men; what is clear is that this Old Testament quote is reproduced without 
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comment, save for castigating the ‘homosexual lobby’ for taking umbrage at such 
statements.
182
  
The Church also engages in the ‘love the sinner; hate the sin’ trope: ‘It is not enough to 
simply condemn the practice of homosexuality. We must show love and compassion and 
seek to minister the grace of Christ to those enslaved by this particular sin.’ We are told 
that ‘homosexual practice is disgusting’, a ‘perversion’ and ‘an abomination’, but then 
again ‘so are many other sins that we commit every single day’ because, as human beings, 
‘our whole self is rotten and needs to be redeemed.’183 These are strong words. One might 
recall the view of humanity in the ‘state of nature’ (in the absence of government) 
summarised by Hobbes as ‘solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.184 Whereas Hobbes’ 
solution lay in a civil society governed by a sovereign power, to whom individuals ceded 
authority in return for protection, and whose realm of control included the ecclesiastical, 
the Presbyterian Church’s solution is to cede all authority to its god.  This is a key point. 
Political Christianity is not just concerned about protecting and/or extending religious 
rights and exemptions. Political Christianity is inherently and fundamentally opposed to 
positive law, as underlined by its adherence to what it believes is the order created by its 
god:  
The customs and norms of culture may change and do change all the time, but the 
Creator’s pattern for humanity stays fixed. There is no way to get around a 
straightforward reading of the Bible on homosexuality (though many try to do so in 
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all kinds of ingenious ways). We can’t rewrite the Bible to suit ourselves. Only God 
has the right to tell us what we may and may not do with our bodies.
185
 
The anti-positive law theme is presented most clearly in the Church’s statement of its 
doctrinal position:  
… Reformed Presbyterians give prominence to the kingship of Christ. This has 
implications for human life in all its spheres. Areas which have received special 
attention… are worship and politics… The nation is under obligation, once 
admitted but now repudiated, to recognise Christ as her king and to govern all her 
affairs in accordance with his will.
186
 
The theme continues in a statement issued to the press on behalf of the church elders, 
which characterises ‘bigamous and homosexual unions as breaches of God’s purpose’, 
meaning that Christians who countenance same-sex desire are necessarily ‘opposing the 
teaching of their Master, Jesus Christ.’ The language of freedom is also deployed as a 
counterpoint to what is perceived as increasing liberalization of sexual mores: ‘the only 
true liberty is liberty based on the gospel of Jesus Christ the King. In so far as we lose the 
gospel, we lose liberty, and it will not quickly or easily be regained.’187  
However, political Christianity treats different “breaches” of “God’s law” differently, in 
terms of what it asks earthly law to do. For example, in the course of the Ashers hearing, 
the court was presented with one of Ashers’ promotional leaflets which advertised 
Hallowe’en cakes. Robin Allen QC, for the plaintiff, put it to the defendants that ‘the 
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Reformed Presbyterian Church does not approve of Halloween being celebrated at all and 
certainly doesn’t approve of witches.’ The defendant (Mr McArthur) responded that he had 
never thought about it and had never spoken to anyone in the Church about it.
188
 While the 
Trinity Reformed Presbyterian Church has not stated its position on Hallowe’en on its 
website, another branch of the Reformed Presbyterian Church in Northern Ireland has 
described its own position, which we may take as analogous to Trinity’s: 
Halloween is not harmless fun, nor should it be treated as such. The Bible 
condemns all witchcraft… Halloween was pagan from the start and remains so 
today, despite any pseudo-christian gloss put on it. Christians should have no part 
in it and should ensure that their children do not either.
189
  
This thesis is less interested in Christianity’s theology per se than in how it operates in the 
public sphere and in the ‘strategies and tactics’ it deploys.190 Nevertheless, it is instructive 
to recognise how the theology is cherry-picked in order to achieve political aims. 
Christianity holds that we are all “broken” by virtue of being human and labouring under 
the stain of “original sin”. Yet it appears that Ashers is happy to make Hallowe’en cakes 
and, presumably, cakes for unmarried heterosexual couples or even birthday cakes for the 
unrelentingly promiscuous.  
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The Church of England was historically described as ‘the Tory party at prayer’.191 Today, 
the Presbyterian Church in Northern Ireland can be described as the Democratic Unionist 
Party at prayer. The DUP’s latest manifesto contains a pledge to continue opposing same-
sex marriage. In a section lauding its record on ‘safer streets and smarter justice’, the 
manifesto states that the DUP has ‘stood by its commitment to family values and marriage 
and will continue to do so.’192 The DUP has a long history of homophobia. In 1977, the 
then leader, the Reverend Ian Paisley, launched the ‘Save Ulster from Sodomy’ campaign. 
Paisley was also the leader of the Free Presbyterian Church at the time. The campaign 
deployed both religious and political discourses focused on protecting ‘the people of 
Ulster’ from increasing freedoms being granted to homosexuals in England and Wales,193 
and from the influences of liberalism and secularism which he saw as undermining the 
Ulster people’s Christian beliefs and values. In a reflection of the anti-law nature of the 
church today, the campaign placed advertisements in newspapers to persuade readers that 
decriminalisation ‘can only bring God’s curse down upon our people’. As an example of 
the mechanics of political Christianity, the campaign engaged in outreach work with 
church attendees and thereby recruited 70,000 people.
194
 
Appeal  
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The judgment in favour of Gareth Lee has been appealed by the bakery. Following a last-
minute intervention by Northern Ireland’s Attorney General, the appeal was been 
adjourned to May 2016. The Attorney General had sought permission to make 
representations concerning any potential conflict between Northern Ireland’s equality 
legislation and the ECHR. The Court of Appeal also sat in March to hear legal argument 
on the compatibility of the regulations with European human rights law and to decide 
whether it raised a devolution point that would enable the Attorney to intervene in the 
case.
195
 The McArthurs’ appeal engages Article 10 ECHR (freedom of expression) in 
addition to Article 9 (freedom of religion); the appellants argued that the business should 
not be compelled to express a view contrary to its managements’ beliefs.196 The 
deployment of Article 10 is a means of circumventing the position that a business cannot 
have religious beliefs.
197
 Judgment has not been handed down at the time of writing, but if 
the appeal is allowed, the implications should be assessed in view of the proposed 
‘Conscience Clause’ Bill in Northern Ireland, which is examined in the following section. 
The Conscience Clause – ‘making space’ for homophobia 
Unionist politicians in Northern Ireland have used the decision in Ashers as justification 
for seeking amendments to equality law to facilitate anti-gay discrimination on grounds of 
religious conscience. Paul Givan of the Democratic Unionist Party has consulted
198
 on a 
Private Member’s Bill to allow people with ‘strongly held’ religious beliefs to refuse to 
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provide services to lesbians and gay men. The Nationalist party, Sinn Féin, has stated its 
intention to block the Bill through a Petition of Concern if it were to reach the stage of a 
vote in the Northern Ireland parliament.
199
 Nevertheless, it is worth examining the 
discursive strategies revealed in the consultation document, as they reveal the extent to 
which the mooted conscience clause has less to do with religious freedom and more to do 
with ensuring that homophobia is ever more firmly entrenched in legislation. Political 
Christianity may be anti-positive law, but this does not preclude it from deploying 
strategies and tactics that enable its followers to “have their cake and eat it”. According to 
Givan: 
This clause will enhance equality legislation. Equality is about ensuring that 
everybody in society is allowed to live out their lives. We now are heading towards 
a community where it’s not just about live and let live – people are now saying, 
‘you need to affirm my particular lifestyle and if that goes against your conscience, 
you have to do that’. That’s not equality; that’s intolerance. 
The characterisation of homosexuality as a ‘particular lifestyle’ is the latest in an attempt to 
downgrade sexual orientation to redress what is seen as a hierarchy of rights at operating at 
the expense of the religious conscience. Givan is supported by Northern Ireland’s First 
Minister, Peter Robinson, whose address to delegates at the DUP conference included the 
following:  
I have become increasingly alarmed at the uneven pitch upon which rights and 
equality issues are played out. More and more the balance is tipped against people 
of faith. This has been recently demonstrated by the treatment meted out to the 
Ashers Baking Company… The publicly-funded Equality Commission has 
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launched an unjustified attack on a small Christian family business. This is simply 
bullying. I contend that the Equality Commission is seeking to use the Ashers case 
to add a further layer of restrictions on Christian behaviour and practice.
200
  
The words ‘bullying’ and ‘attack’ are highly emotive and enable the bakery to be posited 
as a small and vulnerable victim of a monolithic state institution. However, the conscience 
clause proposal would allow religious believers to deny goods and services to people, 
where delivery of goods and services would promote or facilitate same-sex relations. 
LGBT activists such as The Rainbow Project
201
 are campaigning against the proposed Bill, 
arguing that:  
Restaurants could deny same sex couples a table as this could be facilitating same 
sex relations. A mortgage provider could deny a mortgage to a same sex couple as 
it would be facilitating same-sex relations. Hoteliers could deny a room to a same 
sex couple as it would be facilitating same-sex relations. The examples are 
countless.
202
  
Amnesty International has also criticised the proposal.
203
 Its Northern Ireland Programme 
Director, Patrick Corrigan, has stated: 
What is proposed is not a conscience clause, it is a discrimination clause. This is 
not about freedom of religion; this is about treating a section of our population as 
second-class citizens. This change to the law is not welcome and it is not needed. 
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The law already strikes a fair balance between the human right to freedom of 
religion and the human right not to suffer discrimination.
204
 
The consultation document describes the Ashers litigation as its inspiration, because it had 
highlighted the ‘adverse effect’ of equality law on religious people in the realm of goods 
and services provision, and the need to ‘balance and protect rights’ through measures that 
would ‘enhance’ the 2006 Regulations in order to ‘protect religious service providers and 
those who want to access services in the context of a religious ethos’. The document 
(without a hint of irony) appeals to the ‘liberal democratic tradition’ of ensuring that laws 
do not have ‘adverse unintended consequences for minorities’. Thinking back to the idea of 
Queer Space, it is interesting how much talk of ‘space’ can be found the consultation 
document. The current law is charged with ‘eroding space for difference’; as a 
consequence, there is a need to make ‘space for rights that clash’ – and to make ‘space for 
providers’ and ‘space for the service user’ where rights do clash. The following section 
will highlight the arguments they have produced in this regard. 
i. Space for difference 
The consultation argues that, just as laws aimed at the majority can have ‘adverse 
unintended consequences’ on minorities, laws aimed at ‘one minority strand’ can have 
adverse effects on ‘other minority strands’.205 It states that the law is guilty of a ‘marked 
double-standard’ in failing to observe the ‘basic liberal democratic discipline’ of checking 
for this possibility. It is therefore necessary to ‘consider the impact of laws designed for 
one minority group on other minorities’, and make ‘reasonable accommodation’ where 
negative effects are discovered. According to the consultation document, the current law 
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fails to ‘provide proper differential treatment under the law’ and thus ‘completely 
undermines the integrity of equality law’. The law also ‘fails to recognise that the cause of 
equality is not best served by arming different equality strands with different pieces of 
legislation they can use to press against and damage each other.’ The document states that 
equality law should respect and make space for difference. The appeal to liberal standards 
is used to criticise equality law for failing to give due weight to people’s difference. 
However, in this case, the difference is not religious belief per se, but distaste for 
homosexuality that has been based on one interpretation of a creed.  
ii. Space for rights that clash 
The consultation calls for an urgent amendment to the ‘sexual orientation equality strand’ 
in goods and services provision, ‘so that it does not undermine another equality strand, 
religion’. This will be achieved by ‘enhancing’ the legislation – specifically with regard to 
sexual orientation – to ‘protect religious service providers and those who want to access 
services in the context of a religious ethos’.206 This represents the latest example of how 
religious conservatives are using the discourse of a ‘hierarchy of rights’ in order to 
preserve and extend their ability to discriminate on sexual orientation grounds.  
iii. Space for providers 
The current legislation is criticised in the consultation document for being ‘profoundly 
illiberal, effectively giving one strand the ability to make life exceptionally difficult for the 
other’. It states that is ‘patently absurd’ for ‘those opposed to creating appropriate space for 
people of faith’ to pretend that differential treatment ‘is not an important liberal democratic 
principle’ and to suggest that it effectively allows ‘some people to operate outside the law’. 
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The consultation argues that ‘different treatment under the law does not allow anyone to 
operate outside the law’, but in ‘certain tightly defined circumstances’ different treatment 
would ‘prevent unintended negative consequences’. These ‘circumstances’ are envisaged 
as those which involve ‘endorsing, promoting or facilitating a same-sex sexual relationship 
in violation of… faith identity’.207 
This means that, for example, a Catholic adoption agency, a Muslim printer or an 
Evangelical photographer ‘would not be required by law to choose between’ placing a 
child with a same-sex couple, printing a book promoting same-sex relationships, or 
photographing a civil partnership ceremony respectively, or ‘losing his or her livelihood’. 
The document reassures such people that Bill would protect them from having to act ‘in 
violation of their faith identity’ by either ‘endorsing’, ‘promoting’ or ‘becoming complicit 
in celebrating’, same-sex relationships. However, in another example of disclaiming 
homophobia, the consultation is keen to emphasise that these ‘circumstances’ would not 
mean that than Evangelical grocer could refuse to sell apples to a gay man; that a Muslim 
printer could refuse to print a brochure for a lesbian cabinet maker; or that a Catholic 
photographer could refuse to photograph recipes made by a bisexual chef. It appears that 
something more is needed in order to endorse, promote or become complicit in celebrating 
same-sex relationships, but it is not entirely clear where the line is drawn. In any event, the 
effect of this is still to compromise homosexual access to participation in civil life, by 
positing same-sex relationships as something which should not be endorsed, promoted or 
celebrated. 
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iv. Space for the service user 
The consultation argues that, if a religious provider of goods and services were required by 
law to provide a service that ‘endorsed or promoted a same-sex union, or in some sense 
facilitated a same-sex sexual relationship’, that provider would ‘be made complicit in 
affirming same-sex sexual relationships’.208 Furthermore, it states that because religious 
faith deals with ‘higher loyalties to God’, it is likely that religious people ‘confronted’ with 
such a choice ‘would rather lose their livelihood than be pressured by the state into 
violating their faith identity’. The document argues that this would have the effect of 
‘eroding the availability of some goods and services in the context of the faith ethos in 
question’,209 which would disadvantage both service providers and service users.  
In their response to the consultation, Amnesty International considered the proposals ‘to be 
in fundamental conflict with the purpose of hard-won anti-discrimination provisions in 
Northern Ireland.’210 This argument echoes Lady Hale’s words in Bull211 regarding the role 
of law in redressing the historical legacy of discrimination against homosexuality, and 
which is the normative concern of this thesis. Amnesty also raises the issue of the rule of 
law, which is linked with the role of law and with the values that underpin the law.The rule 
of law requires, inter alia, clarity, certainty and compliance with international and human 
rights obligations.
212
 As Amnesty point out, the DUP’s vague proposals are unlikely to 
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pass the ‘in accordance with the law’ test for a lawful interference with Article 8 ECHR. 
Should they happen to pass this test, it is doubtful that the proposals would be considered a 
proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim.
213
 Notwithstanding our ECHR 
obligations, the proposals fail to meet the rule of law’s criterion of certainty. As Amnesty 
asks, ‘What kind of “belief” can the service denier rely on? How far does it go? How 
strong must the religious conviction be?’214  
The following section deals with the second limb of Brownlie J’s judgment; that of 
discrimination on grounds of political opinion. The law relating to political opinion is 
particular to Northern Ireland and was designed to address the centuries of sectarianism 
and Nationalist oppression in the region, by preventing opposition to a political standpoint 
being a lawful basis for a business refusing to deal with an individual. 
b) Discrimination on grounds of political opinion 
This limb of the judgment has been subject to particular criticism. For example, LGBT and 
human rights campaigner Peter Tatchell originally supported the judgment, on grounds 
already mentioned: as a business (not a religious organisation), Ashers is required to 
provide its services without discrimination on religious or other grounds. A victory for 
Ashers ‘would have driven a coach and horses through the equality laws’, leading to a state 
of affairs ‘where anyone could claim the right to discriminate on the basis that they 
disagreed with another person’s beliefs’.215 However, Tatchell subsequently changed his 
mind, stating that ‘the law suit against the bakery was well-intended. It sought to challenge 
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homophobia. But it was a step too far.’216 Unfortunately – and, I am certain, 
unintentionally – the words ‘a step too far’ echo the concerns of the Archbishop of York, 
John Sentamu, who argued that the protection of lesbians and gay men from discrimination 
in goods and services provision created a new hierarchy of rights: ‘Rather than levelling 
the playing field for those who suffer discrimination… this legislation effects a 
rearrangement of discriminatory attitudes and bias to overcompensate and skew the field 
the other way.’217  
The judge in Ashers held that service providers cannot rely on conscientious objection to 
refuse any ‘lawful’ message.218 Tatchell is concerned that a refusal to acknowledge a 
politically-based conscientious objection would lead to, for example, Muslim printers 
being obliged to publish cartoons of Mohammed, or Jewish printers having to publish the 
words of a Holocaust denier, or gay bakers being compelled to make cakes adorned with 
homophobic slurs. Tatchell also raises the spectre of far-right extremists demanding that 
businesses enable the promotion of ‘bigoted messages’. He concludes that ‘it is an 
infringement of freedom to require businesses to aid the promotion of ideas to which they 
conscientiously object. Discrimination against people should be unlawful, but not against 
ideas.’219 Some human rights lawyers have agreed with this view, suggesting that the 
courts should pose the following question in similar cases in the future: 
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Would the service or product which you are being asked to provide involve 
promoting, supporting or participating in a cause you do not agree with? If yes, you 
should be able to refuse on grounds of conscience. If no, you should provide the 
product or service, regardless of who the customer is.
220
  
It is submitted that this is the wrong question. Demanding goods or services from 
businesses (or individuals) in furtherance of hate speech would go beyond the legal 
protection of political opinion. Brownlie J made clear that there is no obligation to print a 
message that would be in breach of the criminal law.
221
 The debate on same-sex marriage 
was a live one at the time the cake was ordered. It was not a matter of a gay man 
purposefully wanting to make a religious business owner feel uncomfortable. The debate 
over freedom of speech and where speech becomes hate speech is far too complex to be 
reduced to a matter of conscientious objection. Asking a printer to print a banner 
proclaiming “Bring Back Slavery!” would be hate speech, whether or not the printer’s 
forebears were dehumanised through slavery.  
The debate has been suffocated by “whataboutery” – the practice of responding to a 
difficult problem by raising another difficult problem, in order to deflect attention from the 
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original issue.
222
 It is necessary to consider how likely these “false flags” are to occur in 
practice. For example, would Islamophobes actually choose to give their money to 
Muslim-run businesses, with the sole aim of making the proprietors feel uncomfortable? 
Would Christian conservatives really want a gay bakery to produce anti-gay cupcakes? If 
Ashers’ management was concerned that their logo would be seen on the box, had they 
made the QueerSpace cake,
223
 would this not also apply to the Christian conservatives? 
The existing law already makes sufficient provision for the regulation of hatred; there is no 
justification for using conscience as a shield, not least because it becomes a weapon with 
which to exclude gay people.  
There are other examples where political – not religious – opinion might influence the type 
of customers who are refused goods or services. A member of an autonomous workers’ 
printing collective has given permission to cite his comments
224
 on the condition that both 
he and the collective remain anonymous. The collective has, in the past, refused to 
undertake printing for the police, News International and the Liberal Democrats, and has 
declined an invitation to quote for a fracking company’s publicity materials. They have 
undertaken other politically or culturally sensitive projects, such as sadomasochistic 
erotica, but with some collective members refusing to participate. He argues that there may 
be a valid difference between an autonomous workers’ collective and a business that has 
the ‘huge privilege of limited liability’ such as Ashers, where the latter ‘should fulfil 
customer orders without discrimination’.225  
However, Cooper acknowledges that demanding that employees comply with their 
employers’ instructions ‘seems hard to recognise as the rallying cry of a progressive 
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state’.226 On the other hand, Ashers is a company with around 80 staff, only some of whom 
are Christian, and yet they made no attempt to have a non-objecting staff member print the 
“offending” image. This suggests that the objection is more to the business being seen to 
endorse the image on the cake, rather than to any individual objection suggestive of 
alienation. Furthermore, what of those individual choices and consciences of employees 
who might (including for religious or secular reasons) feel strongly against being made 
complicit in homophobia? In any event, as Cooper explains:  
Equality’s terrain, in terms of the right to discriminate, should not be the place 
where problems of alienation are legally and politically accommodated… Equality 
should not be the exception to alienation – the one context where you don’t have to 
do something you’d rather not… Otherwise, the debate risks reinforcing the 
exceptional status of religious beliefs.
227
  
The complexities of the relationship between conscience and choice and the constraints on 
choice and agency were touched upon in Chapters 5 and 6. We might also add the 
observations on freedom offered by the feminist existentialist Simone de Beauvoir.
228
  The 
existentialist emphasis on freedom is theoretically at odds with Foucault’s approach, in that 
the former holds that humanity is ‘condemned to be free’,229 while the latter is more 
concerned with the contingencies of and constraints on human agency. Nevertheless, de 
Beauvoir offers an interesting analysis of why people might find it hard to relinquish 
values and ideas with which they are inculcated as children. She argues that people try to 
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deny their freedom, because freedom can be uncomfortable. We begin this process of 
denial as children, by adopting the values of the adults around us (which can often be 
grounded in a religious creed or ethos). De Beauvoir terms this the attitude of 
‘seriousness’, whereby we circumvent the anguish of freedom by believing that these 
ready-made values exist objectively. As we move beyond childhood, we continue to 
assume that we are not free, until we grow up and become the ‘serious man’, subordinating 
our freedom to these unconditioned values, thereby reverting to a kind of childhood. We 
act in bad faith when we refuse to recognise that we are able to choose our own values, and 
continue to abide by those ready-made values handed to us during childhood.  
Drawing parallels between the ‘serious man’ and the religious conscientious objector does 
not mean that the religious believer is little more than a child. It does mean that the 
religious believer can be understood as someone who has chosen scripture as a refuge from 
the more challenging and disquieting task of engaging with the complexities and 
uncertainties of human existence – of which human sexuality is a core aspect.230 Freedom 
is terrifying, so this urge to seek refuge is understandable. However, it is not a basis upon 
which law should be founded. It is disingenuous to argue that a refusal to allow a 
‘conscience clause’ forces religious objectors to compromise their authenticity. On the 
contrary, it can be argued that is bad faith – and thus inauthentic – to cling to values based 
on a particular interpretation of a particular ancient religious text, rather than to attempt to 
grapple with questions of life, love and death in the present day.  A better solution might 
be to look at the values behind the objection, as discussed earlier in this thesis.
231
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Part Two: a Queer critique of conscience 
Like Plummer (and plenty of others), I am ‘a bit of a humanist, a bit post-gay, a sort of a 
feminist, a little queer, a kind of a liberal, and seeing that much that is queer has the 
potential for an important radical change.’232  Engaging in Queer critique involves 
navigating these tensions and questioning whether Queer is enough to achieve the desired 
change. It might be useful to begin this section with a summary of those aspects of Queer 
used in this chapter. In general, Queer undertakes a radical questioning of norms, 
particularly notions norms concerned with of gender and sexuality.
233
 Queer, insofar as it 
can be defined, includes ‘whatever is at odds with the normal, the legitimate, the 
dominant.’234 For the purposes of this thesis, Queer recognises the fluidity of all sexual 
categories, challenges the heterosexual/ homosexual binary and de-centres identity as a 
category. It also problematises mainstream or ‘corporate’ homosexuality. It asks me, as a 
researcher, to be critically self-aware. My take on Queer also seeks to align itself with 
particular political and ethical principles, ones which and to even welcome the tensions, 
recognising that ‘the contradictory messiness of social life [is] such that no category 
system can ever do it justice.’235 In the words of songwriter Leonard Cohen, ‘there is a 
crack in everything; that’s how the light gets in.’236 The tensions and gaps between liberal, 
humanist, Queer and Foucaultian approaches provide space for insight as to what is 
happening and what needs to change.  
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Foucault’s analysis of ‘pastoral power’ provides useful insight when considering the 
discourses and power relations surrounding conscientious objection claims. Foucault’s 
concept of pastoral power was introduced in Chapter 3. Foucault was interested in ‘the 
technologies of individual domination, in the mode of action that an individual exercises 
upon himself by means of the technologies of the self’,237 and pastoral power is one of 
these technologies of individual domination. The following section analyses how this 
individual domination – this experience of being a prisoner of conscience – is grounded in 
pastoral power. Recall that, according to Foucault, ‘religious power… is pastoral 
power’,238 and that religious power has four characteristics: detail; an ‘infinite’ or ‘mystical 
calculus’ which serves as a justification beyond time and history; a focus on the body; and 
a focus on confession.
239
  The ‘infinite’ provides a religious rationale distinct from the 
‘technical rationality’ of earthly institutions, enabling the relations of power to be set up 
‘for the conquest of salvation’.240  
The influence and operation of pastoral power is seen in the Ashers case and the 
surrounding legal and political context. For example, the idea of being bound by one’s 
conscience to a higher law is rooted in religious/pastoral power. Furthermore, the metaphor 
of the shepherd and his flock
241
 is inherent to pastoral power, and shows that it is 
fundamentally a power focused on salvation, much as the shepherd gathers together his 
flock and saves it from danger. This is reflected in the DUP’s discourse, informed by the 
Free Presbyterian Church, during the “Save Ulster from Sodomy” campaign. For Foucault, 
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‘salvation’ provides a technology of power based on a scale of ‘faults and merits’.242 For 
the individual, the scale of ‘faults and merits becomes a process of ‘analytical 
identification’ grounded in the examination of the self.243  The pastor and his flock are 
bound in a relationship whereby ‘the pastor must really take charge of and observe daily 
life in order to form a never-ending knowledge of the behaviour and conduct of the 
members of the flock he supervises’.244 The pastor’s concern with his flock necessarily 
includes guiding the thoughts of his flock – a procedure which involves the production and 
extraction of ‘a truth which binds one to the person who directs one’s conscience’.245 
Foucault’s analysis helps to explain why the religious do not experience themselves as 
having a personal choice over the content of their conscience. It also reveals the earthly, 
discursive power relations at play, in contrast to instead of the “divine law” posited by the 
church. 
The operation of pastoral power has implications for the provision of goods and services to 
gay people, as is demonstrated by the Ashers case. It also has implications for the welfare 
of gay people. Recent research has highlighted how public spending cuts have negatively 
affected LGBT people.
246
 LGBT research participants reported difficulty finding safe, 
LGBT-friendly accommodation, with local access to support and advice services.
247
 They 
experienced greater feelings of marginalisation and invisibility as specialist LGBT services 
and support disappeared. There was also a sense of de-prioritisation of LGBT-focused 
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services (due to the common misconception that there are no financially or socially 
disadvantaged LGBT people), exacerbated by a reluctance to access mainstream services 
for fear of homophobic prejudice.
248
  
Participants expressed concern that the cuts would begin to have an effect on increased 
discrimination such as feeling unsafe on the streets, hate crime and homophobia. Fewer 
‘non-scene’ LGBT-friendly spaces and support groups meant that some LGBT people 
worried that there was less opportunity for safe socialising. Overall, there was fear that 
LGBT needs were beginning to be seen as a luxury.
249
 The trade union Unison has also 
highlighted the impact of austerity cuts on LGBT people.  They have reported problems 
finding accommodation where they could feel safe and that was LGBT-friendly. They 
experienced greater feelings of marginalisation and invisibility as specialist LGBT services 
and support disappeared. There was fear that progress made in challenging heterosexism 
and discrimination was being reversed, and that homophobia and transphobia were on the 
rise again.  
Meanwhile, faith groups are now filling the gap in provision that had been occupied by the 
state until the financial crisis and subsequent onset of austerity. Churches, mosques, 
temples and synagogues provide £3bn pa of free social action work.
250
 Austerity is a 
central plank of the current government’s ideology and is grounded on a philosophical 
belief in the rolling back of state provision of services. This void is being filled by 
increasing levels of provision by religious groups, fuelling a rise in theonormativity and a 
potential resurgence of pastoral power. A study of over 7000 young people in England 
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found that LGBT youth were significantly more likely to report that they did not feel 
accepted within their community – particularly within religious organisations.251  
Tellingly, the Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG) has 
announced a £400,000 programme to ‘strengthen faith institutions’. Funds will be granted 
to bid-winning charities to support the growth of ‘places of worship’ in Britain. Justifying 
its decision, the DCLG stated that ‘faith communities make a vital contribution to national 
life: they guide the moral outlook of many, inspire great numbers of people to public 
service and provide help to those in need.’252 This funding decision appears grounded in 
the belief that religious organisations and people do more good for local communities than 
non-religious ones, and so are more deserving of public funds. Such a belief is, in turn, 
grounded in the theonormativity that permits the continuance of pastoral power.  
Furthermore, a Christian organisation that aims to encourage gay people not to have sex 
has recently been granted charity status. Living Out says it encourages discussion of 
homosexuality ‘from a Biblical perspective’, requiring gay Christians to abstain from (gay) 
sex for life to avoid being seen as ‘sinful’. Living Out preaches that same-sex desire came 
about through Original Sin in the Garden of Eden, and that gay sex is ‘inconsistent’ with 
Christian teachings. Notwithstanding this, the Charity Commission reviewed its previous 
decision and concluded that the group was for the ‘public benefit’, because it was 
‘concerned with promoting the wider Christian principles of unconditional love, 
compassion, acceptance and understanding, and a welcoming place in the Christian Church 
for same-sex attracted individuals who wish to stay true to their Christian faith.’253 Yet 
10% of health and social care workers have observed colleagues expressing the belief that 
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LGBT patients can be cured of their sexualities; this figure rises to 22% in London.
254
 
Homophobia is reportedly rife in the health and social care sector, with homophobic abuse 
almost a daily occurrence: ‘I was told I should be hanging from a tree by a nurse from 
Nigeria with strong religious beliefs’. 
Those who are persuaded that conscience should be accommodated ought to consider the 
costs of such conscience that are borne by LGBT people in society.
255
 A recent study by 
Columbia University, of data from 1988 to 2008, examined whether mortality risk differed 
for LGB people who lived in communities with high or low levels of prejudice. The 
information on sexual orientation and community-level prejudice was linked longitudinally 
to mortality data via the National Death Index. The study found that gay people living in 
communities with high levels of anti-gay prejudice are expected to die 12 years earlier than 
their peers who live in more accepting environments. By the end of the study, 92% of LGB 
respondents living in low-prejudice communities were still alive, whereas only 78% of 
LGB respondents living in high-prejudice communities were still alive: 
… these effects are independent of established risk factors for mortality, including 
household income, education, gender, ethnicity, and age, as well as the average 
income and education level of residents in the communities where the respondents 
lived… In fact, our results for prejudice were comparable to life expectancy 
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differences that have been observed between individuals with and without a high 
school education.
256
  
In the UK, a recent report by the Equalities and Human Rights Commission revealed that 
35,000 homophobic hate crimes go unreported each year. The report stated that 88% of 
LGBT people had experienced some form of hate crime leaving them emotionally or 
physically scarred. Just 14% had reported the latest hate crime to police.
257
 Other research 
illustrates the effect of social class on sexual self-expression. Being lower in social class is 
related to a decreased likelihood of describing oneself as gay or to being able to live in a 
‘safe’ gay community.258 There is an unequal distribution of the gains of the LGBT 
movement, according to educational privilege, skin colour, where you live, and how 
gender-normative you are.
259
 This is why a discussion of class is important in the context 
of the increasing religious influence in service provision. The next section goes on to 
consider the relationship between social class and sexual citizenship. 
Part three: social class and sexual citizenship 
Sexuality, Class and Foucault 
In his genealogy of sexuality, Foucault suggests that the working class had historically 
managed to escape the ‘Christian technology of the flesh’,260 which had hitherto been 
focused on the bourgeois classes. It was not until the nineteenth century, with the 
                                                          
256 David Baldash, ‘Top University Study: Anti-Gay Prejudice Is Killing Gay People’ (The New Civil Rights 
Movement, 17 February 2014) <http://www.thenewcivilrightsmovement.com/top-university-study-anti-gay-
prejudice-is-killing-gay-people/discrimination/2014/02/17/83300> accessed 18 February 2016 
257
 University of Leicester Centre for Hate Studies 2015  
258
 Donald C Barrett and Lance M Pollack, ‘Whose gay community? Social class, sexual self-expression, and 
gay community involvement’ (2005) The Sociological Quarterly 46(3), 437-456, 451 
259
 John D’Emilio, ‘Creating Change’ (2012) The Scholar and Feminist Online, issue 10.1-10.2 ‘A New 
Queer Agenda’ Fall 2011/Spring 2012 <http://sfonline.barnard.edu/a-new-queer-agenda/creating-change/> 
accessed 29 July 2015 
260
 Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality Vol 1: The Will to Knowledge (Penguin, 1978), 121 
255 
 
‘development of the juridical and medical control of perversions’,261 that the deployment 
of sexuality permeated through to the working class – not as a means of repression per se, 
but rather as a ‘new distribution of pleasures, discourses, truths and powers’, the aim of 
which was the strengthening of the ruling class and the forming of a ‘political ordering of 
life, not through an enslavement of others, but through an affirmation of self’.262 Here, 
Foucault differentiates his approach from what might be called a “pure” class analysis of 
repression. However, he concludes ‘that there is a bourgeois sexuality, and that there are 
class sexualities. Or rather, that sexuality is originally, historically bourgeois, and that, in 
its successive shifts and transpositions, it induces specific class effects.’263  
How we understand and experience this ‘new distribution of pleasures, discourses, truths 
and powers’ is shaped by the sociophysical environment in which we live.264 Relations of 
power, on a Foucaultian analysis, do not just involve the domination of others but also the 
extent to which some can take actions that others are denied on the grounds of race, class, 
age, disability and gender.
265
 Four modes of power are key to the Foucaultian analysis:
266
 
ideology (hetero- and theo- normativities); force (how political Christianity justifies its 
claims for conscientious objection); discipline (how social interactions and institutions are 
ordered) and resources (wealth, rights and time – which help to determine class). The 
‘mutually constitutive politics of class and sexuality’ have been forgotten in the current 
conflict between religion and sexual orientation rights claims. Any discussion of sexual 
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citizenship, therefore, should be better ‘attuned to the impact that class has on the potential 
to benefit from rights claims’.267  
It is clear that sexuality matters to rights claims and to citizenship. Yet class also matters to 
rights claims and to citizenship. LGB people in C2DE (lower socio-economic) groups are 
50% more likely to experience sexuality-related bullying than those in ABC1 groups.
268
 A 
survey by the Office for National Statistics revealed a ‘dramatic variation across class and 
geography in the proportion of people identifying as gay’:  1.6% described themselves as 
gay overall (but 3.9% did not know or would not say). In London, this figure was 3.2%; in 
the North-East, it was a mere 1.1%. Among managerial and professional groups, the figure 
was 2.2%; in intermediate, routine, and /manual occupational groups, it dropped to 
1.4%.
269
 Put simply, it is harder to be openly gay in areas and occupations that have a 
higher proportion of economically deprived people.  
The myth of the gentrified gay 
There is an assumption that the “gay (male) community” (such as it is) is middle-class. 
There is an associated hypothesis that the middle-class nature of the gay community 
requires economic and psychosocial resources that are not available to the working-class, 
which may limit the opportunities for working-class expressions of sexual orientation. As 
Valocchi and others argue, the preponderance of middle-class gays is partly due to the 
historic, economic, and social forces that facilitated the development of a middle-class (and 
white) gay movement, and partly due to the contemporary ‘gay lifestyle’ choices that 
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require the residency, employment and consumption patterns of the middle class.
270
 The 
myth of the gentrified gay persists even within some sections of the Queer community.
271
 
However, those urban “bubbles” that did exist, such as Soho in London, are beginning to 
disappear as the process of gentrification forces them to burst.  
For example, The Black Cap in Soho was one of London’s best-known LGBT pubs and 
drag venues, operating as a gay venue since the 1960s. It was recently closed by its 
corporate owners just a week after the local authority granted it the status of ‘asset of 
community value’, in recognition of it ‘furthering the social well-being or cultural, 
recreational or sporting interests of the local community’.272  The venue had an important 
role as a community hub and meeting point for various support groups, particularly for 
older LGBT people and those from ethnic minorities; for hate crime outreach work; and as 
a venue for events, consultations and forums. The ‘community value’ status is supposed to 
give venues an added layer of protection from being sold and redeveloped. The owners had 
unsuccessfully sought local authority permission to redevelop the space above the venue 
three times since 2011, and subsequently put the freehold up for sale. The twin processes 
of gentrification and austerity have had an impact on where and how people live and work. 
It would be helpful to pause at this point and consider how these processes relate to social 
class. First, it is necessary to consider how class is defined for the purposes of this 
discussion. 
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Modern capitalism and class structure 
It can be argued that the traditional Marxist understanding of class is insufficient to address 
the more complex manner in which modern society is stratified. More than a century after 
Marx, Bourdieu
273
 identified three kinds of capital: economic capital (wealth and income); 
cultural capital (educational achievement and the capacity to participate in cultural goods), 
and social capital (contacts and connections). While there was some overlap between these 
kinds of capital, there were also differences. These differences enabled subtle distinctions 
to be drawn between people who possessed varying levels of each, revealing a more 
complex picture than the Marxist landscape of ownership of the means of production 
versus alienated labour.  
The most recent research
274
 now posits the existence of seven social classes, ranging from 
an elite – rich in all types of capital – through to a ‘precariat’ with very low levels of 
capital, comprising some 15% of the population. The research concludes that only two of 
these seven classes conform to traditional understandings of ‘middle’ and ‘working’ 
classes. Further, some of the new classes have economic capital without cultural or social 
capital, while the ‘new affluent workers’ and the ‘emergent service workers’ (often the 
children of the traditional working class) enjoy economic and social capital without 
necessarily accessing ‘highbrow’ culture. Together, these findings ‘challenge the 
perception that the problem of social and cultural engagement is more marked at the lower 
levels of the class structure’, while maintaining the ‘ongoing salience of social class 
divisions in the stratification of British society.’275  
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However social class is understood, it is true that not all gay people have ever had the 
necessary disposable income to enjoy a work, social and economic life in any kind of 
protective gay bubble. This chapter has highlighted how gentrification and austerity have 
combined to threaten this protective zone, but in any event gay people should not have to 
rely solely on gay-run businesses for the provision of goods and services. Whether or not 
they can afford to have their same-sex wedding cake made by Choccywoccydoodah
276
 
should not render gay people vulnerable to discrimination by high street cake shops. Yet 
those who occupy a less advantaged socio-economic position have much fewer choices in 
the goods and services they access, and are thus particularly vulnerable to high street 
homophobia.  
Capitalism, Consumerism and Citizenship 
In the course of this thesis, I have argued that the use of rights discourse has resulted in a 
zero-sum game when applied to the conflict between conservative religious expression and 
sexual orientation. Does this mean that the strategic deployment of rights discourse by the 
movement for gay equality should be replaced with “citizenship discourse”? The argument 
is not without its attractions. Indeed, part of the rationale for equality legislation is to 
remedy the historical oppression faced by particular sections of society; to bring them 
within the realm of citizenship by protecting them against discrimination on grounds of 
certain characteristics. If gay people are still subject to restrictions based on their sexual 
orientation, does reframing the discussion in terms of citizenship remedy this problem? Is 
it possible that consumer capitalism may contain within it the potential for resistance 
through increased gay cultural visibility, just as ‘reform capitalism’ provided an 
opportunity for earlier generations of gay people to challenge discrimination on an ‘equal 
                                                          
276 A gay-friendly bespoke cake maker based in Brighton https://www.choccywoccydoodah.com/ accessed 8 
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rights’ basis?277 The gay rights movement of the 1970s was chiefly concerned with 
breaking out of the heteronormative closet and proclaiming a public, gay identity. Decades 
later, the visibility of gay people in the public, commercialised sphere offered businesses 
new marketing opportunities and led to the conflation of income with a ‘valorized gay 
identity’.278  
There are also wider questions. Recall that one aspect of this Queer critique is marked by 
antipathy towards the construction and marketisation of a purported “gay identity”. With 
this is mind, one can ask to what extent has the movement for sexual orientation equality 
been appropriated by individualist consumerism? Has capitalism’s fascination with ‘the 
pink pound’ become a tool for ‘pinkwashing’ genuine equality for lesbians and gay 
men?
279
 In 2014, Barclays Bank became the headline sponsor for London’s annual Gay 
Pride event. Their website describes Pride as ‘one of the largest annual events held in 
London along with the London Marathon and New Year Fireworks, and regularly attracts 
nearly a quarter of a million people.’ 280 The website includes glowing endorsements from 
the Chair of Pride in London, who speaks of Pride’s ‘levels of consumer satisfaction equal 
only to the Olympic and Paralympic Games’. He adds,  
Research has shown that LGBT people are more inclined (52%) to spend with 
companies that they know to be supportive of their community… Pride in London 
offers companies a truly unique opportunity to secure incredibly strong brand 
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presence and shows backing for diversity and equality to an audience of potentially 
millions of consumers.
281
 
Thus Pride – which originated as a response to police anti-gay and anti-trans brutality as 
part of the Stonewall riots – morphs from a means of protest into a tourist attraction and a 
means for business to secure their ‘brand presence’. What does this mean for social and 
sexual citizenship? Social citizenship, as Marshall highlighted, originated partly in 
capitalism’s move towards mass production and consumerism. In modern capitalism, 
citizens are characterised as ‘consumers with identities and lifestyles which are expressed 
through purchasing goods, communities and services’.282 Consumer power is perceived by 
many as a basis for citizenship: ‘we pay our taxes, we should get our rights’.283 Richardson 
may be largely correct to suggest that lesbians and gay men are broadly accepted as 
consumer citizens – however, this acceptance stops when it meets conservative religious 
expression. Indeed, as discussed earlier, the (Christian) wedding ceremony is a vivid 
example of what Richardson calls the ‘hegemonic heterosexuality of citizenship’.284 This is 
where the challenge and the resistance discussed in Chapter 5 might prove particularly 
useful.  
This chapter has sought to develop a class-informed, Foucaultian queer critique of the 
Ashers case and the subsequent call for a conscience clause to be added to equality law 
provision. It has argued that the current debate surrounding this latest conflict between 
religion and sexual orientation has been conducted in terms of sexuality-rights-based 
freedoms, to the detriment of an appreciation of class-based freedoms. Socio-economic 
                                                          
281 Michael Salter, quoted in ‘Barclays returns for headline sponsorship of Pride in London’ 
<http://prideinlondon.org/about-us/news/2016/03/11/barclays-returns-for-headline-sponsorship-of-pride-in-
london> accessed 11 March 2016 
282 Diane Richardson, ‘Constructing sexual citizenship: theorizing sexual rights’ (2000) Critical Social 
Policy 62, 83-84 
283 Nicola Field, ‘Identity and the Lifestyle Market’ in Rosemary Hennessy and Chrys Ingraham (eds) 
Materialist Feminism: A Reader in Class, Difference, and Women's Lives (Routledge 1997), 259 
284 [n 149] 
262 
 
disadvantage limits the choices that people have to access goods and services in a society 
undergoing both gentrification and austerity. If goods and service providers are permitted 
to use faith as grounds for refusing to deal with gay people on faith grounds, this renders 
gay people second-class citizens. 
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CHAPTER 8: DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
Every time a public official refers to homosexuality as a disease, claims that homosexuals 
are not fit to be parents or draws parallels between homosexuality and child sexual abuse, 
they degrade gay men and lesbians… every time homosexuals are denied access to goods 
and services on the basis of their sexual orientation, prevented from assembling and 
associating in public or dismissed from their jobs, they experience degradation. Such 
degradation cultivates and sustains the social stigma of homosexuality and produces 
detrimental physical and mental effects upon individuals.
1
 
Aim of the thesis 
The task of this thesis was to identify and critically analyse the discourses and societal 
structures that compromise the belonging of non-heterosexuals. In doing so, it has 
highlighted the hetero- and theo- normativities that make it possible for religious 
conservatives to be able to make their claims for religious exemptions, and for law to grant 
them. The thesis has also argued that a society concerned with equality should challenge 
those parts of the law that compromise equal citizenship, dignity and security by 
legitimising heterosexism and homophobia. The effects of heteronormativity and 
homophobia on gay people were examined through concepts of harm: Mill’s classic 
liberalism, Raz’s value-based liberalism, Feinberg’s analysis of harm to others, and Judith 
Jarvis Thomson’s discussion on harm, distress and belief. Thereafter, Kendall Thomas’s 
concept of constructive delegation of power in US anti-sodomy legislation was applied to 
UK equality law, in support of the argument that conscientious objection, viewed in terms 
of power relations, is an example of the state’s constructive delegation of homophobia to 
individual religious conservatives. As well as hetero- and theo- normativities, the thesis 
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also cited the impact of class and socio-economic status on sexual citizenship, because it 
limits the inclusion of non-heterosexuals in the public sphere. 
Research question 
This thesis has considered the question, how should law adjudicate conflicts between 
sexual orientation and the expression of religious belief? It is a normative question, and the 
thesis has sought to address it as part of a much broader discussion about the sort of society 
we want and the role law should play in achieving it. The conflict between religion and 
sexual orientation raises many of the central questions of legal liberalism: freedom, equal 
rights, and harm. Therefore, it has been necessary to engage with the prevailing liberal 
philosophies, but also to move beyond them. Using Queer theory and a Foucaultian 
understanding of discourse, the constellation of liberal concerns regarding the conflict has 
been re-examined in the context of power relations. This has provided some useful insight 
into how the legal norms central to the conflict were created and sustained; how they have 
changed; and how they might further develop. The conflict is a microcosm of the wider 
relationship between law, religion and homosexuality, and the discursive techniques 
employed by legal actors – of which rights discourse plays a key role.  
The role of rights discourse 
The analysis of rights discourse in this thesis can be seen in some ways as a critique of 
rights itself. The conflict between religion and sexual orientation, as a result of their both 
being protected characteristics in the Equality Act, has seen rights discourse adopted by 
religious conservatives to support their claims for exemptions to the Act, so as to allow 
discrimination against others on grounds of sexuality. There is a temptation, then, to view 
rights discourse as fundamentally flawed and incapable of realising genuine equality for 
gay people. While there is some truth in this, it is not the whole picture. The thesis is not, 
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in the final analysis, a condemnation of rights discourse itself, but rather a critique of 
particular engagements with rights discourse. Nevertheless, the analysis of rights discourse 
also has implications for a broader critique of rights.   
A significant limitation is the susceptibility of rights discourse to being used by religious 
conservatives to compromise non-heterosexual equality and citizenship. Moves towards 
secularism and gay equality over the past sixty years or so have encouraged religious 
conservatives to become strategic polyglots; they have largely discarded the language of 
morality and instead have appropriated the language of rights as a cloak to cover their 
continuing distaste for homosexuality. The charge of religious appropriation of rights 
discourse is not hyperbole; rather, it highlights the vulnerability of a rights discourse that is 
grounded in both universality and neutrality. This vulnerability can be revealed by 
interrogating first the idea of a universal rights-bearing individual, and second the law’s 
neutral approach to determining what it means to bear these rights.  
The myth of the “universal human” 
Liberal theories see equality, freedom and autonomy as the basis of all other human rights. 
Humans have rights by virtue of being human – and all are considered equally human. 
They have rights to enable them to be the (partial) authors of their life. The nature and 
extent of all human rights in the liberal canon, including freedom of religion, are largely 
defined by equality and freedom, and by the concept of a “universal” human being. 
However, as the thesis has shown, the liberal rhetoric of universality largely ignores the 
situatedness of the human and the social construction of identity and difference. More 
specifically to the current issue, it does not account for the influence of heteronormativity 
and theonormativity as prisms through which the “universal subject” was historically 
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constructed, nor for the impact of class and socio-economic status on the ability of a rights-
bearing individual to exercise these supposed universal rights.  
Rights need to be grounded in something firmer than the idea of a “universal human”. The 
thesis has drawn on Queer theory to provide vital insights into the limitations of this 
traditional liberal idea. Recall Foucault’s observation in Chapter 3 that the exercise of 
power in Western societies ‘has always been formulated in terms of law.’2 This power 
encompasses both judicial power (the enforcement of behavioural norms) and disciplinary 
power (the production of identity). Disciplinary power defines people through differences 
which become enshrined in law, so that ‘the law is brought in to manage otherness, but in 
doing so identities become reified’.3 Discipline as a mechanism of power regulates a 
society’s people through regulating their space, their time and their behaviour. Disciplinary 
power also operates to exclude and restrict those people who have been deemed to be 
“other than” the universal rights-bearing subject. 
Chapter 2 described the construction of “the homosexual” as “other”, as a species that was 
excluded from the moral embrace of universal rights. Further, disciplinary power 
originated in the church – through the operation of pastoral power – before being adopted 
by other social institutions through the rise of the State and the development of 
‘governmentality’.4  In Western society, therefore, it was the discipline of theonormativity 
– the acceptance of the role of religion in shaping behaviour – that begat the discipline of 
heteronormativity, dictating how men and women should be, physiologically, 
psychologically and sexually. These two norms have an historical connection that 
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traditional liberal theory overlooks. This oversight is also manifested in liberalism’s second 
limb: that of neutrality. 
The myth of “liberal neutrality” 
Liberalism strives to uphold human autonomy by adopting a neutral stance towards what 
constitutes a “good” life. However, this neutral approach has been a means by which 
religious conservatives have sought to argue that their religious conscience – which 
governs their conception of what is “good” – entitles them to claim exemptions from 
equality law. In most claims for exemption on grounds of religious conscience, both in the 
UK and in the European Court of Human Rights, the courts apply a mostly neutral rhetoric 
while almost completely ignoring the content of the relevant conscience. In these cases the 
courts avoid, almost completely, making any normative judgment about the content of the 
relevant conscience. It is true that such conservative judicial rhetoric can be deployed to 
justify progressive outcomes, as has been seen in the cases discussed in Chapter 4. 
Nevertheless, they do – even if unconsciously – make a (theo)normative judgment that 
religion is prima facie a valid basis for conscientious objection. Otherwise, they would not 
need to entertain the question at all. So the absence of a normative judgment does not mean 
that there are no norms being played out.   
The content-neutral approach, then, is not truly neutral because it has been underpinned by 
a pervasive theonormativity. As discussed in Chapter 2, the public sphere is infused with 
religious values. Even in liberal states that profess to be secular, there remains a 
presumption that religion is a human good, as reflected in international and domestic 
Human Rights charters. This presumption can affect how the so-called “neutral” liberal 
state undertakes any supposedly neutral balancing exercise, and highlights how even 
content-neutral considerations are situated in a theonormative society. The courts’ 
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emphasis on neutrality therefore sits uneasily amidst a prevalent theonormativity. Even the 
courts’ recognition of the secular state5 is of limited value if their judgments then proceed 
on the illusory basis of neutrality. 
Our society is not a theocracy, but it remains theonormative. A theonormative society can 
be persuaded to take religious arguments at face value because of the assumption that 
religion is special. The task then becomes to halt and then reverse the process. The state 
should recognise explicitly that the theo-norm should not dictate the terms of human 
equality. Further, the courts’ interpretation of the Equality Act should recognise explicitly 
a hierarchy of rights, according to which principles of equality define the limits of religious 
freedom. However, the courts are reluctant to recognise this hierarchy because of its 
implications: it would puncture the theo-norm and require the liberal state to remove its 
mask of neutrality. 
Perfectionist liberalism – a move away from “neutrality” 
Raz’s perfectionist liberal theory6  moves closer to the desired solution, by enabling a 
critique of the traditional content-neutral approach to the values underpinning 
conscientious objection claims to gay equality. A perfectionist moral stance would instead 
differentiate between two types of case: claims for exemption or accommodation that are 
directly based on intolerant, anti-liberal and ultimately illegitimate values; and claims that 
are based on values that may be irrational or misguided but are not necessarily unjustly 
intolerant or illegitimate. This latter type of case includes, for example, wearing religious 
dress or symbols in the workplace. Normative evaluation of the content of the 
conscientious objection offers a reason for not ever tolerating the first type of case – and 
for tolerating the second type only under certain conditions.  
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Advocates for gay equality and citizenship should point out that the state has already 
expressed a view that discrimination against gay people relies on illegitimate values.
7
 The 
Equality Act sets an underlying moral principle whereby direct discrimination because of a 
protected characteristic is indefensible, so freedom of religion ends when it expresses itself 
through unjust discrimination against others. Accordingly, in this case the state has set the 
limits of liberal tolerance by relying on content-based, rather than content-neutral, 
considerations. If the courts can be persuaded to make this clear in their judgments, it 
would be an important step towards enshrining genuine gay equality and citizenship.  
Rights discourse has not, so far, proved fully amenable to religious appropriation; as 
discussed in Chapter 4, the courts have rejected religious conservatives’ pleas for 
exemptions from equality law on repeated occasions. These are indeed important victories 
but, as the thesis has sought to demonstrate, the battle is not yet fully won. This is why it 
remains important to engage with rights discourse but to use that engagement to encourage 
a move away from neutrality, towards an explicit recognition that it is the content of the 
conscience that matters.  
Rights and citizenship – Article 3 ECHR 
A move away from neutrality in rights discourse would help confirm the status of gay 
people as equal, but something more is still needed in the canon of gay rights before full 
citizenship can be achieved. For example, as discussed in Chapter 6, the courts have not 
yet gone so far as to confirm that excluding gay people from equal treatment is a form of 
degrading treatment, contrary to ECHR Article 3. The Equality Act is one site of strategic 
engagement with rights; Article 3 ECHR provides another. Again, it demonstrates the 
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importance of engaging with rights discourse to protect and extend genuine gay 
citizenship. 
Article 3 forbids the infliction of torture, or of inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment. The ECtHR has defined inhuman treatment as treatment which may ‘cause 
either actual bodily harm or intense physical or mental suffering’,8 and degrading treatment 
as that which can ‘arouse in the victim feelings of fear, anguish and inferiority capable of 
humiliating and debasing them’.9 An argument can be made that discrimination against, 
and exclusion of, gay people – ‘actions that create feelings of fear, anguish and inferiority 
that humiliate and debase individuals’10 – does constitute degrading treatment. It defines 
gay people as less deserving of equal treatment; it thereby renders them less than citizens.  
This is not a far-fetched proposal. In fact, it provides an opportunity to develop and extend 
the Court’s interpretation of the Convention in respect of sexual orientation. For example, 
in Smith and Grady v UK,
11
 the applicants claimed that investigations by the armed forces 
into their sexual orientation involved questioning that was ‘hurtful and degrading… 
prurient and offensive’.12 Although the applicants failed to meet the threshold of severity 
currently required for Article 3, the judgment did confirm the reasoning in Kudla that 
‘treatment which is grounded upon a predisposed bias on the part of a heterosexual 
majority against a homosexual minority… could, in principle, fall within the scope of 
Article 3’.13 Most recently, in Identoba,14 a case involving peaceful public assembly, the 
ECtHR recognised that anti-gay hate crime is a violation of Article 3, when taken in 
conjunction with Article 14 ECHR. Identoba heralds the start of a process whereby gay 
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people have the right not to experience degrading public treatment because of their sexual 
orientation.  It also serves as a further example of the importance of continuing to engage 
with rights discourse. 
However, the question arises whether recognition of gay citizenship under Article 3 would 
leave the door ajar for religious conservatives to use Article 3 to justify appeals to 
conscience. The European Commission has stated that ‘treatment or punishment of an 
individual may be said to be degrading if it grossly humiliates him before others or drives 
him to act against his will or conscience.’15 Thus there remains the possibility that it could 
be used by religious conservatives in the future, particularly if the scope of Article 3 
evolves to protect gay people from degrading treatment through discrimination or 
exclusion. As illustrated in Chapter 4, ECtHR jurisprudence does not adopt a content-based 
approach to claims for conscientious objection. Therefore it is not sufficient for domestic 
courts to adopt a content-based approach; the European Court of Justice would have to 
develop its thinking along similar lines. Otherwise, the zero-sum game that is played on the 
field of rights discourse is in danger of being replicated under Article 3.  
Rights and queer theory: a strategic engagement 
The insights of Queer theory show that rights discourse has been slow to embrace those 
humans who had historically been classified as outside of the universal moral embrace. Yet 
Queer theory has its own limitations; it can fail to recognise the potential of rights 
discourse in furthering equality, and the necessity of engaging on the terrain of rights in 
legal conflicts such as this. If change is desired, then it is important to engage politically 
and ethically with rights. As Foucault observed, ‘it is not a matter of imposing law on 
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men… but of employing tactics rather than laws, or… employing laws as tactics.’16 Rights 
discourse has enabled LGBT people to win important legal victories: equal treatment in 
employment, education and goods and services provision, as well as freedom from 
criminal sanctions and recognition of non-heterosexual relationships. It remains an 
important weapon in the armoury of strategies and tactics in the pursuit of genuine equality 
and citizenship. It is possible, then, to recognise the utility – and the success – of rights 
discourse in the pursuit of gay equality. Indeed, the development of Queer theory, as well 
as feminist and critical race theories, has influenced rights discourse to become more 
inclusive; to begin to recognise the complexity and the intersectionality of the erstwhile 
“universal human”. 
Queer theory has sometimes been reluctant to tackle normative jurisprudential questions. 
However, as this thesis has sought to argue, Queer’s pedigree in challenging established 
norms does not mean that it must necessarily resist any normative encounter. The 
discussion in this thesis has highlighted the continued existence of lesbian and gay 
inequality, and has suggested a need for both a rethinking of an essentialist approach to 
rights and a legal and political system willing to tackle the widening gap between rich and 
poor and the drastic shortfall in government social welfare spending. Accordingly, ‘Queer 
and liberal theory need to converse with each other’,17 particularly in the current debate 
where issues of rights, and the state’s role in determining these rights, are highlighted. This 
thesis is a contribution to the conversation by offering a ‘critical and strategic 
engagement’18 with rights discourse. 
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The master’s house: law and rights 
This thesis opened with a quote from Audre Lorde which said that the master’s tools will 
never fully dismantle the master’s house. The master’s house can be viewed as an allegory 
for the use of rights discourse within the legal system, with reference to equality law in 
particular.  Lorde’s words served to position this work as a critical analysis of the role of 
rights as a tool (or weapon) in conflicts between religion and sexual orientation, and 
contends that traditional rights discourse lacks the necessary recognition of how hetero- 
and theo- normativities have underpinned law’s construction. The master’s house can also 
be viewed as an allegory for law in a broader sense; more specifically, the master’s house 
can be construed as the disciplinary society, with law operating as one of its tools. 
This view enables an understanding of equality law as a product of power relations and the 
discourses that have constructed truth and knowledge claims – in this context, claims about 
sexual orientation and religion. Historically, the master’s house has been constructed on 
foundations that are both hetero- and theo- normative. Trying to resolve the conflict 
between religion and sexual orientation using the traditional, liberal rights-based 
framework is akin to using the master’s tools to effect repairs: plastering over cracks while 
failing to notice that the whole building is damaged. The damage consists of the hetero- 
and theo- normativities already mentioned, but also damage on a more structural, socio-
economic level.  
The relevance of class 
As well as norms pertaining to religion and to sexuality, the master’s house – as an 
allegory for the disciplinary society – is also underpinned by norms relating to socio-
economic status. If the traditional, liberal rights-bearing subject is a white, male, 
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heterosexual Christian, he also belongs to a certain class. As explained in Chapter 1, class 
is one of the ‘organising principles’ – along with others such as race, age, disability and 
gender – that affect how power is exercised wherever it operates in society.19 However, 
class is not recognised as a protected characteristic because law views it as lacking the 
requisite categorical fixity. This view is itself informed by the ideology of meritocracy and 
social mobility.
20
  Yet one’s class – particularly one’s socio-economic status – has an 
impact on one’s choices as to how public space, in its broadest sense, can be accessed. This 
has implications for lesbian and gay citizenship. As Vaid puts it, 
… homophobia does not originate in our lack of full civil equality. Rather, 
homophobia arises from the nature and construction of the political, legal, 
economic, sexual, racial, and family systems within which we live. As long as the 
rights-oriented movement refuses to address these social institutions and cultural 
forces, we cannot eradicate homophobic prejudice.
21
 
This illustrates the limits of civil rights, which are ‘principally mechanisms to gain access, 
not means to implement fundamental social change’.22 This aspect of rights has led to class 
(as a shorthand for socio-economic status) being overlooked in the mainstream debates. 
However, this thesis contends that an analysis of class in equality law is necessary, because 
‘without an analysis and appreciation of systemic subordination and advantage, a 
progressive politics can become directionless’.23 Moreover, the key flashpoint in the 
conflict between religion and sexual orientation has been in the area of goods and services 
provision. This may not be widely recognised as an area in which class has particular 
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relevance; class might be seen as being more obviously relevant to discrimination in 
employment, perhaps. However, it is important to place discrimination in goods and 
services provision in the context of a consumer-oriented, capitalist society, where the 
ability to consume – and the choices of what and where to consume – are affected by social 
class. The ‘mutually constitutive politics of class and sexuality’ have been forgotten in the 
current conflict between religion and sexual orientation rights claims. Any discussion of 
sexual citizenship, therefore, should be better ‘attuned to the impact that class has on the 
potential to benefit from rights claims’.24  
As discussed in Chapter 7, LGB people in C2DE (lower socio-economic) groups are 50% 
more likely to experience sexuality-related bullying than those in ABC1 groups.
25
 There is 
in the UK a ‘dramatic variation across class and geography in the proportion of people 
identifying as gay’:  1.6% described themselves as gay overall; in London, this figure was 
much higher at 3.2%, whereas in the North-East it was a mere 1.1%. Among managerial 
and professional groups, the figure was 2.2%; in intermediate, routine, and /manual 
occupational groups, it dropped to 1.4%.
26
 Put simply, it is harder to be openly gay in areas 
and occupations that have a higher proportion of economically deprived people.  
This has implications for genuine equality and sexual citizenship; yet neither liberal nor 
Queer theories have placed adequate emphasis on the importance of class. This why the 
thesis highlights it in Chapter 7; as part of the ongoing conversation between liberal and 
Queer theory, the thesis foregrounds class to underline how much it matters to rights 
claims and to citizenship. In addition, Chapter 7 makes an important contribution to 
knowledge by bringing an understanding of class-based inequality up to date. Laclau and 
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Mouffe’s discourse theory (discussed in Chapter 3) offered a ‘reformulation of the socialist 
project’27 by challenging Marxism’s view that class struggle was the sole dynamic in 
human society. They sought to develop a theory that incorporated the emerging struggles 
and rights claims based on gender, race and sexuality. Chapter 7 of this thesis is intended 
to serve as a reminder that class should not be forgotten amidst identity-based rights 
claims. It is true that the traditional, Marxist understanding of class is no longer sufficient 
to address the particular stratification and consumer orientation of modern society.  
Nevertheless, class remains relevant and needs to be (re)emphasised as a vital factor in a 
critical analysis of rights and citizenship for gay people.  
Intersectionality  
As stated earlier, Queer, feminist and critical race theories have influenced rights discourse 
to become more inclusive and recognise the complexity and the intersectionality of the 
erstwhile “universal human”. The thesis did not specifically examine the interplay between 
sexuality and religion in the lives of working class gay people, or gay people of colour, 
which are important areas for further research. However, the focus of this thesis was a 
critical analysis of rights discourse in the conflict between religion and sexual orientation, 
rather than an exploration of religion and/or sexuality in general. Further, intersectionality 
is now more recognised than class in liberal and Queer discourse, which is why class is 
foregrounded in a specific chapter while intersectionality is referred to more implicitly 
throughout the arguments in the thesis. 
For example, the discussion on discourse theory in Chapter 3 refers to discursive attempts 
to represent a hegemonical unity in society through concepts of ‘nation’ and ‘people’, 
which mask the conflicts and antagonisms that exist beneath the veneer of unity. When 
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antagonism occurs, the so-called “unity” loses its pretence of universality. Chapter 3 also 
makes the point that people can be interpellated in a number of different subject positions 
at once, such as ‘mother’, ‘black woman’, ‘Christian’ and ‘lesbian’. The thesis focuses on 
the subject positions of ‘homosexual’ and ‘Christian’ within this discourse-theoretical 
framework, but it also recognises the events occurring at the intersection of religion and 
sexuality that may prove pivotal in our future understanding of both sexuality and religious 
expression. Chapter 6 highlights the resistances that are taking place within religious 
organisations and communities, with the voices of gay people of faith now beginning to be 
heard.  
A significant aspect of this resistance is to do with clergy’s desire to have and to formalise 
their same-sex relationships. For example, the current Bishop of Grantham is the first 
Bishop to declare that he is in a same-sex (albeit celibate) relationship.
28
 Notably, a senior 
bishop from the Church’s evangelical wing has called for far-reaching change in the 
church’s attitudes to homosexuality and a welcome to Christians in same-sex 
relationships.
29
 Unfortunately, words have not translated into Church action so easily. 
Jeremy Pemberton, a gay clergyman, was prevented from taking up a post as a hospital 
chaplain after marrying his partner. He recently lost an employment tribunal against the 
Church, but has been given the right to appeal.
30
  
These examples of resistance are happening alongside with the Church of England’s 
ongoing conversations regarding human sexuality.
31
 There is an increasing recognition of 
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intersectionality as more LGBT religious people come forward to make their voices heard 
within the Church. As Andrew Yip observes, there is great diversity among different 
Christian denominations; there is a considerable difference between orthodox Christian 
teachings and what actually occurs among Christians; and there is an increasing acceptance 
of people with gay identities within some parts of the Christian faith community.
32
 This 
observation is reflected in one of the points made in Chapter 4 that the assertion of a 
“religious right” to discriminate against gay people only makes sense if one accepts that 
there is a special relationship between religion and sexual orientation that renders it 
compulsory for religious people to be anti-gay.  
Methodology 
For now, laws purporting to offer same-sex equality – but with limitations and religious 
exceptions – offer little more than a ‘promise of a solution’.33  Recognition of this problem 
led to the formation of the research questions guiding this project, and the focus on three 
particular areas within the broader discussion: 
1. How are heteronormativity and theonormativity expressed in UK equality law? 
2. How central is the concept of harm to resolving the conflict between religion and 
sexual orientation? 
3. How might UK law finally realise sexual citizenship for lesbians and gay men? 
 
No methodology is perfect, and discourse theory is no exception. Neither Foucault, nor 
Laclau and Mouffe, ever prescribed a method for undertaking discourse-theoretical 
analysis. It is certainly true that the meta-theoretical character of Foucault’s approach can 
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be difficult to apply methodologically. As Torfing acknowledges, ‘discourse theory… has 
no ambition of furnishing a detailed framework for the study of all kinds of social, cultural 
and political relations’.34 Nevertheless, the thesis has sought to use a Foucaultian approach 
to highlight where and why traditional concepts and norms have floundered in this conflict. 
It has advocated a new perspective using Queer and class concerns to provide an additional 
dimension to the liberal debate over rights. The work has had regard to the guidance from 
Jorgensen and Phillips,
35
 and to Foucault’s ‘five questions’,36 and has asked a series of 
questions to identify the struggles that take place over meaning. In the context of the 
current conflict, the work has illustrated how both “Christian” and “homosexual” are filled 
with meaning as part of the discursive construction of (competing) identities. The thesis 
has charted the struggle between these competing identities to understand how the 
discursive structure is constituted and changed. 
 
Reflections on methodology  
Discourse theory is based on an epistemology that considers all knowledge to be socially 
constructed, so it is important for the researcher to be aware of her own part in the process 
– including the gathering, choice and presentation of data. I am a member of the LGBT 
community and I am also an atheist, having been brought up in a Catholic environment. As 
such, I have a keen interest in (and strong feelings about) the influence of religion on 
equality law, particularly where the expression of religious belief conflicts with the 
expression of sexuality. I have endeavoured to find a place of distance in my research, as 
far as is possible. This has not been an easy task, not least because of my own subject 
position and the complex questions of identity and experience of discrimination that such a 
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position entails. This is another reason why a Foucaultian-informed Queer approach is an 
appropriate methodology for the work, because it recognises these very issues as part of its 
critique of liberal neutrality. 
 
Contribution to knowledge 
This thesis has sought to provide an original contribution to the conflict between sexual 
orientation and the expression of religious belief. Notwithstanding the gains that have been 
made in terms of same-sex equality, it has argued that non-heterosexuals continue to be 
stalked by what has been characterised as the “four horsemen of homophobia”: war, 
famine, pestilence and death.
37
 War - because religious conservatives have often adopted 
such language to describe their experience vis-à-vis extensions to gay equality.
38
 Famine - 
because cutbacks to public spending have impacted on LGBT support services, with faith-
based organisations increasingly filling the gap in provision and having a 
disproportionately negative impact on working-class gay people.
39
 Pestilence - because old 
tropes of homosexual infection and corruption of youth still persist.
40
 Finally, death - 
because conservative religious attempts to curtail sexual citizenship has the effect of 
causing gay people – particularly working-class gay people with fewer consumer choices – 
to be ‘socially dead’.41 The thesis has argued that religious exemptions to equality law, 
coupled with a political environment that is avowedly pro-business while hostile to social 
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welfare spending, have a negative effect on the citizenship of non-heterosexuals. This has a 
number of policy implications. 
Policy implications 
First, section 1 of the Equality Act 2010 – the public sector duty regarding socio-economic 
inequalities should be brought into force. This would place socio-economic disadvantage 
more firmly on the legal and political agenda. Unfortunately, the problems that bedevil the 
Act would remain. For example, the duty involves having ‘due regard’, when making 
strategic decisions, to the desirability of exercising public functions so as to reduce socio-
economic inequality. In practice, without any additional requirements, this duty could 
amount to little more than a box-ticking exercise.
42
 Moreover, the Act relies on people 
bringing claims, and with government cuts affecting access to the justice system
43
 their 
ability to do so is further compromised. Christian conservative organisations, on the other 
hand, are well-organised and well-funded, and are well positioned to bring and defend 
cases.
44
 
Second, the scope of Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights should be 
extended. It should encompass the degrading treatment meted out to lesbians and gay men 
by denying them access to employment and to the provision of goods, services and 
facilities. Article 3 ECHR is an absolute, not a qualified, right and this would communicate 
the important message that religious belief is not valid grounds for restricting same-sex 
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citizenship rights. However, current political trends make it by no means certain that the 
UK (or what remains of it) will stay a signatory to the ECHR.
45
  
Further research 
The result of the Ashers appeal is awaited with interest; further research may be needed 
regarding the implications of the judgment. The appeal of Canon Jeremy Pemberton is also 
anticipated to bring up further issues around exemptions for religious organisations in 
employment, which may also require further research. This could be linked with the 
Church of England’s ongoing conversations regarding human sexuality,46 as part of an 
analysis of the shifts taking place in some religious discourse. Empirical studies into the 
lived experience of working-class religious gay people and working-class gay people of 
colour in the UK are also important areas of research to explore. Finally, the state’s failure 
to legislate regarding the practice of gay ‘cure’ therapy suggests that useful research might 
be carried out into common law solutions which have been beyond the scope of this thesis. 
It is clear that the conflict between religion and sexual orientation is continuing; further 
research will help identify how power relations and discourses continue to shift.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
45
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